O'Neal v. Bumbo Int'l Trust
| Decision Date | 01 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 6:11–CV–72. |
| Citation | 959 F.Supp.2d 972 |
| Parties | Leanne O'NEAL, et al, Plaintiffs, v. BUMBO INTERNATIONAL TRUST f/k/a Jonibach Management Trust, et al, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Elizabeth Mitchell Cunningham, Michael Ross Cunningham, Rose Walker, LLP, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Tarush R. Anand, Brown Sims, P.C., Houston, TX, for Defendants.
This is a product liability action involving the Bumbo Baby Seat, an infant seat manufactured by Defendant Bumbo International Trust. Plaintiffs Leanne and Joseph O'Neal brought this action after their daughter sustained injuries from falling out of a Bumbo Seat placed on a kitchen countertop. Bumbo now moves for summary judgment on the related grounds that it (1) adequately warned consumers not to place the seats on raised surfaces and (2) did not design the seat to be restrictive. Bumbo also argues that Plaintiffs are not entitled to punitive damages because they cannot prove that Bumbo had knowledge that its product caused injuries at the time Plaintiffs' seat was purchased. The Court concludes that such issues involve questions of fact appropriately resolved by a jury. Accordingly, Bumbo's motion is DENIED.
I. Background
The Bumbo Baby Seat is a molded foam infant seat designed, manufactured, and sold by Bumbo. When Bumbo distributed the seat at issue in this case, 1 the product had instructions and warnings in three places. The box that the seat came in provided information about the seat and advised: Docket Entry No. 42–2 at 3.
Figure 1. Information provided on Bumbo packaging. Docket Entry No. 42–2 at 3.
Inside the box was a leaflet, similarly advising that the seat is “happiest on the floor” and warning customers “not [to] use on a high surface.” Id. at 5, 7.
Figure 2. Two versions of the warnings included in leaflets inside the box for Bumbo Baby Seats sold before the 2007 recall. Docket Entry No. 42–2 at 5, 7.
Finally, the seat itself contained a warning in all-capital, six-point font stating, among other things, “never use on a raised surface” and “designed for floor level use only.” Docket Entry No. 42 at 11.
Figure 3. Picture of warning on Plaintiffs' Bumbo Seat. Docket Entry No. 42 at 11.
The O'Neals received their Bumbo Seat in March 2009 as a hand-me-down gift from a friend who had received the seat secondhand from someone else. See Docket Entry No. 42–3 at 23:23–25:17, 44:12–45:1. The friend provided the O'Neals with the seat and the accompanying tray, but without the original packaging or informational leaflet. Thus, although Bumbo Seats were packaged with all three warnings, only the warning on the seat was readily available to the O'Neals.
The incident giving rise to this suit occurred on January 1, 2010. The O'Neals placed their daughter, G.O., in the Bumbo Seat on the kitchen countertop as they were cleaning shrimp and preparing dinner. According to Mrs. O'Neal, she and her husband were within arm's length of G.O. the entire time, but when they briefly looked away from her, they heard a pop and then heard her hit the ground. Docket Entry No. 42–3 at 51:2–52:16. G.O. was lying on her back on the floor and cried for a couple of minutes before she calmed down. At the advice of their pediatrician, the O'Neals took G.O. to the emergency room, where the doctors performed CT scans and diagnosed her with two skull fractures, as well as swelling and bruising.
The O'Neals filed their complaint on December 30, 2011, asserting strict products liability and negligence claims based on warning and design defects, and a negligent infliction of emotional distress claim.2 The complaint also seeks punitive damages. Bumbo now seeks summary judgment on the grounds that: (a) its multiple warnings, if heeded, would have prevented the accident; (b) its seat was not designed to be restrictive or for use on raised surfaces; and (c) Plaintiffs cannot show that Bumbo had knowledge of injuries when its product was sold and thus are not entitled to punitive damages.
II. Legal StandardsA. Summary Judgment
When a party moves for summary judgment, the reviewing court shall grant the motion “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). All reasonable doubts on questions of fact must be resolved in favor of the party opposing summary judgment. See Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir.2001) (citation omitted).
B. Indiana Product Liability Act
Bumbo argues in its summary judgment motion, and Plaintiffs do not contest, that this action is governed by Indiana substantive law. The Court agrees. District courts exercising diversity jurisdiction must apply the choice of law rules of the forum state. Mayo v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 354 F.3d 400, 403 (5th Cir.2004) (citing Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941)). Texas courts determine the appropriate choice of law by using the “most significant relationship” test provided by sections 146 and 6 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 848 (Tex.2000); Black v. Toys R US–Del., Inc., No. 4:08–cv–3315, 2010 WL 4702344, at *8 (S.D.Tex. Nov. 10, 2010) (citations omitted). “For tort cases, the Restatement instructs courts to consider the following contacts in determining which state possesses the most significant relationship:
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.”
Black, 2010 WL 4702344, at *8 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 145 (1971)). “The applicable law will usually be the local law of the state where the injury occurred.” Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law § 156(2) (1971).
Given that the injury occurred in Indiana and Plaintiffs reside there, the Court concludes that Indiana's substantive law applies to this case. See Black, 2010 WL 4702344, at *16 (). Specifically, the Indiana Product Liability Act governs the action, as it covers all cases that are: “(1) brought by user or a consumer; (2) against a manufacturer or seller; and (3) for physical harm caused by a product; regardless of the substantive legal theory or theories upon which the action is brought.” I.C. § 34–20–1–1.
The Indiana Product Liability Act applies to actions sounding in negligence and strict liability. Stegemoller v. ACandS, Inc., 767 N.E.2d 974, 975 (Ind.2002) (citation omitted). For the O'Neals' negligence claim, they must prove: (1) Bumbo owed them a duty; (2) Bumbo breached that duty; and (3) the breach proximately caused an injury. See Ford Motor Co. v. Rushford, 868 N.E.2d 806, 810 (Ind.2007) (citation omitted). For the strict liability claim, they most prove that: (1) the product was defective and unreasonably dangerous; (2) the defective condition existed at the time the product left Bumbo's control; and (3) the defective condition proximately caused the injuries. See id. (citation omitted).
III. AnalysisA. Adequacy of Warning
“Under either [a negligence or strict liability] theory a product may be defective under the Act where the manufacturer fails in its duty to warn of a danger or instruct on the proper use of the product as to which the average consumer would not be aware.” Id. (citing Hoffman v. E.W. Bliss Co., 448 N.E.2d 277, 281 (Ind.1983)). The duty requires that the manufacturer both provide adequate instructions for safe use and provide a warning as to dangers inherent in improper use. Id.; see also I.C. § 34–20–2–2 ().
Bumbo argues that summary judgment is warranted because its product included multiple warnings, which, if followed, would have prevented the accident. It relies on the maxim of Indiana product liability law that “[w]here warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.” Docket Entry No. 42 at 16–17 (alterations in original) (quoting Marshall v. Clark Equip. Co., 680 N.E.2d 1102, 1105 (Ind.Ct.App.1997)).
But Bumbo's defense depends on whether its warnings were adequate. “[T]he adequacy of warnings, which implicates breach of duty, is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact to resolve....” Rushford, 868 N.E.2d at 810 (citation omitted); see also Cook v. Ford Motor Co., 913 N.E.2d 311, 327 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) ; Jarrell v. Monsanto Co., 528 N.E.2d 1158, 1162 (Ind.Ct.App.1988) ...
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