Ndiaye v. United States
| Decision Date | 28 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 4:20-cv-01703 |
| Parties | GOURA NDIAYE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio |
OPINION AND ORDER
Defendant CoreCivic, Inc. is a Maryland corporation that contracted with United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement to house detainees and provide medical services to detainees at the Northeast Ohio Correction Center, where Plaintiff Goura Ndiaye was detained for a few months after his arrest in December 2018 before his deportation in August 2019. Plaintiff asserts several causes of action against CoreCivic and the United States of America, claiming he was denied medical treatment for a necrotic hip bone while detained. (ECF No. 1.) CoreCivic moves to dismiss the federal claims against it and also asks the Court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the State law claims. (ECF No. 6.) For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the motion.
On this motion to dismiss, the Court takes the following allegations in the first amended complaint as true and construes them in Plaintiff's favor.
Mr Ndiaye is from Mauritania in Northwest Africa. The country is home to “lighter-skinned Berber and Arab ethnic groups to the north and darker-skinned ethnic groups of sub-Saharan African origin to the south.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 11, PageID #4.) The “dominant ‘white Moors' of Arab-Berber descent” subject the “‘black Moors,' or Arabic-speaking members of sub-Saharan ethnic groups” to slavery, sexual violence, and discrimination. (Id.) In 1989, Mauritania began revoking the citizenship of Black Mauritanians, like Mr. Ndiaye, and expelling them from the country. (Id., ¶ 12.) The government revoked Mr. Ndiaye's citizenship in 1990 and deported him to Senegal. (Id., ¶ 13, PageID #5.) From Senegal, Mr. Ndiaye fled to the United States, arriving lawfully in 2000. (Id., ¶ 14.)
While in the United States, Mr. Ndiaye's application for asylum was denied, but he was granted an Order of Supervision from ICE in 2009. (Id.) He lived in the Columbus, Ohio area, where he worked as an electrician, purchased a home, started a family, and “dutifully attended his scheduled immigration check-ins under his agreement with ICE without incident” until December 10, 2018. (Id., ¶¶ 15-16.) On that day, “ICE abruptly revoked his supervised release status and arrested him.” (Id., ¶ 16.) He was detained for eight months, from December 2018 to August 2019. (Id., ¶ 27, PageID #8.) For the first four months, Mr. Ndiaye was detained in various locations and at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center in Youngstown, Ohio for the last four months. (Id., ¶ 28.) CoreCivic operates the Correctional Center. (Id.)
In July 2018, before his arrest, Mr. Ndiaye was diagnosed with “avascular necrosis, ” meaning he suffered from a necrotic hip bone “rotting inside his body, ” which “caus[ed] him tremendous pain since 2018.” (Id., ¶¶ 1 & 22, PageID #2 & 7.) The disease is “chronic, degenerative and progressive, ” and the underlying cause is often unknown, as is the case here. (Id., ¶ 23, PageID #7.) Mr. Ndiaye had a hip replacement surgery scheduled for January 4, 2019, just under a month after his arrest, to treat the disease. (Id., ¶ 17, PageID #6.) He did not receive the surgery due to his arrest and detention and his surgery was never completed while he was detained. (Id., ¶ 30, PageID #8.)
Mr. Ndiaye reported his diagnosis, need for surgery, and pain levels at each detention facility, but never received adequate treatment for his condition. (Id., ¶¶ 29 & 32, PageID #8 & 9.) While detained, doctors again diagnosed Mr. Ndiaye with avascular necrosis in the left hip joint, noted that his condition had worsened from mild or moderate to advanced, and advised that he needs a left hip replacement. (Id., ¶¶ 31 & 33.) For his condition, detention officials merely provided Mr. Ndiaye with Tylenol, anti-inflammatories, and anti-depressants to help him manage the pain. (Id., ¶¶ 36-37, PageID #10.)
“After his arrest by ICE, Mr. Ndiaye pursued several immigration-related legal actions to prevent his return to Mauritania.” (Id., ¶ 19, PageID #6.) None were successful, and ICE deported Mr. Ndiaye to Mauritania on August 6, 2019. (Id., ¶¶ 19-21.) Although not a citizen of Mauritania, the Mauritanian government issued him laissez-passer documents that permitted him to travel to the country without reinstating his legal citizenship. (Id., ¶¶ 18 & 20.) Because he is a non-citizen of Mauritania, he is prohibited from working and owning property there and lacks easy access to medical care. (Id., ¶ 45, PageID #13.) Although its policy requires “removal officers to determine the availability of health care in destination countries, ” ICE granted medical clearance for Mr. Ndiaye's deportation to Mauritania. (Id., ¶ 46.)
After he was deported to Mauritania, Mr. Ndiaye was “forced to flee” to Senegal, where he stays with his daughter. (Id., ¶ 47.) Even there, “he still cannot legally work and his access to medical services or basic medicine remains extremely limited . . . .” (Id.) His health continues to deteriorate, and he suffers debilitating pain. (Id., ¶ 48, PageID #14.)
Based on these allegations, Plaintiff pleads eleven claims, five of which he asserts against Defendant CoreCivic: (1) medical negligence (Count II); (2) negligent employee hiring, training, and supervision (Count IV); (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count VI); (4) gross negligence (Count VIII); and (5) violation of 29 U.S.C. § 794, the Rehabilitation Act (Count XI). Plaintiff invokes the Court's federal question jurisdiction over the Rehabilitation Act claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and supplement jurisdiction over the State law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. (Id., ¶ 8, PageID #3.) CoreCivic moves to dismiss the federal claim under the Rehabilitation Act and asks the Court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the State law claims. (ECF No. 6.)
At the motion to dismiss stage in any civil action, a complaint must “state[] a claim for relief that is plausible, when measured against the elements” of a claim. Darby v Childvine, Inc., 964 F.3d 440, 444 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Binno v. American Bar Ass'n, 826 F.3d 338, 345-46 (6th Cir. 2016)). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must “raise a right to relief above the speculative level” into the “realm of plausible liability.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
When analyzing a complaint under this standard, the Court construes factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, accepts them as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. Wilburn v. United States, 616 Fed.Appx. 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2015). But a pleading must offer more than mere “labels and conclusions, ” because “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Nor is a court required to accept “[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations[.]” Eidson v. Tennessee Dep't of Child.'s Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007).
Therefore, the Court must distinguish between “well-pled factual allegations, ” which must be treated as true, and “naked assertions, ” which need not. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 () (cleaned up); see also, e.g., Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 375 (6th Cir. 2011) (determining that, because some of the plaintiff's factual allegations were “not well-pleaded[, ]” “their conclusory nature ‘disentitles them to the presumption of truth'”). Rule 8 “does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
The Rehabilitation Act prohibits “any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” from discriminating on the basis of a disability. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). It permits any aggrieved party to pursue “[t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . .” 29 U.S.C. 794a(a). To establish a prima facie case of discrimination in violation of the Act, a plaintiff must show that (1) the plaintiff is handicapped within the meaning of the Act; (2) the plaintiff is otherwise qualified to participate in the program or activity; (3) the plaintiff was excluded because of his or her handicap; and (4) the defendant is a recipient of federal financial assistance. G.C. v. Owensboro Pub. Sch., 711 F.3d 623, 635 (6th Cir. 2013).
Defendant's primary argument for dismissing the Rehabilitation Act claim hinges on the meaning of three words in the Act: “Federal financial assistance.” (ECF No. 6, PageID #78-80.) The Act provides, in relevant part:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States, as defined in section 7(20), shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program...
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