Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 509
Citation | 48 S.Ct. 447,277 U.S. 183,72 L.Ed. 842 |
Decision Date | 14 May 1928 |
Docket Number | No. 509,509 |
Parties | NECTOW v. CITY OF CAMBRIDGE et al |
Court | United States Supreme Court |
Messrs. Judson Hannigan and John E. Hannigan, both of Boston, Mass., for plaintiff in error.
Messrs. Peter J. Nelligan and Joseph P. Lyons, both of Boston, Mass., for defendants in error.
[Argument of Counsel from pages 183-185 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.
A zoning ordinance of the city of Cambridge divides the city into three kinds of districts, residential, business, and unrestricted. Each of these districts is subclassified in respect of the kind of buildings which way be erected. The ordinance is an elaborate one, and of the same general character as that considered by this court in Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272 U. S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114, 71 L. Ed. 303. In its general scope it is conceded to be constitutional within that decision. The land of plaintiff in error was put in district R-3, in which are permitted only dwellings, hotels, clubs, churches, schools, philanthropic institutions, greenhouses and gardening, with customary incidental accessories. The attack upon the ordinance is that, as specifically applied to plaintiff in error, it deprived him of his property without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The suit was for a mandatory injunction directing the city and its inspector of buildings to pass upon an application of the plaintiff in error for a permit to erect any lawful buildings upon a tract of land without regard to the provisions of the ordinance including such tract within a residential district. The case was referred to a master to make and report findings of fact. After a view of the premises and the surrounding territory, and a hearing, the master made and reported his findings. The case came on to be heard by a justice of the court, who, after confirming the master's report, reported the case for the determination of the full court. Upon consideration, that court sustained the ordinance as applied to plaintiff in error, and dismissed the bill. 157 N. E. 618.
A condensed statement of facts, taken from the master's report, is all that is necessary. When the zoning ordinance was enacted, plaintiff in error was and still is the owner of a tract of land containing 140,000 square feet, of which the locus here in question is a part. The locus contains about 29,000 square feet, with a frontage on Brookline street, lying west, of 304.75 feet, on Henry street, lying north, of 100 feet, on the other land of the plaintiff in error, lying east, of 264 feet, and on land of the Ford Motor Company, lying southerly, of 75 feet. The territory lying east and south is unrestricted. The lands beyond Henry street to the north and beyond Brookline street to the west are within a restricted residential district. The effect of the zoning is to separate from the west end of plaintiff in error's tract a strip 100 feet in width. The Ford Motor Company has a large auto assembling factory south of the locus; and a soap factory and the tracks of the Boston & Albany Railroad lie near. Opposite the locus, on Brookline street, and included in the same district, there are some residences; and opposite the locus, on Henry street, and in the same district, are other residences. The locus is now vacant although it was once occupied by a mansion house. Before the passage of the ordinance in question, plaintiff in error had outstanding a contract...
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