Nazworth v. State

Decision Date29 November 1977
Docket NumberNo. EE-286,EE-286
Citation352 So.2d 916
PartiesDaniel Anderson NAZWORTH, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Michael J. Minerva, Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and A. S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

RAWLS, Judge.

Nazworth was charged with killing a 3-year old child by beating her with his hands, feet and a belt. He now appeals his conviction of second degree murder.

Nazworth; his 16-year old half-brother, John Stinson O'Neal; the mother of the deceased child; and the deceased child lived together in an apartment. At approximately 6:30 on the night the child died, O'Neal drove the mother to her place of work where she was employed as a topless go-go dancer. O'Neal returned to the apartment. During the material time period, 1 only O'Neal and Nazworth were with the child. At approximately 11:00 p. m., O'Neal and Nazworth carried the child to a hospital. She was examined by a physician who testified that the child was dead on arrival and that she suffered from "battered child syndrome".

Of critical importance is the introduction of certain testimony, over the vigorous objection of defense counsel, given by John Stinson O'Neal at a bond hearing for Nazworth. The trial court, in the absence of the jury, found that the state had exercised due diligence to locate O'Neal but had been unsuccessful in this endeavor. In summarizing to the trial court the testimony O'Neal gave at Nazworth's bond hearing, the state candidly admitted that "without his testimony, of course, the Court would be forced to direct a verdict." Counsel for the state further noted that O'Neal was declared a court witness at the bond hearing. Counsel then stated that the proffered testimony would reflect that on the night of the offense and the material period at time, only O'Neal and Nazworth were with the child; that O'Neal testified he did not strike the child, so the inference is that Nazworth did. A written statement given by O'Neal was then alluded to which the state advised the court that it did not seek to introduce. In referring to the bond hearing, counsel noted:

". . . the court went through the statement line by line and said what is true and what is not true and what are you denying and the court did not infringe, but he clarified certain statements. . . .

"Therefore, the court did not unduly commit itself one way or another as to whether or not the man was talling (sic) the truty (sic). . . ."

The state then proffered the entire transcript of the bond proceedings with a request that the portions of the actual statement put into evidence be deleted.

At this point, defense counsel vigorously objected to the admission of O'Neal's testimony given at the bond hearing, primarily, upon the ground that O'Neal stated that he had been arrested for first degree murder and had been threatened with a perjury charge, and thus his testimony, to a great extent, was the result of threats. Excerpts of O'Neal's testimony adduced at the bond hearing support the observations by defense counsel. 2 Corroboration of the threats were proffered by examination of O'Neal's mother, who testified that a detective told O'Neal if he didn't testify as to what was "typed on those papers" that he would get 15 years for perjury. This proffer was erroneously denied by the trial court.

O'Neal's testimony at the bond hearing basically was to the effect that the bruises and contusions suffered by the minor child were inflicted by her mother. The state's direct examination and defense's cross of O'Neal encompassed a total of eight pages. Re-direct examination by the state, utilizing the written statement given by O'Neal within a few hours of the death of the minor child for impeachment purposes, covered 42 pages of the...

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7 cases
  • People v. Fry
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • 28 d1 Junho d1 2004
    ...hearing did not provide full and fair opportunity for cross-examination; little incentive to impeach credibility); Nazworth v. State, 352 So.2d 916, 918 (Fla.App.1977) (bond hearing, the purpose of which was limited to setting bond, did not afford defendant a proper opportunity for cross-ex......
  • Anderson v. Steven R. Andrews, P.A.
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 23 d3 Abril d3 1997
    ... ... The trial court found that in order to prevail on his claim for legal malpractice, appellant had to be able to prove in federal court that the state criminal charges terminated in his favor. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that appellant failed to show that, but for his attorney's ... ...
  • Petit v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 25 d3 Julho d3 2012
    ...had an opportunity for cross-examination at the hearing. Petit cites to an older case from the First District, Nazworth v. State, 352 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). In Nazworth, the defendant appealed the admission at trial of testimony taken at a bond hearing. Id. at 917. The witness's tes......
  • State v. Kleinfeld, 91-1437
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • 9 d3 Outubro d3 1991
    ...was conducted before a judicial tribunal. These factors indicate compliance with the confrontation requirements. Nazworth v. State, 352 So.2d 916 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977); See Richardson v. State, 247 So.2d 296 (Fla.1971). Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting the motion in limine. We d......
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