Nebbia v. People of State of New York, No. 531

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Writing for the CourtROBERTS
Citation78 L.Ed. 940,291 U.S. 502,89 A.L.R. 1469,54 S.Ct. 505
PartiesNEBBIA v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK
Docket NumberNo. 531
Decision Date05 March 1934

291 U.S. 502
54 S.Ct. 505
78 L.Ed. 940
NEBBIA

v.

PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK.

No. 531.
Argued Dec. 4, 5, 1933.
Decided March 5, 1934.

Appeal from the County Court of Monroe County, New York.

[Syllabus from pages 502-504 intentionally omitted]

Page 504

Mr. Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., of Rochester, N.Y., for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 504-510 intentionally omitted]

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Mr. Henry S. Manley, of Albany, N.Y., for appellee.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 510-515 intentionally omitted]

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Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.

The Legislature of New York established by chapter 158 of the Laws of 1933, a Milk Control Board with power, among other things to 'fix minimum and maximum * * * retail prices to be charged by * * * stores to consumers for consumption off the premises where sold.' Agriculture and Markets Law N.Y. (Consol. Laws, c. 69) § 312. The board fixed nine cents as the price to be charged by a store for a quart of milk. Nebbia, the proprietor of a grocery store in Rochester, sold two quarts and a 5-cent loaf of bread for 18 cents; and was convicted for violating the board's order. At his trial he asserted the statute and order contravene the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and renewed the contention in successive appeals to the county court and Court of Appeals. Both overruled his claim and affirmed the conviction.1

The question for decision is whether the Federal Constitution prohibits a state from so fixing the selling price of milk. We first inquire as to the occasion for the legislation and its history.

During 1932 the prices received by farmers for milk were much below the cost of production. The decline in prices during 1931 and 1932 was much greater than that of prices generally. The situation of the families of dairy producers had become desperate and called for state aid similar to that afforded the unemployed, if conditions should not improve.

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On March 10, 1932, the senate and assembly resolved, 'That a joint Legislative committee is hereby created * * * to investigate the causes of the decline of the price of milk to producers and the resultant effect of the low prices upon the dairy industry and the future supply of milk to the cities of the State; to investigate the cost of distribution of milk and its relation to prices paid to milk producers, to the end that the consumer may be assured of an adequate supply of milk at a reasonable price, both to producer and consumer.' The committee organized May 6, 1932, and its activities lasted nearly a year. It held 13 public hearings at which 254 witnesses testified and 2,350 typewritten pages of testimony were taken. Numerous exhibits were submitted. Under its direction an extensive research program was prosecuted by experts and official bodies and employees of the state and municipalities, which resulted in the assembling of much pertinent information. Detailed reports were received from over 100 distributors of milk, and these were collated and the information obtained analyzed. As a result of the study of this material a report covering 473 closely printed pages, embracing the conclusions and recommendations of the committee, was presented to the Legislature April 10, 1933. This document included detailed findings with copious references to the supporting evidence; appendices outlining the nature and results of prior investigations of the milk industry of the state, briefs upon the legal questions involved, and forms of bills recommended for passage. The conscientious effort and thoroughness exhibited by the report lend weight to the committee's conclusions.

In part those conclusions are:

Milk is an essential item of diet. It cannot long be stored. It is an excellent medium for growth of bacteria. These facts necessitate safeguards in its production and handling for human consumption which greatly increase

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the cost of the business. Failure of producers to receive a reasonable return for their labor and investment over an extended period threaten a relaxation of vigilance against contamination.

The production and distribution of milk is a paramount industry of the state, and largely affects the health and prosperity of its people. Dairying yields fully one-half of the total income from all farm products. Dairy farm investment amounts to approximately $1,000,000,000. Curtailment or destruction of the dairy industry would cause a serious economic loss to the people of the state.

In addition to the general price decline, other causes for the low price of milk include a periodic increase in the number of cows and in milk production, the prevalence of unfair and destructive trade practices in the distribution of milk, leading to a demoralization of prices in the metropolitan area and other markets, and the failure of transportation and distribution charges to be reduced in proportion to the reduction in retail prices for milk and cream.

The fluid milk industry is affected by factors of instability peculiar to itself which call for special methods of control. Under the best practicable adjustment of supply to demand the industry must carry a surplus of about 20 per cent., because milk, an essential food, must be available as demanded by consumers every day in the year, and demand and supply vary from day to day and according to the reason; but milk is perishable and cannot be stored. Close adjustment of supply to demand is hindered by several factors difficult to control. Thus surplus milk presents a serious problem, as the prices which can be realized for it for other uses are much less than those obtainable for milk sold for consumption in fluid form or as cream. A satisfactory stabilization of prices for fluid milk requires that the burden of surplus milk be shared equally by all producers and all distributors in the milk

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shed. So long as the surplus burden is unequally distributed the pressure to market surplus milk in fluid form will be a serious disturbing factor. The fact that the larger distributors find it necessary to carry large quantities of surplus milk, while the smaller distributors do not, leads to price-cutting and other forms of destructive competition. Smaller distributors, who take no responsibility for the surplus, by purchasing their milk at the blended prices (i.e., an average between the price paid the producer for milk for sale as fluid milk, and the lower surplus milk price paid by the larger organizations) can undersell the larger distributors. Indulgence in this price-cutting often compels the larger dealer to cut the price to his own and the producer's detriment.

Various remedies were suggested, amongst them united action by producers, the fixing of minimum prices for milk and cream by state authority, and the imposition of certain graded taxes on milk dealers proportioned so as to equalize the cost of milk and cream to all dealers and so remove the cause of price-cutting.

The Legislature adopted chapter 158 as a method of correcting the evils, which the report of the committee showed could not be expected to right themselves through the ordinary play of the forces of supply and demand, owing to the peculiar and uncontrollable factors affecting the industry. The provisions of the statute are summarized in the margin.2

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Section 312(e) on which the prosecution in the present case is founded, provides: 'After the board shall have fixed prices to be charged or paid for milk in any form

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* * * it shall be unlawful for a milk dealer to sell or buy or offer to sell or buy milk at any price less or more than such price, * * * and no method or device shall be lawful whereby milk is bought or sold * * * at a price less or more than such price * * * whether by any discount, or rebate, or free service, or advertising allowance, or a combined price for such milk together with another commodity or commodities, or service or services, which is less or more than the aggregate of the prices for the milk and the price or prices for such other commodity or commodities, or service or services, when sold or offered for sale separately or otherwise. * * *'

First. The appellant urges that the order of the Milk Control Board denies him the equal protection of the laws. It is shown that the order requires him, if he purchases his supply from a dealer, to pay 8 cents per quart and

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5 cents per pint, and to resell at not less than 9 and 6, whereas the same dealer may buy his supply from a farmer at lower prices and deliver milk to consumers at 10 cents the quart and 6 cents the pint. We think the contention that the discrimination deprives the appellant of equal protection is not well founded. For aught that appears, the appellant purchased his supply of milk from a farmer as do distributors, or could have procured it from a farmer if he so desired. There is therefore no showing that the order placed him at a disadvantage, or in fact affected him adversely, and this alone is fatal to the claim of denial of equal protection. But if it were shown that the appellant is compelled to buy from a distributor, the difference in the retail price he is required to charge his customers, from that prescribed for sales by distributors is not on its face arbitrary or unreasonable, for there are obvious distinctions between the two sorts of merchants which may well justify a difference of treatment, if the Legislature possesses the power to control the prices to be charged for fluid milk. Compare American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 21 S.Ct. 43, 45 L.Ed. 102; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U.S. 563, 30 S.Ct. 578, 54 L.Ed. 883; State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527, 51 S.Ct. 540, 75 L.Ed. 1248, 73 A.L.R. 1464.

Second. The more serious question is whether, in the light of the conditions disclosed, the...

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1449 practice notes
  • Barrick Gold Exploration, Inc. v. Hudson, No. C2-93-0104.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • June 16, 1993
    ...law only if it is arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539, 54 S.Ct. 505, 516-17, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934). The statute will stand if a rational relationship exists between it and a legitimate gover......
  • Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company, No. 71-1113.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • August 2, 1972
    ...in the decades of the 1860's and 1870's.8 The public affectation doctrine of Munn v. Illinois was replaced in 1934 by Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, where the Court declared that the state could regulate and interfere, by virtue of its police powers, wherever ......
  • United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., Civ. A. No. 75-3096
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
    • March 29, 1977
    ...legislative purpose and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied . . .. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537, 54 S.Ct. 505, 516, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934). Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955), and City ......
  • Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Co, No. 566
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • May 6, 1935
    ...and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469. 6 Cong. Rec., vol. 78, p. 5699. 7 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co.,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1446 cases
  • Barrick Gold Exploration, Inc. v. Hudson, No. C2-93-0104.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. Southern District of Ohio
    • June 16, 1993
    ...law only if it is arbitrary, discriminatory or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy the legislature is free to adopt. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539, 54 S.Ct. 505, 516-17, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934). The statute will stand if a rational relationship exists between it and a legitimate gover......
  • Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Company, No. 71-1113.
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • August 2, 1972
    ...in the decades of the 1860's and 1870's.8 The public affectation doctrine of Munn v. Illinois was replaced in 1934 by Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, where the Court declared that the state could regulate and interfere, by virtue of its police powers, wherever ......
  • United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., Civ. A. No. 75-3096
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court (Eastern District of Pennsylvania)
    • March 29, 1977
    ...legislative purpose and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied . . .. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537, 54 S.Ct. 505, 516, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934). Cf. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955), and City ......
  • Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Co, No. 566
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • May 6, 1935
    ...and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940, 89 A.L.R. 1469. 6 Cong. Rec., vol. 78, p. 5699. 7 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co.,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Antitrust's “State Action” Doctrine and the Policy of the Commerce Clause
    • United States
    • Antitrust Bulletin Nbr. 39-3, September 1994
    • September 1, 1994
    ...to prohibitanticompetitive actions by the States in their governmental capacities assovereign regulators.").73 See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); West Coast Hotelv. Parish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).74 See Easterbrook, The ConstitutionofBusiness, ......
  • The New Deal: the Decline of Government
    • United States
    • Political Research Quarterly Nbr. 4-3, September 1951
    • September 1, 1951
    ...of legal speculations. 4 Tyson v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418 (1926).5 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495 (1935).6 Nebbia v. N.Y., 291 U.S. 502 ment might have, he could find no answer because actually there was none. All he could be certain of was the existence of a politically hostile......

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