Navegar Incorp. v. USA.

• Decision Date: 08 October 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-5491,98-5491
• Citation: 192 F.3d 1050
• Parties: (D.C. Cir. 1999) Navegar, Incorporated, d/b/a Intratec, and Penn Arms, Incorporated, Appellants v. United States of America, Appellee
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

Page 1050

192 F.3d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1999)

Navegar, Incorporated, d/b/a Intratec, and Penn Arms, Incorporated, Appellants v. United States of America, Appellee

No. 98-5491

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued September 10, 1999

Decided October 8, 1999

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia(No. 95cv00550)

Richard E. Gardiner argued the cause and was on the briefs for appellants.

Mark B. Stern, Attorney, United States Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief were David W. Ogden, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Michael S. Raab, Attorney and Wilma A. Lewis, United States Attorney.

Before: Wald, Silberman and Tatel, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Wald.

Wald, Circuit Judge:

Navegar, Inc., doing business as Intratec ("Intratec"), and Penn Arms, Inc. ("Penn Arms") (together "appellants"), are licensed by the United States Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("BATF") to manufacture firearms. Intratec and Penn Arms brought a declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C. 2201 in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to challenge the constitutionality of section 110102 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996-98 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(30), 922(v) (1994)). Section 110102(a) makes it unlawful to "manufacture, transfer or possess a semiautomatic assault weapon." See 108 Stat. at 1996-97 (codified at 18 U.S.C. 922(v)(1)). Section 110102(b) specifically identifies the precise weapons Intratec and Penn Arms manufacture as semiautomatic assault weapons. See 108 Stat. at 1997-98 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(30)(A)(viii), (ix)). Appellants sought a declaration that these provisions exceed Congress' Commerce Clause power, and are unconstitutional Bills of Attainder.

Both the appellants and the government filed cross-motions for summary judgment on both of the constitutional challenges to the Act. See Memorandum Order and Opinion, Joint Appendix ("J.A.") at 43. The district court issued a Memorandum Order and Opinion granting the government's motion, rejecting appellants' motion and dismissing the case. We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on both of appellants' challenges.

I. Background

A. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of1994

In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 ("the Act"). Subtitle A of Title XI of the Act, which regulates assault weapons, is entitled the "Public Safety and Recreational Firearms Use Act." See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 110101, 108 Stat. 1796, 1996. Section 110102(a) of the Act makes it "unlawful for a person to manufacture, transfer, or possess a semiautomatic assault weapon." See 18 U.S.C. 922(v)(1). Section 110102(b) defines "semiautomatic assault weapon" to include "any of the firearms, or copies or duplicates of the firearms" enumerated in nine categories of guns identifying 15 weapons by name. See 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(30)(A). Two of the categories of guns specified by the statute are "INTRATEC TEC-9, TEC-DC9, and TEC-22; and ... revolving cylinder shotguns, such as (or similar to) the Street Sweeper and Striker 12." 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(30)(A)(viii), (ix). The definition of "semiautomatic assault weapon" in section 110102(b) also includes semiautomatic rifles and semiautomatic pistols that have the ability to accept a detachable magazine and any two of five enumerated accessories, and semiautomatic shotguns that have any two of four enumerated features. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(30)(B)(D).

Section 110102(a) of the Act contains a "grandfather" clause which exempts from the Act semiautomatic assault weapons lawfully possessed on the date of enactment. See 18 U.S.C. 922(v)(2). The Act does not apply to certain enumerated firearms as well as firearms, replicas or duplicates of firearms specified in an appendix. See id. 922(v)(3); id. App. A. Persons convicted of knowingly violating the Act are subject to a fine and imprisonment of up to five years. See id. 924(a)(1).

B. Factual Background

Appellants are the sole manufacturers of firearms identified by name in the Act as "semiautomatic assault weapons."See 42 U.S.C. 921(a)(30)(A)(viii), (ix). Intratec is the sole manufacturer of the TEC-DC9¹ and TEC-22 semiautomatic pistols. Penn Arms is the sole manufacturer of the Striker 12, 12S, 12E and 12SE, 12-gauge revolving cylinder shotguns. See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 914 F. Supp. 632, 633 (D.D.C. 1996). On September 13, 1994, the Act became law and agents from the BATF visited appellants' facilities to inform appellants' officers of the prohibitions of the Act and give notice that they planned to conduct inventories of the weapons that would be grand fathered. See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Over the next two days, the BATF conducted these inventories. See id.

On September 26, 1994, the BATF sent letters to all federally licensed firearm manufacturers, including Intratec and Penn Arms, giving notice of the "grandfather" provision, and that the BATF would permit seven additional days of weapon manufacturing before it would take a final inventory identifying all grand fathered weapons. See Navegar, 914 F. Supp. at 633. When the additional seven-day window for grand fathering weapons closed, Intratec held in its inventory over 40,000 TEC-DC9 and TEC-22 frames and thousands of dollars of gun parts which it could no longer assemble. Penn Arms was unable to take advantage of the seven-day window and was left with an inventory of $58,000 worth of gun parts for the Striker 12 series of shotguns. See id. at 634-35.

C. Procedural Background

In March, 1995, Intratec and Penn Arms filed a declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Act. See First Amended Compl., J.A. at 9. Appellants alleged that neither 922(v)(1) nor 922(w)(1), which prohibits the transfer or possession of a large capacity feeding device, fell within the powers delegated to Congress under Article I because there were no legislative findings nor anything in the language of the Act which indicated any nexus with Congress' delegated powers. See id., J.A. at 15. In addition, appellants asserted that 922(v)(1) together with 922(a)(30)(A)(viii), (ix), singled out the TEC-DC9, TEC-22 and Striker 12 for prohibition in order to punish them for manufacturing their products and thus were unconstitutional Bills of Attainder. See id., J.A. at 15-16, 20-22. Further, they alleged that provisions using general terms to include certain types of semiautomatic rifles, pistols and shotguns, 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(30)(B)-(D), in the definition of "semiautomatic assault weapon" were void for vagueness under the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See id., J.A. at 17-20.

The government filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that appellants did not have standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to the provisions of the Act since they did not demonstrate a genuine threat of prosecution. On February 1, 1996, the district court issued a Memorandum Order and Opinion granting the government's motion and dismissing appellants' case. See Navegar, 914 F. Supp. at 632. Appellants appealed the district court's decision on standing to this court. See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This court held that since the provisions prohibiting the weapons that Intratec and Penn Arms alone manufactured effectively single them out as intended targets, these provisions presented an imminent threat of prosecution sufficient to bring a pre-enforcement challenge. See id. at 1001. However, this court also held that appellants had failed to show an imminent threat of prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 921(a)(30)(B)-(D) and 922(w), which outlawed items using general terms, because nothing indicated a special priority of enforcement against appellants and the general nature of the language made it impossible to predict whether these provisions would be applied to them. See id. at 1002. Therefore, this Court reversed the part of the order of the district court relating to the enumerated powers claims challenge to 922(v)(1) and the Bill of Attainder challenge to 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(30)(A)(viii), (ix) in conjunction with 922(v)(1) and affirmed the decision to dismiss the void for vagueness claims and the enumerated powers challenge to 922(w)(1). See id.

On remand to the district court, appellants sought leave to amend their complaint to demonstrate that their challenges to the general provisions of the Act were justiciable in light of this court's prior decision. See Memorandum Order and Opinion, J.A. at 43. On December 1, 1997, the district court issued an opinion denying appellants' motion to amend their complaint. See Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 986 F. Supp. 650 (1997). The district court held that the motion to amend was futile because the proposed amended complaint failed to establish standing to bring a pre-enforcement challenge to the provisions of the Act prohibiting general categories of weapons. See id. at 653. Appellants did not appeal that order.

The appellants and the government subsequently filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the enumerated powers challenge to 922(v)(1) and the Bill of Attainder challenge to 922(v)(1) in conjunction with 921(a)(30)(A)(viii), (ix). The district court held that Congress did not exceed its authority in enacting 922(v)(1) of the Act and that 922(v)(1) together with 921(a)(30)(viii), (ix) does not constitute a Bill of Attainder with respect to Intratec and Penn Arms. See Memorandum Order and Opinion, J.A. at 89. On the basis of congressional testimony discussing ...