Naylor v. Township of Hellam

• Decision Date: 20 June 2001
• Citation: 773 A.2d 770,565 Pa. 397
• Parties: Irvin S. NAYLOR, Harry H. Fox, Jr., and Valley Acres, Inc., Appellants v. The TOWNSHIP OF HELLAM and the Board of Supervisors of the Township of Hellam, Appellees.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

773 A.2d 770

565 Pa. 397

Irvin S. NAYLOR, Harry H. Fox, Jr., and Valley Acres, Inc., Appellants v. The TOWNSHIP OF HELLAM and the Board of Supervisors of the Township of Hellam, Appellees.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 1, 2000.

Decided June 20, 2001.

Albert G. Blakey, Bradley J. Leber, Blakey Yost Bupp & Schumann, York, for appellants, Irvin S. Naylor et al.

David Keiter, Seidensticker, Kreiter & Baughman, York, for appellees, Tp. of Hellam et al.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN and SAYLOR, JJ.

OPINION

ZAPPALA, Justice.

This appeal presents the issue of whether a municipality may enact a temporary moratorium on certain types of subdivision and land development while the municipality revises its zoning and subdivision land development ordinances. We hold that the Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as reenacted and amended, 53 P.S. §§ 10101-11202, does not grant a municipality such power and therefore reverse the order of the Commonwealth Court, which held to the contrary.

The undisputed facts establish that Appellants, Irvin S. Naylor, Harry H. Fox, Jr., and Valley Acres, Inc., each own or have an interest in tracts of undeveloped land in Hellam Township, York County. On July 20, 1995, the Hellam Township Board of Supervisors (Board) enacted Ordinance No. 1995-10, which imposed a moratorium on new residential subdivision and land development for a period of one year. Hellam Township Ordinance No. 1995-10, §§ 2 and 5. Commercial and industrial development were also prohibited, but only to the extent that such development was not serviceable by the existing public sewer system. Id. at § 3. Subdivisions already in progress prior to the enactment of the moratorium that did not require additional lots, as well as land development plans that did not require further subdivision or an on-lot disposal system, were excepted from the moratorium. Id. at § 4. The express purpose of the ordinance was to suspend certain subdivision and land development approvals while the Township completed the process of revising its comprehensive plan, so as to prevent development that is inconsistent with the proposed revisions. Id. at § 1. The moratorium expired by its own terms on July 25, 1996, but was extended by ordinance for an additional two month period on August 1, 1996. Hellam Township Ordinance No. 1996-5.

On June 10, 1996, the Board first advertised its revised subdivision and land development ordinance. A public hearing was held on June 27, 1996, and the ordinance became effective on September 5, 1996. On August 22 and 23, 1996, approximately two weeks before the new plan was effective, Appellants submitted their preliminary subdivision and development plans to the Hellam Township Zoning Officer. The zoning officer rejected the plans on the grounds that they appeared to have been submitted under the ordinances being revised rather than the pending ordinances and that they failed to comply with the pending ordinances. The zoning officer further indicated that the plans would have been denied even if compliant with the pending ordinances due to the moratorium in effect at the time of application.

Appellants subsequently filed the instant action, seeking a declaratory judgment that the moratorium was invalid or was not in effect at the time their preliminary plans were submitted. Appellants further requested the court to order the Board to accept and review their respective preliminary plans under the ordinances in effect at the time of their submission. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Appellants asserted that neither the MPC nor the Second Class Township Code, Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, as reenacted and amended, 53 P.S. §§ 65101-68701, authorized the enactment of a moratorium ordinance, and therefore the ordinance was invalid as a matter of law. The Township maintained that the moratorium was valid and that it had properly reviewed and rejected Appellants' plans under the pending, revised ordinances.

The common pleas court granted summary judgment in favor of the Township. It acknowledged that the MPC does not expressly grant municipalities the authority to prohibit subdivision or development either temporarily or permanently. It held, however, that the power is incidental as essential and necessary for the effectuation of a municipality's power to regulate land use under the MPC. Although not challenged by the parties, the court went on to examine the scope and duration of the moratorium and found them to be reasonable, and enacted without discriminatory intent.¹

The Commonwealth Court affirmed. Naylor v. Township of Hellam, 717 A.2d 629 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998). Construing the purpose and provisions of the MPC liberally, the court held that "the power to impose moratoria may be a power which is necessarily or fairly implied or incidental to those powers expressly granted [by the MPC]." Id. at 632. It found that it was in the public interest to maintain the status quo in land development by ensuring that proposed development conforms to rather than defeats the revised plans and regulations. Otherwise, the court concluded, the municipality's ability to effectuate the express purposes of the MPC, such as coordinated growth and development consistent with the comprehensive plan, would be hindered. Id. at 633.

Summary judgment may be entered only in those cases where the record clearly demonstrates that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dean v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, 561 Pa. 503, 751 A.2d 1130 (2000). As the parties concede that no issues of material fact remain, we must determine whether the lower courts erred as a matter of law in concluding that a municipality has the power to enact a moratorium on land development while it revises its comprehensive zoning plan. As with all issues of law, our review is plenary. Phillips v. A-Best Products Co., 542 Pa. 124, 665 A.2d 1167 (1995).

Initially, we note that it is fundamental that municipalities are creatures of the state and that the authority of the Legislature over their powers is supreme. Denbow v. Borough of Leetsdale, 556 Pa. 567, 729 A.2d 1113, 1118 (1999); Shirk v. Lancaster City, 313 Pa. 158, 169 A. 557 (1933). Municipal corporations have no inherent powers and may do only those things that the Legislature has expressly or by necessary implication placed within their power to do. Id.; In re Gagliardi, 401 Pa. 141, 163 A.2d 418 (1960)

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The parties agree that neither the MPC nor the SCTC expressly grants a municipality the power to impose a moratorium on subdivision approvals. Our inquiry therefore becomes whether such power is implicitly granted or is incidental to those powers expressly conferred.

We begin our analysis by examining the relevant provisions of the MPC.³ In doing so, we recognize that zoning enabling legislation, as opposed to zoning ordinances themselves, must be liberally construed in order to effect its purposes. Township of Middletown v. Abel, 7 Pa. Cmwlth. 6, 297 A.2d 525, 528 (1972); Exton Quarries, Inc. v. Zoning Board of Adjustment, 425 Pa. 43, 228 A.2d 169, 174 (1967); see also 1 Pa.C.S. § 1928(c). Moreover, it must be presumed that the legislature intended to favor the public interest as against any private interest. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(5).

Section 105 of the MPC sets forth the broad purpose of the Act, which is to protect and promote citizen safety, health and morals, accomplish coordinated development, promote energy conservation, provide for the general welfare by guiding and protecting development and growth and permit municipalities to minimize such problems as may presently exist or which may be foreseen. 53 P.S. § 10105. To carry out some of these objectives, the statute expressly grants municipalities the authority to create and adopt a comprehensive development plan, id. at. §§ 10301 and 10302, and to regulate development by enacting subdivision and land development ordinances. Id. at §§ 10501 and 10601. The MPC provides that such ordinances may include, among other things, provisions for insuring that the layout of the subdivision and land development conforms to the comprehensive plan, id. at § 10503(2)(i), and provisions for encouraging and promoting flexibility, economy and ingenuity in the layout and design of subdivisions. Id. at § 10503(5). The MPC further states that zoning ordinances may permit, prohibit and regulate uses of land, areas and dimensions of land as well as the density of population and intensity of use. Id. at §§ 10603(b)(1), (3) and (4). A catch-all provision states that zoning ordinances may contain "such other provisions as may be necessary to implement the purposes of [the MPC]." Id. at § 10603(c)(4).

As noted, the Commonwealth Court found that the power to enact a temporary moratorium while the Township revises its comprehensive plan is incidental to these expressly granted powers. We disagree. The practical effect of the enactment of the moratorium was to suspend the existing zoning ordinances applicable to subdivision approval until the revised ordinances became effective. Even construing the provisions of the MPC liberally, we find that the power to enact a zoning ordinance, for whatever purpose, does not necessarily include the power to suspend a valid zoning ordinance to the prejudice of a land owner. Compare 53 P.S. § 10609.2 (express grant of authority for municipality to invalidate zoning ordinance for period not to exceed 180 days while it enacts curative amendment). More significantly, the power to suspend land development has historically been viewed in this Commonwealth as a power distinct from and not incidental to any power to regulate land development. Accordingly, as the MPC is silent regarding land planning through the temporary suspension of development, we decline to...