Naylor v. Ahlin

• Decision Date: 01 November 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2:10-cv-00039-JKS,2:10-cv-00039-JKS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: TROY MITCHELL NAYLOR, Petitioner, v. PAM AHLIN, Director, Coalinga State Hospital, Respondent.

TROY MITCHELL NAYLOR, Petitioner,

v.PAM AHLIN, Director, Coalinga State Hospital, Respondent.

No. 2:10-cv-00039-JKS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: November 1, 2011.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Troy Mitchell Naylor, a state civil committee appearing pro se, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Naylor is currently in the custody of the California Department of Mental Health, incarcerated at the Coalinga State Hospital as a Sexually Violent Predator ("SVP").¹ Respondent has answered, and Naylor has replied.

I. BACKGROUND/PRIOR PROCEEDINGS

In 1992, the Yuba County Superior Court sentenced Naylor to a ten year prison term for lewd acts and sodomy with children under California Penal Code §§ 286 and 288. As he was eligible for parole in March 1997, the Department of Corrections placed a temporary hold on Naylor to evaluate whether he was a SVP within the Sexually Violent Predator Act ("SVPA").² In August 1997 the superior court sustained the People's SVPA petition to commit Naylor civillyto a secure facility for a two-year term. Thereafter, Naylor was periodically committed to successive two-year terms. Naylor does not challenge his initial conviction and sentence or his periodic commitments for two-year terms through 2005. In October 2007 a jury found Naylor a SVP and the Yuba County Superior Court committed him to the Department of Mental Health for an indeterminate term. Naylor appealed that decision to the California Court of Appeal, Third District, which affirmed Naylor's commitment in an unpublished, reasoned decision,³ and the California Supreme Court denied review on October 28, 2009. Naylor timely filed his Petition for relief in this Court on December 29, 2009. Subsequently, on January 28, 2010, the California Supreme Court handed down its decision in People v. McKee,⁴ in which it addressed some of the issues presented in this case.

Because they are well known to the parties and unnecessary for a determination of the issues raised in Naylor's Petition, as did the California Court of Appeal, this Court does not set forth the factual basis for the jury's finding that Naylor is a SVP.

II. GROUNDS RAISED/DEFENSES

At issue in this case is California Proposition 83, passed by the voters in November 2006, modifying the terms by which SVP's may be released from civil commitment under the SVPA. In essence, Proposition 83 changed the commitment from a two-year term, renewable only if the People proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the individual still met the definition of an SVP, to an indefinite commitment from which the individual may be released if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is no longer an SVP.

In his Petition, Naylor challenges the 2006 amendments to the SVPA on five grounds:⁵ (1) the SVPA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) by failing to provide for mandatory periodic hearings on continued commitment, the SVPA violates the Due Process Clause; (3) as revised, the statute improperly shifts the burden of proof to the SVP to prove he or she should be released; (4) commitment to an indefinite term deprives SVP's of the equal protection of the law; and (5) the limitations placed upon rights of SVP's to petition the court for release violates the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. Respondent does not raise any affirmative defense to these grounds.⁶

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), this Court cannot grant relief unless the decision of the state court was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" at the time the state court renders its decision or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State courtproceeding."⁷ The Supreme Court has explained that "clearly established Federal law" in § 2254(d)(1) "refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court] as of the time of the relevant state-court decision."⁸ The holding must also be intended to be binding upon the states; that is, the decision must be based upon constitutional grounds, not on the supervisory power of the Supreme Court over federal courts.⁹ Thus, where holdings of the Supreme Court regarding the issue presented on habeas review are lacking, "it cannot be said that the state court 'unreasonabl[y] appli[ed] clearly established Federal law.'"¹⁰ When a claim falls under the "unreasonable application" prong, a state court's application of Supreme Court precedent must be "objectively unreasonable," not just "incorrect or erroneous."¹¹ The Supreme Court has made clear that the objectively unreasonable standard is "a substantially higher threshold" than simply believing that the state-court determination was incorrect.¹² "[A]bsent a specific constitutional violation, federal habeas corpus review of trial error is limited to whether the error 'so infectedthe trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.'"¹³ In a federal habeas proceeding, the standard under which this Court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state court criminal trial is whether the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the outcome.¹⁴ Because state court judgments of conviction and sentence carry a presumption of finality and legality, the petitioner has the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she merits habeas relief.¹⁵

The Supreme Court recently underscored the magnitude of the deference required:

As amended by AEDPA, § 2254(d) stops short of imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims already rejected in state proceedings. Cf. Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827 (1996) (discussing AEDPA's "modified res judicata rule" under § 2244). It preserves authority to issue the writ in cases where there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court's decision conflicts with this Court's precedents. It goes no farther. Section 2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a "guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems," not a substitute for ordinary error correction through appeal. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 332, n.5, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.¹⁶

In applying this standard, this Court reviews the last reasoned decision by the state court.¹⁷ State appellate court decisions that summarily affirm a lower court's opinion without explanation are presumed to have adopted the reasoning of the lower court.¹⁸ This Court gives the presumed decision of the state court the same AEDPA deference that it would give a reasoned decision of the state court.¹⁹

IV. DISCUSSION

Ground 1: Ex Post Facto Claim

Naylor argues that because the acts for which he has been committed occurred prior to the amendment to the California Welfare and Institutions Code that changed the period of commitment from a definite period of two years to an indefinite period, application to him violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution. This Court disagrees.

In upholding a law similar to California's SVPA, the Supreme Court held that "[a]n Act, found to be civil, cannot be deemed punitive 'as applied' to a single individual in violation of theDouble Jeopardy and Ex Post Facto Clauses and provide cause for release."²⁰ Similarly, the California Supreme Court has stressed the civil nature of a SVP commitment and rejected challenges to California's SVPA based on the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution.²¹ Thus, Naylor's ex post facto claim is foreclosed, and he is not entitled to relief under his first ground.

Ground 2: Lack of Mandatory Periodic Hearings

Naylor argues that, because he may be confined as an SVP only for so long as he meets the definition of an SVP, the failure to provide for mandatory periodic hearings creates a risk that he will be held beyond the time when he no longer qualifies as an SVP. The California Court of Appeal rejected Naylor's argument, holding:

[Naylor] contends that indeterminate commitment, as provided by the revisions to the SVPA, violates due process because it fails to provide for mandatory periodic hearings on whether continued commitment is warranted, thereby "creat [ing] an unacceptable risk that an SVP detainee who no longer qualifies as a sexually violent predator will have his commitment continued in violation of his right to due process." We disagree.

[Naylor] again neglects to consider that, pursuant to section 6605, subdivision (a), he is entitled to an annual review of his present dangerousness by a qualified expert. If dissatisfied with the review, he may request appointment of another mental health professional or he may file a petition under section 6608, thereby obtaining judicial review of his circumstances. To the extent [Naylor's] contention implies that the annual report would necessarily be biased in favor of the government, he offers no basis for such speculation. It simply defies both common sense and the presumption that an official duty will be regularly performed to conclude that the DMH has any desire to detain any person whom it believes is no longer dangerous

merely to avoid placing the government in a position where it, instead of [Naylor], will bear the burden of proof.²²

This Court also notes that in its subsequent decision in ...