Neal v. McKune
| Decision Date | 09 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 11-3155-JTM |
| Parties | ALDRED BLAKE NEAL, Plaintiff, v. DAVID R. MCKUNE, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
The court has before it a Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. 32) by defendants David R. McKune, Don Almond, Colette Winkelbauer, Rex Pryor, Elizabeth L. Rice, and Roy Roberts. After reviewing the parties' arguments, the court grants the Motion.
The relevant facts are uncontested. Plaintiff Aldred Blake Neal, is a Muslim prisoner who was, at all times relevant, an inmate in the custody of the Kansas Department of Corrections, incarcerated at the Lansing Correctional Facility. Neal filed his complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his rights under the First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.1 In Counts One and Two, Neal claims that the defendants violated his rights under the First and Fifth Amendments when they failed to properly accommodate his religious fasts during the months ofRamadan in 2009 and 2010 by not allowing him adequate time for breakfast before dawn (when Neal's fast must begin, according to his Muslim faith).
Count One pertains to events occurring during Ramadan in 2009. On August 22, 2009, Neal was served breakfast at 5:13 a.m., only seven minutes before dawn at 5:20 a.m., the time at which Ramadan fast began that day, giving Neal less than the standard twenty minutes to eat that inmates are supposed to receive. On August 23, Neal received his breakfast at 5:26 a.m. five minutes after dawn broke at 5:21 a.m., forcing him to decide whether to forgo eating until night or break his fast for the day. Neal filed a grievance on August 24. Defendant Winkelbauer, a deputy warden, responded that "Sunrise in Lansing, Kansas on 8/23/09 was 0640 hours so there was time to eat prior to sunrise that day." Based on this, Winkelbauer stated that no further action was necessary. On Neal's appeal, Defendant Rice, the Secretary of Corrections's designee, concluded that Winkelbauer's response was appropriate.
Count Two pertains to events occurring during Ramadan in 2010. On August 11 and 14, 2010, Neal did not receive his breakfast until after dawn. On August 12, 13, 17, 18, and 19, Neal received his breakfast less than ten minutes before dawn. On August 19, Neal filed a grievance notifying prison officials of his late meals. On September 30, Neal received Winkelbauer's response, which stated that Aramark—the food company with which the prison contracts for prisoners' meals— Winkelbauer also noted that one of the late meals was caused by apower problem in the kitchen. After Neal forwarded his grievance to defendant McKune, the warden of Lansing Correctional Facility, McKune sent him a letter apologizing for the tardiness of the meals and acknowledging that "Aramark should have been more mindful and diligent."
In Count Three, Neal claims defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment when he was placed on the religious diet and served a piece of chicken on two occasions during Ramadan in 2009. Since 2001, Neal had been on an approved vegetarian diet. After submitting a Religious Accommodation Request for Ramadan, Neal was placed on the Religious Diet Menu For Use During Ramadan, along with all of the other inmates participating in Ramadan. Neal asserts that Winkelbauer gave Aramark's manager the instruction to serve the Ramadan participants the religious diet. Over the month-long period, Neal was served a chicken entrée twice. After Neal filed a grievance, deputy warden Winkelbauer responded that "Aramark was using the Department of Corrections Ramadan approved religious diet," and that a vegetarian entrée was available to be substituted for the chicken had Neal requested it. Winkelbauer also explained the differences between the general Religious Diet Menu and the Religious Diet Menu For Use During Ramadan, stating that "the calorie count has been adjusted by the dietician to account for not having lunch." After Neal appealed this response, McKune responded that Winkelbauer's input was appropriate and correct and no further action was necessary.
Based on his claims, Neal requests injunctive relief to stop all parties from violating his religious tenets. He seeks $250,000.00 in punitive damages from thedefendants. Finally, Neal requests that $100,000.00 be placed in a trust outside the control of the Kansas Department of Corrections for books, religious materials, and an education scholarship fund.
In their motion, the defendants argue that (1) the Eleventh Amendment's doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the claims against them in their official capacities, (2) qualified immunity bars the claims against them in their personal capacities, and (3) the Complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Defendants argue that Neal's § 1983 claims for money damages against the state defendants in their official capacities are barred by the Eleventh Amendment doctrine of sovereign immunity. Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state is generally immune in law or in equity for damages or any other relief in any action brought by any citizen. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see also Lee v. McManus, 589 F. Supp. 633, 637 (D. Kan. 1984) (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974)). Furthermore, "civil rights suits against the state of Kansas or one of its agencies are absolutely barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Lee, 589 F. Supp. at 637; see also Brennan v. University of Kansas, 451 F.2d 1287 (10th Cir. 1971)). However, suits seeking declaratory or injunctive relief against state officials are not barred. Id. at 637-38 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908)).
Neal seeks both monetary and prospective injunctive relief. Under the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity doctrine, this court has no subject matterjurisdiction over the claims for monetary damages against state officials in their official capacities. Therefore, these claims are dismissed.
However, sovereign immunity does not rob the court of subject matter jurisdiction to the extent that Neal seeks injunctive relief. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60. Regardless, as the court explains below, Neal fails to state a constitutional claim.2 Therefore, the court dismisses Neal's claims for injunctive relief as well.
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must present factual allegations, assumed to be true, that "raise a right to relief above the speculative level" and must contain "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Under this standard, "the mere metaphysical possibility that some plaintiff could prove some set of facts in support of the pleaded claims is insufficient; the complaint must give the court reason to believe that this plaintiff has a reasonable likelihood of mustering factual support for these claims." Ridge at Red Hawk, L.L.C. v. Schneider, 493 F.3d 1174, 1177 (10th Cir. 2007). The allegations must be enough that, if assumed to be true, the plaintiff plausibly, not merely speculatively, has a claim for relief. Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2008).
In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court assumes as true all well pleaded facts in the complaint and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 118 (1990); Swanson v. Bixler, 750 F.2d 810, 813 (10th Cir. 1984). The court, however, need not accept as true those allegations which state only legal conclusions. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Although a plaintiff need not precisely state each element of its claims, it must plead minimal factual allegations on those material elements that must be proved. Id. "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
Because Neal is pursuing this action pro se, the court must be mindful of additional considerations. "A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. "[The] court, however, will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf." Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). "The broad reading of the plaintiff's complaint does not relieve the plaintiff of the burden of alleging sufficient facts on which a recognized legal claim could be based." It is the Plaintiff's burden to allege that there are, "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bafford v. Pokorski, 2008 WL 2783132, at *1 (D. Kan. July 17, 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. 570 (1974)).
Defendants advance two arguments to dismiss Neal's claims against them in their individual capacities. First, they claim qualified immunity shields them from Neal's claims. Second, the defendants argue that Neal has not pled facts that show their personal participation in the alleged constitutional violations. The court resolves the matter on the former argument, therefore it does not address the latter.
Qualified immunity exists "to protect public...
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