Neal v. Baker
| Decision Date | 29 October 1926 |
| Docket Number | 25,313 |
| Citation | 153 N.E. 768,198 Ind. 393 |
| Parties | Neal et al. v. Baker |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
1. QUIETING TITLE.---Complaint held insufficient to quiet title for the reason that it did not show any title had vested in plaintiff.---A complaint alleging that, in response to a letter received from the owners of certain real estate proposing that if the plaintiff would come and live with them and care for them during their lives, they would convey or devise the same to her, she accepted their proposition, made her home with them, and cared for them until the death of the survivor, receiving no wages or other compensation, and that they neither conveyed nor devised said land to the plaintiff and that defendants, their heirs, had refused to convey the same to her, was insufficient as a complaint to quiet title as it did not show that any title had become vested in her p. 399.
2 PLEADING.---A complaint which alleges facts showing that plaintiff is entitled to some relief will withstand a demurrer although not sufficient to entitle plaintiff to the relief asked. p. 399.
3. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.---Paragraph of complaint held sufficient as stating cause of action for specific performance, though relief asked was to quiet title.---A paragraph of complaint alleging that the owners of certain real estate had promised in writing to give the same to her if she would come and live with them and care for them during their lives, they would convey or devise said land to her, that she accepted their proposition and lived with and cared for them until the death of the survivor, without any compensation therefor, that neither the decedents nor their heirs had conveyed said property to her, sufficiently stated a cause of action for specific performance. p. 399.
4. PLEADING.---An allegation that plaintiff was the owner in fee simple of the equitable title to the land described in the complaint was a defect properly challenged by motion to make more specific. p. 400.
5. PLEADING.---Effect of opposing motion to make pleading more specific stated.---Where the plaintiff opposes a motion to make his pleading more specific by stating the facts supporting certain conclusions alleged therein and procures the overruling of such motion, he will be deemed to have admitted that no facts other than those stated were relied on to sustain said conclusions, and the conclusions are to be disregarded in ruling on a demurrer thereto. p. 400.
6. JURY.---Overruling motion for trial of issues by court held proper.---There was no available error in overruling a motion to submit the issues to trial by the court where the complaint consisted of two paragraphs, one seeking the specific performance of a contract and the other asking that title be quieted, although the former paragraph should have been submitted to the court for trial. p. 400.
7. MOTIONS.---Overruling motion asking for relief to which party is not entitled is not error.---Where a motion asks for relief to which the party is not entitled, it may be overruled without error, even though it also contains a petition for relief which the court ought to grant if asked by a proper motion. p. 400.
8. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.---An undertaking to make a gift of land, without consideration, even though in writing, cannot be specifically enforced where the donee has not taken possession or made improvements. p. 403.
9. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.---Sufficiency of memorandum of agreement.---A memorandum of agreement under the statute of frauds (8045 Burns 1926) must set out its terms so fully that the court can know from the writing what the person seeking to enforce the agreement was to do as well as what was to be done by the other party. p. 403.
10. FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.---Oral evidence is not admissible to supply any of the essential terms of a contract within the statute of frauds (8045 Burns 1926). p. 403.
11. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.---Letter held not sufficient memorandum of contract to convey land to authorize specific performance of contract.---A letter in which the owners of real estate promised to give to another "the home place," but did not state what the donee was to do in consideration for the gift, was not sufficient evidence to establish the right of the latter to specific performance, since the agreement was within the statute of frauds (8045 Burns 1926). p. 403.
12. QUIETING TITLE.---Evidence held insufficient to justify verdict for plaintiff in action to quiet title.---Evidence held not sufficient to justify verdict for plaintiff in action to quiet title to farm which the owners promised, in writing, to convey to her if she would care for them for the remainder of their lives. p. 403.
From Sullivan Circuit Court; Walter F. Wood, Judge.
Action by Essie F. Baker against Alfred Neal and others. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. (Transferred from Appellate Court under subd. 2 of § 1357 Burns 1926.)
Reversed.
Emison & Hoover, Kessinger & Hill, D. Frank Culbertson and Hays & Hays, for appellants.
Curtis G. Shake, Joseph W. Kimmel, J. W. Lindley, James A. Jones and Charles H. Bedwell, for appellee.
Travis and Willoughby, JJ., absent, and not participating.
Appellee, the plaintiff below, commenced an action for specific performance of a contract alleged to have been made by the ancestor of appellants, the defendants below, to convey to her a certain described quarter section of land in Knox county, Indiana. She afterward filed a second paragraph alleging substantially the same facts that had been alleged in the original complaint, except for the substitution in the second paragraph of an averment that, by reason of being the heirs of Caroline Haper, the defendants "are claiming to be the owners of said described real estate," in place of an averment in the original complaint "that by reason of said heirship said defendants * * * now are the owners of said described real estate," and the substitution therein of formal averments such as are usually found in a complaint to quiet an alleged equitable title against claims of the defendants adverse thereto and of a demand that her title be quieted instead of the averments that by reason of alleged promises of defendants' ancestors, plaintiff was entitled to a decree of specific performance, and the demand for a decree of specific performance and the appointment of a commissioner to convey the real estate in question to plaintiff, which the original complaint had contained. A third paragraph was also filed which alleged that "plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the equitable title to" the real estate [describing it], and that defendants were claiming some interest in said real estate adverse to plaintiff's right which was unfounded and a cloud upon her title, followed by a prayer that her title be quieted and for all proper relief. A motion to make the third paragraph of complaint more specific by stating the facts on which plaintiff based her alleged conclusion that she was the owner in fee simple of the equitable title to the real estate was overruled. Appellants then demurred separately to each of the second and third paragraphs of complaint on the ground that neither states facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, which demurrer was overruled and they excepted. The first paragraph of the complaint was then dismissed, and over an objection and exception by the defendants, the cause was submitted to a jury, which returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants filed a motion for a new trial, alleging error in the submission of the cause for trial by a jury and in the giving and refusal of certain instructions, and insisting that the verdict was not sustained by sufficient evidence, in that the letter written by defendants' ancestor and her husband did not constitute a conveyance of the land, nor a written memorandum of agreement to convey the land to plaintiff that was sufficient under the statute of frauds, but the court overruled this motion and entered a judgment in general terms quieting plaintiff's title. Overruling the demurrers to the second and third paragraphs of complaint and overruling the motion for a new trial are assigned as errors.
The second paragraph of the complaint alleged, in substance, that Henry A. Haper and Caroline (Neal) Haper were husband and wife; that in 1898 they acquired by purchase the tract of land in question, containing 150 acres, more or less; that thereafter until the death of Henry A. Haper on August 12, 1920, they owned and possessed said real estate as tenants by entireties; that by the death of her said husband, Caroline Haper became the sole owner thereof, in fee simple; that afterward, on July 21, 1921, Caroline Haper died, intestate, leaving defendants as her sole heirs, by reason of which, they "ever since her said death have been and now are claiming to be the owners of said described real estate, as tenants in common in fee simple." That in March, 1901, plaintiff was a strong and healthy girl nineteen years old, and she then entered the employment of said Henry A. and Caroline Haper as a servant in their home, and remained in said employment continuously until the first of March, 1905. That from then until May, 1911, she did domestic work for various persons, but worked for Henry and Caroline Haper occasionally, from time to time. That during that period, Henry and Caroline Haper many times asked and begged plaintiff to return to their home and live with and work for them, and wrote her letters begging her to return and make her home with them. That in May, 1911, they were living alone in their home on said described real estate and then wrote, directed and caused to be forwarded and delivered to plaintiff by United States mail, a...
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