Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart

Decision Date30 June 1976
Docket NumberNo. 75-817,75-817
PartiesNEBRASKA PRESS ASSOCIATION et al., Petitioners, v. Hugh STUART, Judge, District Court of Lincoln County, Nebraska, et al
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Respondent Nebraska state trial judge, in anticipation of a trial for a multiple murder which had attracted widespread news coverage, entered an order which, as modified by the Nebraska Supreme Court, restrained petitioner newspapers, broadcasters, journalists, news media associations, and national newswire services from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions or admissions made by the accused to law enforcement officers or third parties, except members of the press, and other facts "strongly implicative" of the accused. The modification of the order had occurred in the course of an action by petitioners, which had sought a stay of the trial court's original order and in which the accused and the State of Nebraska intervened. This Court granted certiorari to determine whether the order violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press. The order expired by its own terms when the jury was impaneled. Respondent was convicted; his appeal is pending in the Nebraska Supreme Court. Held:

1. The case is not moot simply because the order has expired, since the controversy between the parties is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." Pp. 546-547.

2. While the guarantees of freedom of expression are not an absolute prohibition under all circumstances, the barriers to prior restraint remain high and the presumption against its use continues intact. Although it is unnecessary to establish a priority between First Amendment rights and the Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial under all circumstances, as the authors of the Bill of Rights themselves declined to do, the protection against prior restraint should have particular force as applied to reporting of criminal proceedings. Pp. 556-562.

3. The heavy burden imposed as a condition to securing a prior restraint was not met in this case. Pp. 562-570.

(a) On the pretrial record the trial judge was justified in concluding that there would be intense and pervasive pretrial publicity concerning the case, and he could also reasonably conclude, based on common human experience, that publicity might impair the accused's right to a fair trial. His conclusion as to the impact of such publicity on prospective jurors was of necessity speculative, however, dealing as he was with factors unknown and unknowable. Pp. 562-563.

(b) There is no finding that measures short of prior restraint on the press and speech would not have protected the accused's rights; the Nebraska Supreme Court no more than implied that alternative measures might not suffice, and the record lacks evidence that would support such a finding. Pp. 563-565.

(c) It is not clear that prior restraint on publication would have effectively protected the accused's rights, in view of such practical problems as the limited territorial jurisdiction of the trial court issuing the restraining order, the difficulties inherent in predicting what information will in fact undermine the jurors' impartiality, the problem of drafting an order that will effectively keep prejudicial information from prospective jurors, and the fact that in this case the events occurred in a small community where rumors would travel swiftly by word of mouth. Pp. 565-567.

(d) To the extent that the order prohibited the reporting of evidence adduced at the open preliminary hearing held to determine whether the accused should be bound over for trial, it violated the settled principle that "there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the courtroom," Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-363, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 1522, 16 L.Ed.2d 600, and the portion of the order restraining publication of other facts "strongly implicative" of the accused is too vague and too broad to survive the scrutiny given to restraints on First Amendment rights. Pp. 567-568.


E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., Washington, D. C., for petitioners.

Floyd Abrams, New York City, for National Broadcasting Co., Inc., and others as amici curiae, by special leave of Court.

Harold Mosher, Lincoln, Neb., for respondent Hugh Stuart, Judge.

Milton L. Larson, North Platte, Neb., for respondent State of Nebraska.

Mr. ief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The respondent State District Judge entered an order restraining the petitioners from publishing or broadcasting accounts of confessions or admission made by the accused or facts "strongly implicative" of the accused in a widely reported murder of six persons. We granted certiorari to decide whether the entry of such an order on the showing made before the state court violated the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.

[Amicus Curiae Information from page 541 intentionally omitted]


On the evening of October 18, 1975, local police found the six members of the Henry Kellie family murdered in their home in Sutherland, Neb., a town of about 850 people. Police released the description of a suspect, Erwin Charles Simants, to the reporters who had hastened to the scene of the crime. Simants was arrested and arraigned in Lincoln County Court the following morning, ending a tense night for this small rural community.

The crime immediately attracted widespread news coverage, by local, regional, and national newspapers, radio and television stations. Three days after the crime, the County Attorney and Simants' attorney joined in asking the County Court to enter a restrictive order relating to "matters that may or may not be publicly reported or disclosed to the public," because of the "mass coverage by news media" and the "reasonable likelihood of prejudicial news which would make difficult, if not impossible, the impaneling of an impartial jury and tend to prevent a fair trial." The County Court heard oral argument but took no evidence; no attorney for members of the press appeared at this stage. The County Court granted the prosecutor's motion for a restrictive order and entered it the next day, October 22. The order prohibited everyone in attendance from "releas(ing) or authoriz(ing) the release for public dissemination in any form or manner whatsoever any testimony given or evidence adduced"; the order also required members of the press to observe the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines.1 Simants' preliminary hearing was held the same day, open to the public but subject to the order. The County Court bound over the defendant for trial to the State District Court. The charges, as amended to reflect the autopsy findings, were that Simants had committed the murders in the course of a sexual assault.

Petitioners several press and broadcast associations, publishers, and individual reporters moved on October 23 for leave to intervene in the District Court, asking that the restrictive order imposed by the County Court be vacated. The District Court conducted a hearing, at which the County Judge testified and newspaper articles about the Simants case were admitted in evidence. The District Judge granted petitioners' motion to intervene and, on October 27, entered his own restrictive order. The judge found "because of the nature of the crimes charged in the complaint that there is a clear and present danger that pre-trial publicity could impinge upon the defendant's right to a fair trial." The order applied only until the jury was impaneled, and specifically prohibited petitioners from reporting five subjects: (1) the existence or contents of a confession Simants had made to law enforcement officers, which had been introduced in open court at arraignment; (2) the fact or nature of statements Simants had made to other persons; (3) the contents of a note he had written the night of the crime; (4) certain aspects of the medical testimony at the preliminary hearing; and (5) the identity of the victims of the alleged sexual assault and the nature of the assault. It also prohibited reporting the exact nature of the restrictive order itself. Like the County Court's order, this order incorporated the Nebraska Bar-Press Guidelines. Finally, the order set out a plan for attendance, seating, and courthouse traffic control during the trial.

Four days later, on October 31, petitioners asked the District Court to stay its order. At the same time, they applied to the Nebraska Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, a stay, and an expedited appeal from the order. The State of Nebraska and the defendant Simants intervened in these actions. The Nebraska Supreme Court heard oral argument on November 25, and issued its Per curiam opinion December 1. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975). 2 The Nebraska Supreme Court balanced the "heavy presumption against . . . constitutional validity" that an order restraining publication bears, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 2141, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971), against the importance of the defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury. Both society and the individual defendant, the court held, had a vital interest in assuring that Simants be tried by an impartial jury. Because of the publicity surrounding the crime, the court determined that this right was in jeopardy. The court noted that Nebraska statutes required the District Court to try Simants within six months of his arrest, and that a change of venue could move the trial only to adjoining counties, which had been subject to essentially the same publicity as Lincoln County. The Nebraska Supreme Court held that "(u)nless the absolutist position of the relators was constitutionally correct, it would appear that the District Court acted properly." 194 Neb., at 797, 236 N.W.2d, at 803.

The Nebraska Supreme Court rejected that "absolutist position," but modified the District Court's order to accommodate the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1456 cases
  • Goldin v. Public Utilities Commission
    • United States
    • California Supreme Court
    • March 15, 1979
    ...that prior restraints on speech are "the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." (Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart (1976) 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2803, 49 L.Ed.2d 683; see Near v. Minnesota (1931) 283 U.S. 697, 712-714, 51 S.Ct. 625, 75 L.Ed. 1357; New York Times Co......
  • Courthouse News Serv. v. Yamasaki
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Central District of California
    • May 9, 2018
    ...value of timely reporting in the context of prior restraints imposed on the press. See Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart , 427 U.S. 539, 609, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring). But as already explained, First Amendment negative rights are much broader than the affirmat......
  • Jones v. Chatman
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Georgia
    • September 30, 2019
    ...prejudice standard, however, is "rarely applicable," Coleman, 778 F. 2d at 1490 (quoting Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2800, 49 L. Ed. 2d 683 (1976)), and "is reserved for an extreme situation," Id. (quoting Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992, 997 (5th Cir.......
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey
    • October 29, 1990
    ...falls within the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" exception to mootness. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 2796-97, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976) ("jurisdiction is not necessarily defeated simply because the order attacked has expired, if the underl......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
3 firm's commentaries
45 books & journal articles
  • TV or not TV - that is the question.
    • United States
    • Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology Vol. 86 No. 3, March 1996
    • March 22, 1996 128 366 U.S. 717 (1961). 129 Id. at 720, 726. 130 Id. at 720, 723 citations omitted). 131 421 U.S. 794 1975). 132 Id. at 799. 133 427 U.S. 539, 551-53 134 Id. at 543-44. 135 Id. at 558 (citing Carroll v. Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 181 (1968)). 136 Id. at 569. The Court did not elab......
  • The Ideology of Supreme Court Opinions and Citations
    • United States
    • Iowa Law Review No. 97-3, March 2012
    • March 1, 2012
    ...U.S. 160 (1976) Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) Pasadena City Bd. of Ed. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976) Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) Woodson v. North C......
  • Gutting Bivens: How the Supreme Court Shielded Federal Officials from Constitutional Litigation.
    • United States
    • Missouri Law Review Vol. 85 No. 4, September 2020
    • September 22, 2020
    ...310, 318-19 (2010). (210.) Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 768 (2002). (211.) Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541 (212.) Martin H. Redish & Matthew B. Arnould, Judicial Review, Constitutional Interpretation, and the Democratic Dilemma: Proposing......
  • Trial
    • United States
    • James Publishing Practical Law Books Federal Criminal Practice
    • April 30, 2022
    ...firmer basis upon which the parties may exercise their peremptory challenges intelligently, See , e.g. , Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart , 427 U.S. 539, 602 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgement) ( voir dire “facilitate[s] intelligent exercise or peremptory challenges and [helps] ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT