Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 September 1957
• Docket Number: No. 738,738
• Citation: 68 A.L.R.2d 1341,99 S.E.2d 756,246 N.C. 547
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: , 68 A.L.R.2d 1341 Marietta NEECE v. RICHMOND GREYHOUND LINES, Inc.

Page 756

99 S.E.2d 756

246 N.C. 547, 68 A.L.R.2d 1341

Marietta NEECE v. RICHMOND GREYHOUND LINES, Inc.

No. 738.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Sept. 18, 1957

C. C. Cates, Jr. and W. R. Dalton, Jr., Burlington, for plaintiff appellant.

Jordan & Wright and Perry C. Henson, Greensboro, for defendant appellee.

RODMAN, Justice.

The loss which plaintiff sustained results from a movement of goods in interstate commerce; hence, the rights of the parties must be determined by the application of appropriate Federal statutes. St. Sing v. Express Co., 183 N.C. 405, 111 S.E. 710; Scott v. Express Co., 189 N.C. 377, 127 S.E. 252; Crompton v. Baker, 220 N.C. 52, 16 S.E.2d 471.

Congress, by the Interstate Commerce Act (Part I, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-27) enacted in 1906, sanctioned a limitation of liability by carriers subject to the Act. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314; Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U.S. 97, 34 S.Ct. 526, 58 L.Ed. 868; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Woodbury, 254 U.S. 357, 41 S.Ct. 114, 65 L.Ed. 301. The Cummins Amendment adopted in 1915 prohibited carriers from limiting their liability. Adams Express Co. v. Darden, 265 U.S. 265, 44 S.Ct. 502, 68 L.Ed. 1010. Neither of these statutory provisions seemed to Congress to accord equitable treatment to both carrier and shipper.

In 1916 the second Cummins Amendment was adopted. It forbids limitation of liability except as there expressly provided for. These several provisions are now codified as 49 U.S.C.A. § 20(11). The provisions of that section material to this case read: 'Any common carrier * * * receiving property for transportation * * shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it * * * and no contract, receipt, rule, regulation, or other limitation of any character whatsoever shall exempt such common carrier * * * from the liability imposed; * * notwithstanding any limitation of liability or limitation of the amount of recovery or representation or agreement as to value in any such receipt or bill of lading, or in any contract, rule, regulation, or in any tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission; and any such limitation, without respect to the manner or form in which it is sought to be made is declared to be unlawful and void: * * * Provided, however, That the provisions hereof respecting liability for full actual loss, damage, or injury * * * shall not apply, first, to baggage carried on passenger trains or boats, or trains or boats carrying passengers (emphasis supplied); second, to property * * * received for transportation concerning which the carrier shall have been or shall be expressly authorized or required by order of the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish and maintain rates dependent upon the value declared in writing by the shipper or agreed upon in writing as the released value of the property, in which case such declaration or agreement shall have no other effect than to limit liability and recovery to an amount not exceeding the value so declared or released * * * and any tariff schedule which may be filed with the commission pursuant to such order shall contain specific reference thereto and may establish rates varying with the value so declared and agreed upon * * *.'

When these statutory provisions were enacted, the term 'common carrier' did not include a motor carrier. In 1935 Congress enacted the Motor Carrier Act, now Part II of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-327). The Act, by its terms, applies to the transportation of passengers or property by motor carriers engaged in interstate or foreign commerce. 49 U.S.C.A. § 302. It imposes on the Commission the duty'To regulate common carriers by motor vehicle * * * and to that end the Commission may establish reasonable requirements with respect to continuous and adequate service, transportation of baggage and express * * * and safety of operation and equipment.' 49 U.S.C.A. § 304.

49 U.S.C.A. § 316 provides: 'It shall be the duty of every common carrier of passengers by motor vehicle * * * to establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable * * * fares, and charges, and just and reasonable regulations and practices relating thereto, and to the issuance, form, and substance of tickets, the carrying of personal, sample, and excess baggage, the facilities for transportation, and all other matters relating to or connected with the transportation of passengers in interstate or foreign commerce * * *.' Other portions of sec. 316 impose responsibility for establishing reasonable rates and facilities substantially in conformity with the provision of other common carriers subject to Part I of the Interstate Commerce Act (49 U.S.C.A. § 6). Transportation without the filing of tariffs is forbidden.

Provision was made for motor carriers to limit their liability by sec. 319 which provides: 'The provisions of section 20 (11) and (12) of this title, together with such other provisions of chapter 1 of this title (including penalties) as may be necessary for the enforcement of such provisions, shall apply with respect to common carriers by motor vehicle with like force and effect as in the case of those persons to which such provisions are specifically applicable.'

Sec. 20 of Part I authorizing carriers other than motor carriers to limit their liability permits limitation with respect to 'baggage carried on passenger trains or boats, or trains or boats carrying passengers.' When the Motor Carrier Act was adopted in 1935 and sec. 20 was written as quoted above, the language permitting limitation of liability with respect to baggage of passengers was not expressly enlarged to include baggage carried on motor buses. Did Congress, by making sec. 20 applicable to motor carriers, intend to enlarge the first provision permitting limitation of liability by adding 'or motor carriers' so as to read 'to baggage carried on passenger trains or boats or motor vehicles, or trains or boats or motor buses carrying passengers?'

We have found no Federal decision or rule which gives a definite answer. Mr. Justice Clark, in a footnote to his opinion in New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 73 S.Ct. 986, 989, 97 L.Ed. 1500, quotes from the report of the Congressional Committee accompanying the 1916 amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act thus: 'Further, the commission has held that baggage carried on passenger trains upon the ticket of a passenger is within the terms of law. Whether this construction is correct or incorrect, it is palpable that baggage so transported on a passenger fare ought not to be subject to the rule which controls ordinary freight, and in the bill now reported it is excepted in express terms.' The report explained the aim of the 1916 legislation: 'to restore the law of full liability as it existed prior to the Carmack amendment of 1906, so that when property is lost or damaged in the course of transportation under such circumstances as to make the carrier liable recovery is had for full value or on the basis of full value. From this general rule there is excepted, first, baggage carried on passenger trains. This is done for obvious reasons.'

The Ohio courts hold the Act was in effect amended so as to read 'or motor buses' as contended by defendant. Patton v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 75 Ohio App. 100, 60 N.E.2d 945. We reach a different conclusion. Common carriers may, by contract, limit their liability for negligence when expressly so authorized by statute. That was the holding in Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, supra. That case arose under the Carmack Amendment and prior to the adoption of the Cummins Amendments. The rule there enunciated is of course still applicable when the provisions of the Cummins Amendments have been complied with. A carrier may also limit its liability when authorized so to do by a regulatory body with power to grant that privilege. Knight v. Carolina Coach Co., 201 N.C. 261, 159 S.E. 311; Russ v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681. The law does not look with favor on provisions which relieve one from liability for his own wrong. Any doubt as to the meaning of the contract or its application will be resolved against the carrier. Union Pacific R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317, 41 S.Ct. 283, 65 L.Ed. 656, 657; 13 C.J.S. Carriers § 89; 10 Am.Jur. sec. 1752, p. 456

The fact that the first permission for limitation of liability in the Federal statute is not applicable to baggage transported by motor carriers does not mean that they are not permitted to limit their liability under other portions of the Act. The statute, 49 U.S.C.A. § 319, by express terms declares that motor carriers may do so. The authority of motor carriers to limit their liability is found in the second portion of the provision. Cases recognizing the right of motor carriers and air carriers to limit their liability point to the provisions of the statutes giving the regulatory bodies, Interstate Commerce Commission and Civil Aeronautics Authority, power to regulate rates and conditions of travel as supporting limitation of liability granted...