Nebraska v. Iowa
| Decision Date | 24 April 1972 |
| Docket Number | O,No. 17,17 |
| Citation | 31 L.Ed.2d 733,406 U.S. 117,92 S.Ct. 1379 |
| Parties | State of NEBRASKA, Plaintiff, v. State of IOWA. rig |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
The exceptions to the Special Master's Report in this action brought by Nebraska for construction and enforcement of the Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compact of 1943, entered into to establish a permanent location of a boundary line made difficult by the meanderings of the Missouri River, are generally overruled. Iowa's exception to the Master's recommendation for an injunction enjoining Iowa from further prosecution of certain pending cases is sustained, as the Court is confident Iowa will abide by the adoption of the Master's conclusion that in any proceeding between a private litigant and the State in which a claim of title good under Nebraska law to land allegedly ceded to Iowa under the Compact is proved, Iowa shall not invoke its common-law doctrine of state ownership as defeating such title. The States may submit a proposed decree in accordance with this opinion, and, if they cannot agree, the Master will prepare and submit a recommended decree. Pp. 117-127.
Howard H. Moldenhauer, Omaha, Neb., for plaintiff.
Michael Murray, Logan, Iowa, for defendant.
Both Iowa and Nebraska filed Exceptions to the Report submitted by the Special Master in this original action brought by Nebraska against Iowa for construction and enforcement of the Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compact of 1943.1
The Missouri River is the boundary between the two States. In 1892, in another suit brought by Nebraska against Iowa, this Court held that the boundary line in the river at Carter Lake, Iowa, was to be located according to the principle that the boundary 'is a varying line' so far as affected by 'changes of diminution and accretion in the mere washing of the waters of the stream,' but not where the river is shifted by avulsion: 'By this selection of a new channel the boundary was not changed, and it remained as it was prior to the avulsion, the centre line of the old channel; . . . unless the waters of the river returned to their former bed, [such center line] became a fixed and unvarying boundary, no matter what might be the changes of the river in its new channel.' Nebraska v. Iowa, 143 U.S. 359, 370, 12 S.Ct. 396, 400, 36 L.Ed. 186 (1892); the decree is in 145 U.S. 519, 12 S.Ct. 976, 36 L.Ed. 798 (1892). The Compact adopts this line at Carter Lake, and for the rest of the boundary fixes the line in 'the middle of the main channel of the Missouri river,' defined as the 'center line of the proposed stabilized channel of the Missouri river as estab- lished by the United States engineers' office, Omaha, Nebraska, and shown on the alluvial plain maps of the Missouri river from Sioux City, Iowa, to Rulo, Nebraska, and identified by file numbers AP-1 to 4 inclusive, dated January 30, 1940, and file numbers AP-5 to 10 inclusive, dated March 29, 1940, which maps are now on file in the United States engineers' office at Omaha, Nebraska, and copies of which maps are now on file with the secretary of state of the state of Iowa and with the secretary of the State of Nebraska.' The 'proposed stabilized channel' refers to a project begun in the early 1930's by the United States Army Corps of Engineers to tame the river along its entire length by containing it within a designed channel. The work had been partially completed by 1943, but was suspended when World War II intervened. When work resumed in 1948, the channel was partly redesigned, and by 1959 the river had been confined in the newly designed channel.
The States determined in 1943 to agree by compact upon a permanent location of the boundary line when experience showed that 'the fickle Missouri River . . . refused to be bound by the Supreme Court decree [of 1892]. In the past thirty-five years the river has changed its course so often that it has proved impossible to apply the court decision in all cases, since it is difficult to determine whether the channel of the river has changed by 'the law of accretion' or 'that of avulsion." Eriksson, Boundaries of Iowa, 25 Iowa J. of Hist. and Pol. 233, 235 (1927). The Special Master found, on ample evidence, and we adopt his findings, that by 1943 the shifts of the river channel had been so numerous and intricate, both in its natural state and as a result of the work of the Corps of Engineers, that it would be practically impossible to locate the original boundary line.2
The fixing of the permanent boundary by Compact resulted in some riparian lands formerly in each State being located within the other State. This created the problem of the effect to be given by the new State to titles, mortgages, and other liens that had arisen under the laws of the other State. Sections 2 and 3 of the Compact were designed to solve this problem.3 Under § 2 each State 'cedes' to the other State 'and relinquishes jurisdiction over' all such lands now located within the Compact boundary of the other. Under § 3, '[t]itles, mortgages, and other liens' affecting such lands 'good in' the ceding State 'shall be good in' the other State.
The instant dispute between the States arose when Iowa in 1963 claimed state ownership of some 30 separate areas of land, water, marsh, or mixture of the three wholly on the Iowa side of the Compact boundary. The eighth and part of a ninth such areas were formed before 1943. The 21st and part of a 22d were formed after 1943.4 Iowa's claim was based on Iowa common law that private titles to riparian lands run only to the ordinary high-water mark on navigable streams and that the State is the owner of the beds of all navigable streams within the State and is also the owner of any islands that may form therein. McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa 1 (1856); Holman v. Hodges, 112 Iowa 714, 84 N.W. 950 (1901). The areas formed before 1943 lie south of Omaha and those formed after 1943 lie north of Omaha. Two of the pre-1943 areas are Nottleman Island and Schemmel Island. Each is the subject of an action to quiet title brought by Iowa in Iowa courts.5 The defense in each case is that there exist 'titles . . . good in Nebraska' to the islands that, under § 3 of the Compact, Iowa obligated itself to recognize to be 'good in Iowa' as against any claim of Iowa under its doctrine of state ownership.
Thus, the controversy between the States in this case centers around the proper construction of their Compact. The Special Master's Findings and Conclusions generally favor Nebraska's position on the merits of the controversy over the areas that formed before July 12, 1943, and Iowa's exceptions are addressed to them. On the other hand, the Findings and Conclusions favor Iowa's position on the merits of the controversy over the areas that formed after July 12, 1943, and Nebraska's exceptions are primarily addressed to them. We overrule all excep- tions, save two, of Nebraska's addressed to printing errors in the Report,6 except as we sustain, infra, Iowa's Exceptions IV and V insofar as the Special Master recommended that an injunction issue, and except as mentioned in n. 8, infra.
The Special Master construed the word 'cedes' in § 2 as meant by the States to describe all areas formed before July 12, 1943, regardless of their location with reference to the original boundary, whose '[t]itles, mortgages, and other liens' were, at the date of the Compact, 'good in' the ceding State, and ruled that, under § 3, the other State is bound to recognize such '[t]itles, mortgages, and other liens' to be 'good in' its State, and not to claim ownership in itself. Iowa urges, in its Exceptions II and III, that this construction is erroneous and that §§ 2 and 3 should be construed as relating only to areas formed before July 12, 1943, that can be proved by clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence to have been on the Nebraska side of the original boundary before the Compact fixed the permanent boundary. We overrule Iowa's Exceptions. Iowa's construction would require the claimant who proves title 'good in Nebraska' also to shoulder the burden of proving the location of the original boundary before 1943, as well as proving that the lands were on the Nebraska side of that boundary. That, said the Special Master, and we agree, 'would be placing a burden upon the land owner which the states themselves refused to undertake in 1943 and agreed would not be necessary. The states would in effect be saying to the land owners, 'we could not prove where the boundary was in 1943 but now, after we have waited 27 years, we are going to make you prove where it was at your expense even though we know it is impossible."7
Iowa's Exceptions IV and V concern the Special Master's findings that the State of Iowa does not own Nottleman Island and Schemmel Island. The Special Master found that the proofs sufficed to establish title 'good in Nebraska' to Nottleman Island and Schemmel Island, but did not suffice to prove title 'good in Nebraska' to the other areas claimed by Iowa that were formed before 1943.8 He found, and we agree, that titles 'good in Nebraska' include private titles to riparian lands that under Nebraska law, differing from Iowa law, run to the thread of the contiguous stream. Kinkead v. Turgeon, 74 Neb. 573, 104 N.W. 1061 (1905), 74 Neb. 580, 109 N.W. 744 (1906).9 He found further that titles 'good in Nebraska' embrace titles obtained by 10 years' open, notorious, and adverse possession under claim of right without any requirement of a record title; under Iowa law, a claim must be under 'COLOR OF TITLE,' REQUIRING SOME TYPE OF record title to commence the period of adverse possession.10
The Special Master recommended that as to areas formed before July 12, 1943, §§ 2 and 3 should be construed as limiting the State of Iowa to contesting with private litigants in state or federal courts the question whether the private claimants can prove title 'good in...
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