Neal v. Vannoy
| Decision Date | 20 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION CASE NO. 15-5390 |
| Parties | Jarrell NEAL v. Darrel VANNOY, Warden |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
Cecelia Trenticosta Kappel, The Capital Appeals Project, New Orleans, LA, Rachel I. Conner, Rachel I. Conner, Attorney at Law, New Orleans, LA, for Jarrell Neal.
Juliet L. Clark, District Attorney's Office Parish of Jefferson, Gretna, LA, Matthew R. Clauss, Office of the District Attorney Department of Research and Appeals, Gretna, LA, for Darrel Vannoy, Warden.
SECTION: "G" (3)
ORDER AND REASONS
Petitioner Jarrell Neal ("Petitioner"), a state prisoner incarcerated in the Louisiana State Penitentiary in Angola, Louisiana, seeks habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 from his conviction for two counts of first-degree murder and the sentence of death on each count.1 Petitioner was convicted of murdering Greg Vickers and Fergus Robinson on March 31, 1998 at the home of Claudette Hurst in Metairie, Louisiana. The primary issue at Petitioner's trial was his identity as the shooter. Considering that Petitioner, his half-brother Zannie Neal, and his uncle Arthur Darby were apprehended by the police as they fled the scene, there was little dispute that the trio were involved in the commission of the offense and were each culpable to some extent. The defense sought to persuade the jury that Petitioner was the least culpable because he stayed in the car while his brother and uncle murdered the victims, whereas the State relied on the testimony of cooperating witness, Arthur Darby, to show that Petitioner was the shooter and thus the most culpable. In fact, the State's theory rested almost entirely on Darby's testimony, as Claudette Hurst, the only eyewitness to testify at Petitioner's trial, described the shooter as someone who seemed to match a physical description of Arthur Darby rather than Jarrell Neal.2 As the Louisiana Supreme Court recognized on direct appeal, the jury's assessment of Arthur Darby's credibility was critical to the State's case.3
Despite the importance of Arthur Darby's testimony, it went largely unchallenged by defense counsel. Specifically, three pieces of evidence with clear impeachment value were not used to impeach Darby, nor were they offered into evidence during Petitioner's trial at all: (1) a serology report indicating the possible presence of blood on the shoes the Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Office collected from Arthur Darby on the night of the murder4 (the "serology report"); (2) a forensic report showing that Petitioner's shoes5 were excluded as the source of the bloody shoeprint found at the scene, whereas Zannie Neal's shoes6 could not be excluded as the source (the "shoeprint analysis report"); and (3) an inconsistent prior statement of Darby from February 22, 1999, wherein Darby told the police that Petitioner did not have a gun when he exited the vehicle (the "February 22, 1999 statement"). Petitioner primarily argues that the State violated Brady v. Maryland7 by failing to disclose this evidence to the defense before trial.8 Alternatively, if the evidence was disclosed to the defense, Petitioner asserts that his counsel violated Strickland v. Washington9 by failing to offer the evidence in his defense.10
In the state post-conviction proceedings, the trial court concluded that no Brady violation occurred because the shoeprint analysis report, the serology report, and the February 22, 1999 statement were disclosed to the defense.11 Ultimately, for the reasons discussed in detail below, the Court credits the state trial court's factual finding and concludes that the Brady claim fails because Petitioner has not met his burden to show that these three items of evidence were in fact suppressed. Therefore, this Court's inquiry must focus on Petitioner's argument that counsel's failure to use this evidence to impeach Arthur Darby's testimony rendered his performance deficient.
With respect to the Strickland claim, the state trial court found that counsel's decisions were "strategic choices" that could not have affected the verdict because Petitioner "was involved in the commission of the offense along with his co-defendants including attempting to kill police officers with a high powered assault rifle while fleeing the scene" and the "conviction would remain unchanged when considered in light of his role as a principal."12 This finding was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. The record reflects that defense counsel did not review the forensic evidence in this case, and his failure to use the evidence was an oversight, not a strategic choice.13
Moreover, there is a reasonable probability that but for this error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Petitioner could not have been convicted of first-degree murder without evidence establishing his requisite mental state—that Petitioner had the specific intent to kill the victims. The testimony of Arthur Darby was the only evidence establishing that Petitioner entered the house with the specific intent to kill the victims. The jury heard testimony from Hurst, indicating that the shooter did not match the physical description of Petitioner, "but, nevertheless, accepted Darby's testimony implicating [Petitioner]."14 This credibility determination was within the purview of the jury. However, defense counsel failed to inform the jury of key information calling into question Darby's version of the events. Given the importance of Darby's testimony to the State's case and the value of the impeachment evidence, no fairminded jurist could conclude that the failure to impeach Darby's testimony with evidence showing the presence of blood on his shoe would not have "undermine[d] confidence in the outcome."15
Alternatively, even assuming that the state courts’ denial of relief was not unreasonable, Petitioner has demonstrated that he is entitled to relief on his procedurally defaulted ineffective assistance of counsel claim brought under Martinez v. Ryan .16 In 2019, while this federal habeas petition was pending, an expert retained by Petitioner's counsel conducted DNA testing on a thread made from the blood debris evidence recovered from the left Nike brand tennis shoe, which the JPSO chain of custody report identifies as item 13 recovered from Arthur Darby.17 That testing showed that it is "approximately 100 quintillion times more likely [ ] the DNA originated from Greg Vickers than if the DNA originated from an unknown individual."18 The results of the DNA testing demonstrate that counsel's performance prejudiced the defense. While Darby testified that he remained in the car during the shooting, the DNA testing reveals the presence of the victim's blood on Darby's shoe. Therefore, both Petitioner's trial counsel and his post-conviction counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to test the blood evidence.
The role of a federal habeas court is not to adjudicate a petitioner's guilt or innocence.19 For this reason, "[f]ederal habeas review of state convictions has traditionally been limited to claims of constitutional violations occurring in the course of the underlying state criminal proceedings."20 A conviction cannot stand if it results "specifically and directly from the consequences of [the denial of] the right to effective counsel in violation of ... the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution."21 For the reasons discussed in more detail below, Petitioner was denied effective counsel both at trial and during the state post-conviction proceedings. Accordingly, his first-degree murder convictions and the resulting death sentences cannot stand.
On May 21, 1998, Petitioner was charged by Indictment with two counts of first-degree murder in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana.22 Petitioner was indicted with his older half-brother, Zannie Neal, and their uncle, Arthur Darby.23 After Darby turned state's witness and the trial court severed the brothers’ cases, Petitioner's case proceeded to trial by jury beginning on February 23, 1999 in the Twenty-Fourth Judicial District Court for the Parish of Jefferson.24
The charges related to the murders of Greg Vickers and Fergus Robinson on March 31, 1998 at the home of Claudette Hurst in Metairie, Louisiana. At Petitioner's trial, Claudette Hurst testified that she was at home that evening with her boyfriend Fergus Robinson, her three children, her brother Carl Duncan, and a friend, Keinna Porter.25 Hurst had fallen asleep on a sofa in the den.26 At approximately 11:30 p.m., she was awakened by "some noise" and heard Robinson "telling someone to take it outside."27 Hurst looked into an adjoining room and saw a person (later identified as victim Greg Vickers) with a red hood over his head kneeling on the floor and a tall, thin person dressed in black clothing aiming a rifle at Vickers.28 Although Hurst was acquainted with Petitioner, she testified that she never saw him on the night of the shooting.29
Hurst and Robinson ran to a bedroom where Carl Duncan and Keinna Porter were smoking marijuana.30 Duncan and Robinson held the door shut against the intruder's repeated attempts to push his way into the room.31 Unable to enter the room, the intruder fired multiple shots through the door, hitting both men.32 Robinson suffered a fatal gunshot wound to his right thigh which severed his femoral artery.33 Duncan was shot in the right arm but survived the injury.34
Greg Vickers’ body was found lying near the threshold of a side door.35 He suffered two fatal gunshot wounds to his neck which severed his carotid artery.36 Crime scene investigation uncovered four spent 7.62 caliber casings, four bullet holes in the door to the bedroom, and a bloody shoeprint on the tile.37 Investigators did not dust for fingerprints.38 Robinson was found holding twelve rocks of crack cocaine in his hand, and Vickers had a crack pipe...
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