Naylor v. LEE'S SUMMIT REORGANIZED SCHOOL D. R-7

• Decision Date: 11 January 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-0767-CV-W-8.,88-0767-CV-W-8.
• Parties: Jennifer T. NAYLOR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LEE'S SUMMIT REORGANIZED SCHOOL DISTRICT R-7, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri

703 F. Supp. 803

Jennifer T. NAYLOR, et al., Plaintiffs, v. LEE'S SUMMIT REORGANIZED SCHOOL DISTRICT R-7, et al., Defendants.

No. 88-0767-CV-W-8.

United States District Court, W.D. Missouri, W.D.

January 11, 1989.

Arthur A. Benson, II, Benson & McKay, Kansas City, Mo., James S. Liebman, Columbia University School of Law, New York City, Theodore M. Shaw, Los Angeles, Cal., Julius Chambers, James M. Nabrit, II, New York City, for plaintiffs.

George Feldmiller, Kirk May, Stinson, Mag & Fizzell, Kansas City, Mo., for defendants Lee's Summit and N. Kansas City school districts.

Norman Humphrey, Jr., Independence, Mo., for defendant Independence school dist.

John W. Simon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, Mo., for defendant State of Mo., Ashcroft, Bailey, Bartman and members of Bd.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

STEVENS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit on August 9, 1988 alleging that the defendant school districts refused them admission as nonresident students in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction of the enforcement of defendant school district's admission requirements for black nonresident students, as well as monetary damages for the violation of each plaintiff's constitutional rights. Several motions are currently before the court: motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment filed by each of the defendant suburban school districts (SSDs); the motion of the state defendants for summary judgment and the plaintiffs' alternative motion for partial summary judgment against the state defendants; and the joint motion of the defendant school districts for sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 11.¹ The court will address these motions in three groups: school districts' dispositive motions, state's motion and plaintiffs' cross motion, and motion for sanctions.

I. Facts

Plaintiffs in this suit, each of whom is black and resides within the boundaries of the Kansas City, Missouri school district (KCMSD), attempted to enroll in either the Lee's Summit Reorganized School District (LSRSD), the North Kansas City, Missouri School District (NKCSD) or the Independence School District (ISD) but were refused admission because they were not residents of the school district and did not fall within any of the district's guidelines for the admission of nonresident students. On January 6, 1989 the court certified this case as a class action² with three subclasses, one for students applying to each of the defendant SSDs. As will be discussed in greater detail later in this opinion, each of the school districts gave somewhat different reasons for refusing to enroll plaintiffs although each of the districts justified its decision, at least in part, on the fact that plaintiffs were not residents of the district to which they applied nor did they fall within any of the exceptions allowing for the admission of nonresident students.

Each of the students here involved attempted to enroll in one of the defendant suburban school districts because of Judge Russell G. Clark's decision in Jenkins v. State of Missouri, 639 F.Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo.1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom., Kansas City, Missouri School District v. Missouri, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 70, 98 L.Ed.2d 34 (1987). In that order Judge Clark directed that "the State of Missouri shall actively seek the cooperation of each school district in the Kansas City, Missouri metropolitan area in a voluntary interdistrict transfer program." Id. at 38. Plaintiffs allege that defendants had a duty, under Judge Clark's order, to develop nondiscriminatory voluntary interdistrict transfer programs (VITs) and that the school districts' refusals to admit the plaintiffs as nonresident students were based on race and, therefore, constituted a violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights.

The plaintiffs began preparations to enroll in the SSDs in May 1988. At that time plaintiffs' attorney wrote a letter to George Feldmiller, one of defendants' attorneys, stating that the plaintiffs and KCMSD district had developed a proposal for a VIT program under which plaintiffs would present themselves for admission at one of the defendant SSDs. Appendix to Plaintiffs' Memorandum, Exhibit 11 (hereinafter "Appendix"). The defendant SSDs responded that they were working with the state on proposals of their own and warned that any overstepping or threats of litigation by the plaintiffs would slow the process. Correspondence was exchanged throughout the summer months between the respective counsel for plaintiffs, the SSDs and the state. None of the SSDs had a plan in effect by late summer of 1988 and, consequently, each of the plaintiffs attempted to enroll in one of the defendant districts pursuant to the plan proposed by counsel for plaintiffs in May. Their applications were rejected and this litigation followed.

In order to understand the issues raised by this lawsuit it is necessary briefly to review the previous Kansas City, Missouri desegregation litigation, especially the court's orders in Jenkins. All of the defendants, as well as other SSDs, were originally named as defendants in Jenkins but on June 5, 1984 Judge Clark dismissed the suburban school district defendants from Jenkins because they were not constitutional violators under the standards announced by the Supreme Court in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974). See Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420 (W.D.Mo. June 5, 1984) (unpublished opinion). As a result of this finding, Judge Clark concluded that the suburban districts could not be required to participate in an interdistrict remedy to desegregate the Kansas City, Missouri School District. Id. at 103-04. Judge Clark later ordered, however, that the state of Missouri, as a constitutional violator, had a duty to seek the cooperation of the suburban school districts in a voluntary interdistrict transfer program and to pay all transportation and tuition costs of any black KCMSD student wishing to transfer to a suburban school district where their race was in the minority. Jenkins, 639 F.Supp. at 38. Judge Clark noted that "if any of the suburban districts volunteer to participate in inter-district transfers, the program shall begin with the 1986/87 school year."³ Id. at 39.

While Judge Clark's order encouraged the development of VIT programs, he clearly stated that the participating districts would not have unlimited discretion over how the programs operated, noting that

the receiving district will agree not to reject individual applicants unless there is a history of serious disciplinary problems, will allow the transfer student to remain in attendance until such student graduates or returns to the student's home district, as long as that student satisfies all academic and other standards applicable to all resident students, will treat interdistrict transfer students in the same manner, in all regards, as they treat resident students, and will permit KCMSD to recruit applicants for interdistrict transfers within its district.

Id. at 39.⁴

The Eighth Circuit affirmed Judge Clark's dismissal of the suburban school districts, holding that the district court did not err in finding that the SSDs were not constitutional violators and, therefore, that a mandatory interdistrict remedy was not permissible under Milliken. Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 664 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied sub nom., Kansas City, Missouri School District v. Missouri, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 70, 98 L.Ed.2d 34 (1987). The court noted in a footnote, however, that although the district court did not have the power to mandate a voluntary interdistrict transfer program, the refusal of a district to participate in such a program could be evidence of a constitutional violation. Specifically, the court stated that "whether a refusal of a district to participate in such a voluntary program may evidence discriminatory intent and thus be an independent basis for further relief and mandatory participation is an issue that we should not anticipate." Id. at 683, n. 30.⁵ Judge Ross wrote a separate concurring opinion "to emphasize to the parties in this case the importance of the admonition in footnote 30." Judge Ross emphasized that "the failure to organize and implement this program would be a very significant factor in determining discriminatory intent in the future litigation which is certain to result from the further processing of this case." Id. at 687 (Ross, J., concurring).⁶

Plaintiffs contend that footnote 30, coupled with Judge Ross' separate concurrence, establishes that the suburban school districts could be found liable for a constitutional violation, separate and distinct from that litigated in Jenkins, if the SSDs unlawfully discriminated against plaintiffs by refusing to participate in plaintiffs' proposed voluntary interdistrict transfer plan. Specifically, plaintiffs allege that the reasons advanced by the SSDs for refusing to admit the plaintiffs as nonresident students were merely pretextual and that the true reason that the defendant SSDs did not admit plaintiffs was that they did not want black KCMSD students in their schools. Defendants refute this contention, arguing that plaintiffs' claims are precluded by the Eighth Circuit's decision affirming Judge Clark's dismissal of the SSDs in the Jenkins litigation. In addition, defendants argue that plaintiffs were refused admission to the SSDs not because they were black KCMSD students but because they did not meet the requirements for admission of nonresident students as established by the separately stated written policies of each of the defendant suburban school districts.

A. Lee's Summit Nonresident Policy

The most current Lee's Summit Reorganized School District policy regarding...