Neal v. State, 6 Div. 980

• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
• Writing for the Court: HARRIS
• Citation: 460 So.2d 257
• Parties: Eddie Barnard NEAL v. STATE.
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 980
• Decision Date: 12 June 1984

Page 257

460 So.2d 257 Eddie Barnard NEAL
v.
STATE. 6 Div. 980. Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama. June 12, 1984.
Rehearing Denied July 17, 1984.
Certiorari Denied Nov. 30, 1984
Alabama Supreme Court 83-1225.

Page 259

J. Wilson Dinsmore and Larry Waites of Dinsmore, Waites & Stovall, Birmingham, for appellant.

Charles A. Graddick, Atty. Gen., and Martha Gail Ingram and William D. Little, Jr., Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellee.

HARRIS, Judge.

This appeal follows from the second conviction of Eddie Barnard Neal, under Section 13-11-2(a)(2), Code of Alabama 1975, for the capital offense of robbery during which the victim was intentionally killed.

With appellant's first conviction for the robbery and murder of Quenette Shehane the jury recommended a sentence of death, which was commuted by the trial judge to a sentence of life imprisonment without parole. This judgment was affirmed in Neal v. State, 372 So.2d 1331 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 372 So.2d 1348 (Ala.1979); however, the case was later reversed and remanded for new trial in accordance with the decisions in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980), and Beck v. State, 396 So.2d 645 (Ala.1980), construing Alabama's Death Penalty Act.

On August 13, 1982, appellant was again found guilty of the robbery and murder of Miss Shehane. The jury recommended that he be imprisoned for life without the possibility of parole and the trial court concurred in the jury's finding, sentencing appellant to life imprisonment without provision for parole.

The facts and circumstances surrounding the robbery and murder of Miss Shehane are set out in detail in Neal, supra, and will not be repeated here.

Appellant raises seven issues for consideration on this appeal. First appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions for judgment of acquittal based on insufficiency of the evidence. He asserts that none of the elements of robbery were sufficiently proven and that, in any case, the evidence in the case pointed to a rape of the victim, then a killing and then a taking of the property. According to appellant, the offense of which he was convicted must begin with a robbery, or attempt to rob, and end with an intentional killing of the victim.

In Thomas v. State, 460 So.2d 207 (Ala.Crim.App.1983), this court held that, when a robbery and murder form a continuous chain of events, the fact the victim was dead when the property was taken would not negate the crime of robbery. Clements v. State, 370 So.2d 708, (Ala.Crim.App.1978), rev'd on other grounds, 370 So.2d 723 (Ala.1979); Cobern v. State, 273 Ala. 547, 142 So.2d 869 (1962). In addition, this court held in Thomas, supra, that the killing and robbery of Quenette Shehane on December 20, 1976, between the hours of 6:30 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. were part of a continuous chain of events.

In respect to appellant's contention concerning sufficiency of the evidence, it is clear that this court, on review, is required to consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Bozeman v. State, 401 So.2d 167 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 401 So.2d 171 (Ala.1981); McCord v. State, 373 So.2d 1242 (Ala.Crim.App.1979). Moreover, evidence favorable to the prosecution must be taken as true and the State must be accorded all legitimate inferences therefrom. Jolly v. State, 395 So.2d 1135 (Ala.Crim.App.1981); Johnson v. State, 378 So.2d 1164 (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 378 So.2d 1173 (Ala.1979).

Miss Shehane's fiance testified that her television was packed in her car on the evening of December 20, 1978, when she drove to the store to buy a bottle of salad

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dressing for dinner. The television was not in the car when it was found by the police the following morning.

On the evening of Miss Shehane's disappearance, John Mays overheard appellant, Thomas (appellant's fraternity brother) and Jones (a pledge in the fraternity) say they were going out to pick up some young ladies, after which they left. Mays later saw Jones's car parked beside the U-Tote-M store, one of two stores within one-half mile of Birmingham-Southern College, where Miss Shehane's fiance awaited her return. Mays heard a young lady yell and saw a man push her into a car which pulled out and which was followed by Jones's car. On the following day Mays found a note from appellant stating that he had taken Mays's tennis shoes and left his [appellant's] boots in their stead. The boots were covered in mud and what appeared to Mays to be blood.

Edward Lynn received a call from Thomas on the night in question asking him to come to a convenience store to pick up the three men. He picked them up and took them to Jones's apartment. He testified that both appellant and Jones had noticeable amounts of blood on their clothing, which they explained by saying they had been in a fight. Two or three days later Thomas was observed to be in possession of Miss Shehane's television, and when he was arrested he called his roommate and asked that he get rid of it. Thomas's palmprint was found on the windshield of Miss Shehane's car, and he was arrested with the murder weapon in his possession.

When appellant was arrested in California, he was using the alias Eddie Ivory. He said that he knew he had been indicted for the rape and murder of a Birmingham girl, but did not surrender because he was afraid the police had a strong case against him. He testified that he left school in January, after Miss Shehane's death in December, and that he stayed with his mother in Memphis until he saw the police entering his mother's house, and then he went to live in California.

From an examination of the record, we find that the State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude, by fair inference, that appellant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, of the crime charged. It is settled law that whether circumstantial evidence tending to implicate a defendant in a crime excludes every other reasonable hypothesis, to a moral certainty, is a question for the jury and not the court. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the jury. Cumbo v. State, 368 So.2d 871 (Ala.Crim.App.1978), cert. denied, 368 So.2d 877 (Ala.1979); Cannon v. State, 17 Ala.App. 82, 81 So. 860 (1919).

The next issue appellant raises is whether the trial court erred in admitting the testimony given by Officer Robbins in appellant's first trial.

In Williams v. State, 375 So.2d 1257, 1269, (Ala.Crim.App.), cert. denied, 375 So.2d 1271 (Ala.1979), this court held that "[t]estimony of a witness in a former trial is admissible in a second trial when,...