O'NEAL v. ARCHDIOCESES OF NEW YORK

• Decision Date: 24 September 2001
• Citation: O'NEAL v. ARCHDIOCESES OF NEW YORK, 286 A.D.2d 757, 730 N.Y.S.2d 524 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)
• Parties: ISRAEL O'NEAL et al., Appellants,<BR>v.<BR>ARCHDIOCESES OF NEW YORK et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

286 A.D.2d 757

730 N.Y.S.2d 524

ISRAEL O'NEAL et al., Appellants,

v.ARCHDIOCESES OF NEW YORK et al., Respondents, et al., Defendants.

Decided September 24, 2001.

O'Brien, J. P., Krausman and Schmidt, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The infant plaintiff, Israel O'Neal, was a resident in a nonsecure facility for youths found in need of supervision by the Family Court which was operated by the Archdioceses of New York and Pius 12 Residential Services—Chester Campus Program (hereinafter collectively the respondents).One evening, while O'Neal was waiting with other residents in the cafeteria to obtain items from the bookstore, his roommate, the defendantWilliam Cook, punched him in the face, breaking his jaw.At the time, there were three staff members in the cafeteria supervising 15 to 19 residents, and staff members immediately separated O'Neal and Cook.

The respondents were under a duty to provide adequate supervision to the youths placed in their care to protect them from foreseeable injuries proximately caused by the acts of fellow residents of the facility (see generally, Mirand v City of New York,84 NY2d 44;Convey v City of Rye School Dist.,271 AD2d 154, 159-160).The respondents, however, are not insurers of the safety of the residents and cannot be expected to continuously control all their actions.Therefore, to prevail, the plaintiffs must establish that the respondents had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused the injury (see, Mirand v City of New York, supra).

The respondents established prima facie that Cook's action was impulsive and could not reasonably have been anticipated, particularly since O'Neal acknowledged in his deposition testimony that he had not had any previous confrontations with Cook.Moreover, the incident occurred in so short a time span that any lack of supervision was not the proximate cause of the injury (see, Convey v City of Rye School Dist., supra, at 160).The plaintiffs failed to present evidence sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact with respect to the respondents' liability.

Thus, the Supreme Court correctly granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment.

Crane, J., dissents and votes to reverse the order appealed from, on the law, deny the motion, and reinstate the complaint insofar as asserted against the defendants Archdioceses of New York and Pius 12 Residential Services—Chester Campus Program with the following memorandum:

A party moving for summary judgment must establish as a matter of law that there are no issues of fact (see, Zuckerman v City of New York,49 NY2d 557, 562) before the burden shifts to the opposing party(see, Winegrad v New York Univ. Med. Ctr.,64 NY2d 851).Because the moving defendants did not sustain their burden on the motion to dismiss the complaint, I dissent.

I agree with the majority that this case should be measured by the standards pertaining to the duty of educational institutions to provide adequate supervision.We part company on the question of whether the record made by the moving defendants was sufficient to negate actual or constructive notice (see, Mirand v City of New York,84 NY2d 44, 49["In determining whether the duty to provide adequate supervision has been breached in the context of injuries caused by the acts of fellow students, it must be established that school authorities had sufficiently specific knowledge or notice of the dangerous conduct which caused injury; that is, that the third-party acts could reasonably have been anticipated"]).

The Supreme Court, it seems, was led into error in one small respect that the majority appears to ratify.The Supreme Court articulated that there had been no reports "of any prior specific incidents between the two students."Prior conduct of the assailing student, however, need not have been directed against the plaintiff.Predicate acts of violence against any students may suffice (see, Moores v City of Newburgh School Dist.,237 AD2d 265;cf., Convey v City of Rye School Dist.,271 AD2d 154, 159-160).

The record is replete with information about William Cook, the assailant who broke the infant plaintiff's jaw in the instant case.From the examinations before trial presented by the moving defendants there emerge ample facts to destroy their prima facie case on the issue of notice.The administrative structure of the Pius 12 Residential Services—Chester Compus Program (hereinafter Pius 12) is designed to maintain staff awareness through social workers and other professionals, including "treatment team meetings," of the background and problems of the residents and whether they might endanger the health or welfare of other residents.This awareness includes whether a resident is constantly getting into fights.

The information about the behavior of Cook is well documented and includes allegations of his incorrigible behavior and...