Navegar, Inc. v. U.S., Civil No. 95-550 (RCL) (D. D.C. 8/31/1998)
| Decision Date | 31 August 1998 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 95-550 (RCL). |
| Parties | NAVEGAR, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
This matter comes before the court on defendant's and plaintiffs' cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if . . . there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). See also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Upon consideration of the submissions of the parties and the relevant law, plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is denied and defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
On March 3, 1995, federally licensed firearm manufacturers Navegar, Inc. ("Intratec") and Penn Arms, Inc. ("Penn Arms") filed a complaint in this court seeking a declaratory judgment that certain provisions of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.L. No. 103-327, 108 Stat. 1796 ("the Act"), were outside of Congress's enumerated powers, unconstitutional bills of attainder, and vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The facts leading up to plaintiffs' challenges to the Act are fully set forth in Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 914 F. Supp. 632, 633-35 (D.D.C. 1996).
The government filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that plaintiffs' pre-enforcement constitutional challenge to certain provisions of the Act did not constitute a justiciable controversy under Article III as plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a genuine threat of prosecution. Upon consideration of the arguments presented, this court granted the government's motion and dismissed plaintiffs' case. Id. at 637.
Plaintiffs appealed the decision of this court to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The Court of Appeals first considered the justiciability of the plaintiffs' challenges to the sections of the Act specifically mentioning firearms produced by Intratec and Penn Arms by name. By its terms, the Act makes it unlawful for a person to "manufacture, transfer, or possess a semiautomatic assault weapon." 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(1). "Semiautomatic assault weapon" is defined to include "any of the firearms, or copies or duplicates of the firearms in any caliber, known as . . . INTRATECTEC-9, TEC-DC9 and TEC-22, and . . . revolving cylinder shotguns, such as (or similar to) the Street Sweeper and Striker 12." Id. § 921(a)(30)(A). In effect, these portions of the Act make it unlawful to manufacture or transfer Intratec's "TEC-9," "TEC-DC9," and "TEC-22" models, and Penn Arms' "Striker 12" model. Id. §§ 922(v)(1), 921(a)(30)(A)(viii) & (A)(ix). Because of the weapon-specific nature of these sections, the Court of Appeals considered plaintiffs' challenges to these provisions separately from the challenges based on the generally worded provisions of the Act.
The Court of Appeals reversed this court's conclusion dismissing plaintiffs' pre-enforcement challenge to these provisions of the Act for lack of a justiciable controversy. Navegar, 103 F.3d at 999-1001. The Court of Appeals noted that the Act effectively singles out both Intratec and Penn Arms as intended targets by prohibiting the production of weapons that only these companies manufacture. The Court of Appeals commented that "the applicability of the statute to appellants' business [is] indisputable: if these provisions of the statute are enforced at all, they will be enforced against these appellants for continuing to manufacture and sell the specified weapons." Id. at 1000. For this reason, the Court of Appeals determined that the imminent threat of prosecution could be deemed speculative only if it was likely that the government would simply decline to enforce these provisions of the Act — a conclusion that the Court of Appeals was unwilling to reach. As such, plaintiffs demonstrated an imminent threat of prosecution under this portion of the Act and the controversy was ripe for adjudication. Thus, the Court of Appeals was satisfied that the controversy was justiciable.
A contrary conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeals with respect to plaintiffs' pre-enforcement challenges to those portions of the Act identifying prohibited materials by general characteristics only. Plaintiffs sought to challenge the constitutionality of other portions of the Act referring to weapons and accessories sharing certain features, rather than to particular brands and models of weapons. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that the Act exceeded the powers of Congress enumerated in the Constitution and that the Act was too vague to comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The enumerated powers claim presented by plaintiffs challenged the portion of the Act outlawing "large capacity ammunition feeding devices," defined as ammunition magazines "that ha[ve] a capacity of . . . more than 10 rounds of ammunition." 18 U.S.C. § 922(w)(1) and 921(a)(31). Plaintiffs' vagueness claims were centered on the portions of the Act that prohibited firearms "known as . . . revolving cylinder shotguns," 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(A)(ix), and semiautomatic pistols that have two out of five listed characteristics. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(30)(C).
The Court of Appeals agreed with this court's conclusion that plaintiffs were unable to show an imminent threat of prosecution under the portions of the Act describing the outlawed items in general categorical terms and thus, the challenges to these portions of the Act were determined to be non-justiciable at that time. Navegar, 103 F.3d at 1001-02.
Upon remand to this court, plaintiffs sought leave to amend their complaint in an effort to demonstrate their challenges to the generic portions of the Act were justiciable in light of the Court of Appeals' prior decision in this case. After considering plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, this court concluded that the information contained in plaintiffs' Proposed Second Amended Complaint failed to establish that plaintiffs would have standing to assert a pre-enforcement challenge to the constitutionality of the generic portions of the Act. This court further held that plaintiffs failed to make any showing that they faced a greater or more imminent threat of prosecution than did other manufacturers of the products covered by the terms of the Act.
Because this court denied plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint, plaintiffs' pre-enforcement constitutional challenge to the generic provisions of the Act identifying prohibited materials by characteristics only remained dismissed. Plaintiffs and the government have since filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the remaining constitutional challenges to the weapon-specific portions of the Act.
The Gun Control Act of 1968, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 921-30 ("GCA"), imposes a comprehensive regulatory scheme on the manufacture and distribution of firearms. On September 13, 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which amends § 922 of Title 18, United States Code, and makes it unlawful to "manufacture, transfer, and possess a semiautomatic assault weapon." 18 U.S.C. § 922(v)(1). The Act is to be in effect for a period of ten years from the date of its enactment in 1994 and effectively maintains the number of legal assault weapons in private hands at the 1994 level.
The term "semiautomatic assault weapon" is defined as any of the firearms known by nine categories of specified brand names or model numbers,1 including "any of the firearms, or copies or duplicates of the firearms in any caliber, known as . . . INTRATEC TEC-9, TEC-DC9 and TEC-22; and revolving cylinder shotguns, such as (or similar to) the Street Sweeper and Striker 12." Id. § 922(a)(30)(A). Another section of the Act defines prohibited firearms by generic features, including semiautomatic rifles that have "an ability to accept a detachable magazine" and have at least two of five other specified characteristics. Id. § 921(a)(30)(C).
In § 922(w)(1) of the Act, the transfer or possession of any "large capacity ammunition feeding device" is outlawed for a period of ten years. Section 921(a)(31)(A) defines such devices to include ammunition magazines manufactured after the date of the enactment of the Act, which can hold more than ten rounds of ammunition.2 Id. §§ 922(w)(1), 921(a)(31).
The Act contains various exceptions to the general prohibitions. The Act provides exemptions for the transfer of the proscribed assault weapons to government agencies and law enforcement officers, Id. § 922(v)(4) & (w)(3), and for export of the weapons under certain conditions. The Act also contains a "grandfather" provision that permits the possession or transfer of semiautomatic weapons and large capacity ammunition feeding devices that were lawfully possessed on the date of enactment of the Act. Id. § 922(v)(2) & 922(w)(2). Persons convicted of knowingly violating these provisions are subject to fines and prison sentences of up to five years. Id. § 924(a)(1).
Because plaintiffs contend that neither the Act's language nor its legislative history offers a clear explanation of its nexus between the banning of assault weapons and interstate commerce, plaintiffs submit that the Act exceeds Congress's enumerated powers as set forth in Article I of the Constitution. Plaintiffs also assert that the...
To continue reading
Request your trial