O'Neal v. O'Neal, 47478

Decision Date29 June 1984
Docket NumberNo. 47478,47478
Citation673 S.W.2d 126
PartiesMarnay S. O'NEAL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. F. Hodge O'NEAL, Respondent.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

Theodore F. Schwartz, Clayton, for petitioner-appellant.

Harold B. Bamburg, St. Louis, for respondent.

KAROHL, Presiding Judge.

Petitioner Marnay O'Neal (wife) appeals from a decree dissolving her marriage to respondent F. Hodge O'Neal (husband) and an order enforcing a written separation agreement which was incorporated into the decree. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

Wife's petition prayed for a legal separation, and husband cross-petitioned asking that a dissolution be granted. Wife first contends that because she requested a legal separation the trial court, under § 452.305.2 1 was required to grant the decree in that form. We disagree. Both parties alleged in their petitions that the marriage was irretrievably broken, and the trial court so found. Our Supreme Court has held that under these circumstances § 452.320.1, enacted after § 452.305.2, controls and mandates that the court enter a dissolution decree rather than a decree of legal separation. Colabianchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Mo. banc 1983).

Wife next contends that the trial court erred in ordering the enforcement of a written separation agreement which she had refused to sign and in incorporating said agreement into the decree.

We view the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's decree. After several hours of negotiations on the day the cause was set for trial, June 1, 1983, the parties reached an oral agreement as to maintenance and the division of their property. The parties were present in the courthouse but were in separate rooms and communicated only through their attorneys. Although the attorneys took some notes as to the terms of the agreement, nothing was entered into the record on that day. The parties' lawyers merely informed the judge that they had reached an agreement, and the judge asked them to let him know when they would like him to hear the case. Neither a formal memorandum passing the case for settlement nor the terms of the agreement were presented to the court. The parties agreed husband's attorney would put the terms of the oral agreement into writing for the parties to sign. Husband had several local witnesses on call and informed them they would not be needed.

Two days later, on June 3, 1983, wife called her attorney and told him she was dissatisfied with the agreement they had discussed and did not intend to sign it. Her attorney informed opposing counsel of wife's position and then withdrew from the case.

On June 14, 1983, husband's attorney filed a motion to enforce settlement. The motion to enforce alleged that the parties had agreed on "all the issues in litigation." The oral agreement, if there was one, had been reduced to writing, but wife did not receive a copy until the day of the hearing on husband's motion, June 20, 1983. On that day she received a copy but did not read the document. After hearing testimony and receiving memoranda from the parties, the court granted husband's motion to enforce settlement. The court ordered wife to sign the agreement and granted a dissolution decree which incorporated the now written separation agreement.

Separation agreements are authorized in § 452.325.1:

To promote the amicable settlement of disputes between the parties to a marriage attendant upon their separation or the dissolution of their marriage, the parties may enter into a written separation agreement containing provisions for the maintenance of either of them, the disposition of any property owned by either of them, and the custody support and visitation of their children. (emphasis added)

In the instant case no children had been born of the marriage and the written agreement pertained only to maintenance and property.

A separation agreement is unique in that the trial court must review it and, considering the parties' economic circumstances and any other relevant factors, find it conscionable before it takes effect. § 452.325.2. There are thus actually three parties who must approve of its terms before it may be enforced. In this respect a separation agreement under § 452.325.1 differs from a settlement agreement in a typical civil suit. The statute specifically asserts that the purpose of...

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11 cases
  • Reynolds v. Reynolds
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • July 15, 2003
    ...offer the existing agreement when presented." In re Marriage of Brinell, 869 S.W.2d 887, 888 (Mo.App.1994) (quoting O'Neal v. O'Neal, 673 S.W.2d 126, 127-28 (Mo.App. 1984)). Therefore, "a condition precedent to the court's consideration of a separation agreement is that the parties be `pres......
  • McCallister v. McCallister, No. 17067
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 14, 1991
    ...prevails over § 452.305.2 (enacted in 1973). Colabianchi v. Colabianchi, 646 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Mo.banc 1983). See also O'Neal v. O'Neal, 673 S.W.2d 126, 127 (Mo.App.1984). At issue is the applicability to our facts of § 452.320.1. If § 452.320.1 applies and the trial court finds the marriage i......
  • Carter v. Carter, WD
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • February 1, 1994
    ...of children, are binding upon the court unless the court finds that the separation agreement is unconscionable. In O'Neal v. O'Neal, 673 S.W.2d 126, 127-28 (Mo.App.1984), the court A separation agreement is unique in that the trial court must review it and, considering the parties' economic......
  • Freeland v. Freeland
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • June 24, 2008
    ...by counsel and sufficiently spread upon the record. See Perryman v. Perryman, 117 S.W.3d 681, 685-86 (Mo.App. 2003); O'Neal v. O'Neal, 673 S.W.2d 126, 127-28 (Mo.App.1984); Markwardt v. Markwardt, 617 S.W.2d 461, 462-63 (Mo. App.1981). The Southern District also will enforce an oral separat......
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2 books & journal articles
  • Section 7.1 The Basics—A Statutory Contract
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Family Law Deskbook (2014 Supp) Chapter 7 Separation Agreements
    • Invalid date
    ...separation agreements in essence have three parties—the divorcing spouses and the judge approving their agreement. O’Neal v. O’Neal, 673 S.W.2d 126, 127–28 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984). While all separation agreements are subject to approval by the court, a court should not interfere with a couple’......
  • Section 7.1 The Basics—A Statutory Contract
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Family Law Deskbook (2019 Supp) Chapter 7 Separation Agreements
    • Invalid date
    ...separation agreements in essence have three parties—the divorcing spouses and the judge approving their agreement. O’Neal v. O’Neal, 673 S.W.2d 126, 127–28 (Mo. App. E.D. 1984). While all separation agreements are subject to approval by the court, a court should not interfere with a couple’......

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