O'neal-Vidales v. Richard L. Clark, Affirmative Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 26 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-14-0549,2-14-0549 |
| Citation | 2014 IL App (2d) 140549 -U |
| Parties | ADDIE M. O'NEAL-VIDALES, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellant, v. RICHARD L. CLARK, AFFIRMATIVE INSURANCE COMPANY., and FOUNDERS INSURANCE COMPANY., Defendants and Counterplaintiffs (Founders Insurance Company, Defendant and Counterplaintiff-Appellee). |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago County.
Honorable J. Edward Prochaska Judge, Presiding.
¶ 1 Held: The insurance policy's exclusion provision unambiguously excluded uninsured motorist coverage for vehicles furnished to plaintiff for her regular use. Because plaintiff testified in a deposition that she used the same truck while working for the USPS, the truck was furnished to her for her regular use and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in Founders Insurance's favor. We affirmed.
¶ 2 In September 2009, plaintiff, Addie M. O'Neal-Vidales, while employed for the United States Postal Service (USPS) and driving one of its trucks, was in an accident with defendant, Richard L. Clark. Plaintiff suffered injuries and filed a claim with Clark's liability insurer, defendant Affirmative Insurance Company. Affirmative Insurance denied plaintiff's claim and she filed a claim for uninsured motorist coverage with her insurance carrier, defendant Founders Insurance Company, which also denied coverage.
¶ 3 Thereafter, plaintiff brought the current matter, seeking a declaratory judgment against Affirmative Insurance and Founders Insurance. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding coverage. The trial court denied plaintiff's and Affirmative Insurance's motions, but granted summary judgment in Founders Insurance's favor. Pursuant to Rule 304(a) (eff. Feb. 26, 2010), plaintiff appeals the trial court's determination to grant summary judgment in favor of Founders Insurance while denying her cross-motion for summary judgment against that defendant (Clark and Affirmative Insurance are not parties to this appeal). We affirm.
¶ 5 The pleadings, depositions, and affidavits on file reflect that plaintiff was employed by USPS as a collector, picking up mail from various blue boxes. Plaintiff would drive the same truck every day while at work and her shift during the relevant time period was from 10 a.m. until 6:30 p.m. As she approached the intersection of 7th Street and 18th Avenue in Rockford, Clark's vehicle struck plaintiff and plaintiff suffered injuries to her neck, right arm, left shoulder, and fractured her left hand, left knee, and left leg. Following the accident, plaintiff filed a workers compensation claim, which USPS honored.
¶ 6 After Affirmative Insurance, Clark's liability insurance carrier, denied plaintiff's claim for coverage, plaintiff filed a claim with Founders Insurance, her insurer, for uninsured motoristcoverage. Founders Insurance denied plaintiff's claim pursuant to the exclusion provision of her policy. That provision provides:
"PART [4] - UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
Exclusions. The policy does not apply under Part [4]:
(m) to bodily injury of an insured while occupying a motor vehicle owned by, or furnished for the regular use of the name insured, a resident spouse or a relative if that motor vehicle is not described in the declarations of this policy or is not a newly acquired or replacement motor vehicle within the meaning of subsection (c) of the definition of 'owned automobile' in this policy;"
¶ 7 On May 24, 2011, plaintiff filed her complaint. As amended, the complaint sought a declaratory judgment against Founders Insurance. Plaintiff alleged that she suffered injuries during an automobile accident, made a claim for uninsured motorist coverage with Founders Insurance, and Founders Insurance denied the claim. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the USPS vehicle was covered under her insurance policy and that Founders Insurance was obligated to provide benefits for uninsured motorist coverage.
¶ 8 On July 22, 2013, Founders Insurance filed a motion for summary judgment. Relying on section 4(m), Founders Insurance argued that the USPS vehicle was not described in the policy, that the vehicle was furnished to plaintiff for her regular use, and plaintiff used the truck on a daily basis in connection with her work. Founders Insurance argued that "[r]egular use exceptions, like the one [here], have been found by Illinois courts to be unambiguous and not against public policy."
¶ 9 On March 18, 2014, plaintiff filed her motion for summary judgment against Founders Insurance. Plaintiff emphasized that the purpose of mandatory liability insurance is to protectthe public from injuries sustained in motor vehicle accidents. According to plaintiff, "the legislature has required uninsured-motorist coverage to place the policyholder in substantially the same position he would occupy *** if the wrongful driver had had the minimum liability insurance required by [law]." Plaintiff argued that Affirmative Insurance denied her claim for coverage and, therefore, she was entitled to coverage under her policy with Founders Insurance. Plaintiff argued that the exclusion Founders Insurance claimed was both inapplicable and against public policy, and maintained that the purpose of the policy exclusion was to "prevent individual policy holders from owning two or more vehicles, but only paying the premium and insuring one vehicle." Plaintiff further argued that denying her coverage deprived her of the benefits "for which she has in fact paid premiums."
¶ 10 On May 16, 2014, the trial court entered an order denying plaintiff's summary judgment motion and granting Founders Insurance's summary judgment motion. Plaintiff timely appealed pursuant to Rule 304(a).
¶ 12 Plaintiff's only contention on appeal is that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in Founders Insurance's favor while denying her motion for summary judgment. In support of this contention, plaintiff argues that the coverage exclusion provided in paragraph 4(m) does not apply because the postal truck was not available to her unless she was working within the scope of her employment. Further, plaintiff reiterates the argument she made before the trial court that "the purpose of the exclusion cited *** was to prevent individual policy holders from owning two or more vehicles, but only paying the premium and insuring one vehicle."
¶ 13 The construction of an insurance policy and a determination of the rights and obligations arising under the policy are questions of law for the court, and summary judgment is an appropriate proceeding for resolving these questions. Crum & Forster Managers Corp. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 156 Ill. 2d 384, 391 (1993). "When, as in this case, parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they concede the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and invite the court to decide the questions presented as a matter of law." Steadfast Insurance Co. v. Caremark Rx, Inc., 359 Ill. App. 3d 749, 755 (2005). A trial court will enter summary judgment if the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits show that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2010); Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, 191 Ill. 2d 278, 291 (2000). We review de novo an order granting or denying summary judgment. See Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill. 2d 281, 309 (2010).
¶ 14 Section 143(a) of the Illinois Insurance Code (the Insurance Code) provides that every liability insurance policy issued for a motor vehicle registered in Illinois must provide coverage for bodily injury or death caused by an uninsured or a hit-and-run vehicle. 215 ILCS 5/143a (West 2008)). The legislative purpose behind underinsured motorist coverage is to " 'place the insured in the same position he would have occupied if the tortfeasor had carried adequate insurance.' " Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Rosen, 242 Ill. 2d 48, 57 (2011) (quoting Sulser v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 147 Ill. 2d 548, 555-58 (1992).
¶ 15 At issue in this appeal is the policy's exclusion provision provided in 4(m). A court's primary objective in construing the language of an insurance policy is to ascertain and give effect to the intentions of the parties as expressed in their agreement. Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 417 (2008). If the policy terms are clear and unambiguous, they must be given theirplain and ordinary meaning; but if the terms are susceptible to more than one meaning, they are considered ambiguous and will be construed strictly against the insurer who drafted the policy. Pekin Insurance Co. v. Wilson, 237 Ill. 2d 446, 455-56 (2010). Provisions that limit or exclude coverage will be interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and against the insurer. Id. at 456. A court must construe the policy as a whole and take into account the type of insurance purchased, the nature of the risks involved, and the overall purpose of the contract. Id.
¶ 16 In Ryan v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 397 Ill. App. 3d 48 (2009), an uninsured motorist injured the plaintiff, a Chicago police officer, while the plaintiff was operating a police vehicle owned by his employer. Id. at 49. The plaintiff had never driven that specific vehicle, which was randomly assigned to him at the beginning of his shift from a pool of 20 to 25 vehicles. Id. The plaintiff filed a claim for uninsured motorist coverage with the defendant pursuant to a policy covering a vehicle that he owned. Id. The plaintiff's insurance policy provided the following exclusion:
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