NC v. Anderson

Citation882 So.2d 990
Decision Date02 September 2004
Docket NumberNo. SC03-523.,SC03-523.
PartiesN.C., a child, Petitioner, v. Perry ANDERSON, etc., Respondent.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Alan H. Schreiber, Public Defender and Debra A. Bookout, Assistant Public Defender, Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Fort Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner.

Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General, Celia Terenzio, Bureau Chief, and Donna M. Hoffmann, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, FL, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We have for review the decision in N.C. v. Anderson, 837 So.2d 425 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002), which certified conflict with the decisions in A.L. v. State, 790 So.2d 1149 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); S.D.W. v. State, 746 So.2d 1232 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999); C.A. v. State, 685 So.2d 1036 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997); T.A.R. v. State, 640 So.2d 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); and L.M. v. State, 610 So.2d 1314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the Fourth District's decision in N.C. that while a juvenile is entitled to a written order of disposition containing all of the terms of disposition, there is no entitlement to an oral pronouncement containing all of the terms.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

As a result of a misdemeanor battery adjudication, N.C. violated her probation and went before the juvenile court for disposition. N.C., 837 So.2d at 426. At the disposition hearing, the court orally committed N.C. to a level six residential treatment program. In addition, although not stated orally at the hearing, the court's written disposition order issued on the same day required that N.C. be placed upon conditional release following her completion of the treatment program. See id. Subsequently, N.C.'s attorney filed a motion to correct the disposition on the grounds that her adjudication did not qualify for level six treatment. See id. The trial court granted the motion and entered a new disposition order imposing level four treatment. See id. The new order also required post-commitment conditional release/aftercare. See id.1

When N.C. completed the commitment program, she filed a motion to terminate aftercare on the ground that it was not legally binding because the trial court had not orally pronounced the inclusion of aftercare or conditional release at the original disposition hearing. See 837 So.2d at 426-27. N.C. relied on the First District Court of Appeal's decision in L.S. v. Department of Juvenile Justice, 779 So.2d 633, 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), and argued that a written disposition order could only include terms orally pronounced at the disposition hearing. See N.C., 837 So.2d at 427

. The trial court denied the motion to terminate.

On review of the denial of the motion to terminate, the Fourth District affirmed the trial court's denial and distinguished N.C. from L.S. on the grounds that in L.S., aftercare had not been provided for in either a written disposition or an oral pronouncement. See id. The Fourth District concluded that N.C. was not entitled to an oral pronouncement of disposition under the provisions of Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.115(c), and the court held that the written disposition provided for in the juvenile rules was sufficient to comply with constitutional due process concerns.

In addition, the court concluded that N.C.'s due process rights to be fully informed of the terms of disposition in time to object were adequately protected by Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.135(b), which provides that a juvenile may file a motion to correct an illegal or erroneous disposition or commitment order. See id. The district court also observed that N.C. had not satisfied the time provisions under rule 8.135 for objecting, so even if the inconsistency in the oral pronouncement and the written order did constitute error remediable under rule 8.135, she would have been precluded from relief on procedural grounds. See id. The district court denied N.C.'s motion for rehearing, but proceeded to certify conflict with several decisions from the other district courts involving similar or related issues. See id. at 428.2

ANALYSIS

N.C. raises two issues for this Court's consideration: (1) whether constitutional due process concerns require that an oral pronouncement of disposition be issued at the disposition hearing, and (2) whether Florida Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.135, which provides for a motion to correct an illegal or erroneous disposition, provides adequate due process protection. We conclude that due process does not require that the trial court issue an oral pronouncement of disposition at a minor's disposition hearing, and that rule 8.135 provides an adequate safeguard for minors who wish to challenge their written dispositions.

Oral Pronouncement of Sentence

At the outset, N.C. contends that in juvenile delinquency cases the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process of law require that trial courts issue oral pronouncements of dispositions that include all of the terms of disposition. N.C. acknowledges that the juvenile rules provide only for a written disposition order. However, she contends that juveniles should be afforded the same right to an oral pronouncement that adults enjoy. See Justice v. State, 674 So.2d 123, 125 (Fla.1996)

(acknowledging that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700(b) "mandates that the sentence or other final disposition `shall be pronounced in open court.'")

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law." This same protection is provided in the Florida Constitution. See Art. I, § 9, Fla. Const. "Procedural due process serves as a vehicle to ensure fair treatment through the proper administration of justice where substantive rights are at issue." Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So.2d 957, 960 (Fla.1991). Procedural due process requires both reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See id. The notice must be "reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information, and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950) (citations omitted).

At issue in this case is whether N.C. received procedural due process, that is, whether the proper procedures contained in the juvenile rules, which do not include a requirement of an oral pronouncement, are sufficient to satisfy due process concerns. Although a minor has a due process right to some form of notice of disposition, we conclude that minors have no constitutional right to an oral pronouncement of disposition, where there is an adequate procedure in place for the issuance of written dispositions and for objections to those dispositions.

We acknowledge that in adult sentencing proceedings, oral pronouncement of sentence is required. However, the applicable rule, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.700, expressly mandates oral pronouncement. While this might reflect a discrepancy between the juvenile courts and the adult courts, we believe it is explained by the unique nature of the juvenile courts, which are neither entirely civil nor criminal, and by the unique nature of the status of juveniles themselves.

Such a conclusion is consistent with the analysis by the U.S. Supreme Court's statement in Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984):

There is no doubt that the Due Process Clause is applicable in juvenile proceedings. "The problem," we have stressed, "is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process requirement upon such proceedings." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13-14, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). We have held that certain basic constitutional protections enjoyed by adults accused of crimes also apply to juveniles. See id., at 31-57, 87 S.Ct. 1428 (notice of charges, right to counsel, privilege against self-incrimination, right to confrontation and cross-examination); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (double jeopardy). But the Constitution does not mandate elimination of all differences in the treatment of juveniles. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971)

(no right to jury trial). The State has "a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child," Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), which makes a juvenile proceeding fundamentally different from an adult criminal trial. We have tried, therefore, to strike a balance — to respect the "informality" and "flexibility" that characterize juvenile proceedings, In re Winship, supra, at 366, 90 S.Ct. 1068, and yet to ensure that such proceedings comport with the "fundamental fairness" demanded by the Due Process Clause. Breed v. Jones, supra, at 531, 95 S.Ct. 1779; McKeiver, supra, at 543, 91 S.Ct. 1976 (plurality opinion).

Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263, 104 S.Ct. 2403, 81 L.Ed.2d 207 (1984). The informality and flexibility that the U.S. Supreme Court refers to support our conclusion that oral pronouncements of disposition are not mandatory so long as adequate provisions are made for both notice of the juvenile sanctions and a meaningful opportunity to object. It appears that each state is well within its rights to determine just how a minor should receive notice of a disposition, be it oral, written, or both, so long as due process concerns are adequately addressed.3

In Florida, the rule that governs disposition hearings, Florida Rule of...

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