Needleman v. Bohlen, Civ. A. No. 73-669-C.

• Decision Date: 20 December 1974
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 73-669-C.
• Citation: 386 F. Supp. 741
• Parties: Joan Rines NEEDLEMAN v. Jack R. BOHLEN et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

386 F. Supp. 741

Joan Rines NEEDLEMAN v. Jack R. BOHLEN et al.

Civ. A. No. 73-669-C.

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

December 20, 1974.

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David Rines, Robert H. Rines, Rines & Rines, Boston, Mass., for plaintiff.

C. Peter R. Gossels, Boston, Mass., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM and ORDER

CAFFREY, Chief Judge.

This action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to redress alleged violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights. Plaintiff seeks damages, actual and punitive, as well as equitable relief. Plaintiff is a school teacher currently employed as a mathematics teacher by the town of Wayland, Massachusetts. The defendants are present and former chairmen and members of the Wayland School Committee and a present and a former Superintendent of Schools, all named in both their representative and individual capacities, and one of the school principals named in his individual capacity only. Jurisdiction is predicated on 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332 and 1343. Plaintiff further asserts that this Court has pendent jurisdiction over causes of action involving the violation of rights arising under Massachusetts statutes. The defendants move to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds as well as on the ground of failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. They also have pleaded the defense of laches.

The burden of proving the Court's jurisdiction is on the plaintiff. Ricciotti v. Warwick School Committee, 319 F.Supp. 1006 (D.R.I.1970). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, material facts alleged in the complaint are to be construed in the light most favorable to plaintiff and are taken as true but conclusions of the pleader are not to be considered. Robinson v. Stanley Home Products, Inc., 272 F.2d 601 (1 Cir. 1959); Dunn v. Gazzola, 216 F.2d 709 (1 Cir. 1954); Burhoe v. Byrne, 285 F. Supp. 382 (D.Mass.1968).

The amended complaint is in four counts. Count 1 alleges that the chairman and members of the 1970-71 School Committee removed plaintiff from a tenured position as Chairman of the Mathematics Department without affording her notice and a hearing thereby violating her rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as her rights under several Massachusetts statutes. It also alleges that members of subsequent school committees have refused to reinstate plaintiff to that position.

Count 2 alleges that defendant former Superintendent Gainey caused plaintiff to be thus wrongfully deprived of her tenured position as Chairman of the Mathematics Department by recommending to the 1970-71 School Committee that plaintiff not be offered a contract as Chairman.

Count 3 alleges that defendant principal Kulevich and superintendent Zimmerman conspired to the end that plaintiff's annual salary increment for the school year 1972-1973 be withheld in reprisal for and in order to chill plaintiff's exercise of free speech in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985(3). She alleges that in furtherance of that conspiracy defendant Kulevich, without cause, evaluated her teaching performance as unsatisfactory and defendant Zimmerman recommended to the 1971-1972 and 1972-1973 School Committees that her annual salary increment be withheld. Count 3 further alleges that the defendant Chairman and members of the 1972-1973 School Committee deprived plaintiff of her salary increment without affording her a hearing in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. She also alleges that this action was taken by defendant members of the School Committee in bad faith and in reprisal for her exercise of free speech.

Count 4 charges defendants Kulevich and Zimmerman with inducing the 1972-1973 School Committee to withhold plaintiff's increment, pursuant to their conspiracy, by means of fraudulent allegations and in bad faith.

The matter was argued and briefed by counsel and after hearing I rule as follows:

1. Re Defendants' Jurisdictional Allegations

Defendants contend that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. It is well established that when a complaint in federal court is drawn to seek recovery directly on the basis of the Constitution and laws of the United States, the court must entertain the suit unless the claim appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction, or is wholly insubstantial and frivolous. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Kelley, 493 F.2d 784 (5 Cir. 1974); Ouzts v. Maryland Nat'l Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 790 (9 Cir. 1972). Plaintiff predicates jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3).

Sections 1985(3) and 1983 unquestionably authorize federal courts to entertain suits to redress the deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U. S. 528, 538, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974). Plaintiff's claim that the individual defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived her of her constitutional rights is neither insubstantial nor frivolous. Nor is it made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). Therefore, I rule that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's action against the individual defendants. Hagans v. Lavine, supra; Bell v. Hood, supra.

Defendant further asserts that this action must be dismissed to the extent that plaintiff seeks damages from defendants in their official capacities under the doctrine of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961). Plaintiff counters by contending that the grant of equitable relief in the form of a backpay award against the defendants in their official capacities is not precluded by the Supreme Court's holding in Monroe.

In City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 37 L.Ed.2d 109 (1973), the Supreme Court rejected the latter contention and held that states and their political subdivisions are not persons within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for purposes of equitable relief as well as for purposes of damages. To the extent that plaintiff seeks a money judgment against the defendants as officials of the Town of Wayland, whether in the form of equitable relief or damages, this suit is, in actuality, against the town itself, although not formally named as a party, because any recovery would be paid out of the town's treasury. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U.S. 459, 464, 65 S.Ct. 347, 89 L.Ed. 389 (1945); Klein v. New Castle County, 370 F.Supp. 85, 91 (D.Del.1974); Westberry v. Fisher, 309 F.Supp. 12, 18 (D.Me.1970). Under the ruling in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, supra, this Court is without subject matter jurisdiction because the Town of Wayland is not a person within the meaning of § 1983.

I rule, furthermore, that plaintiff is attempting to do indirectly that which she may not accomplish directly. In Hayes v. Cape Henlopen School District, 341 F.Supp. 823 (D.Del.1972) the court in dismissing plaintiff's claim for damages against the defendant school officials in their official capacities stated: "The doctrine established by the Monroe decision, that Section 1983 was not designed to redress an individual's deprivations at the expense of the public fisc, cannot be circumvented in this indirect fashion." 341 F.Supp. at 829. That portion of the motion to dismiss is allowed which seeks to dismiss the claim for monetary relief against the named defendants in their capacities as officials of the Town of Wayland.

Defendants contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction because the amount in controversy is less than ten thousand dollars. I rule that there is no requirement that the amount in controversy exceed $10,000 in order for federal jurisdiction to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1343. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186, 20 L.Ed.2d 1189 (1968); Potter v. McQueeney, 338 F. Supp. 1133 (D.R.I.1972). Plaintiff's allegation of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 which does require a jurisdictional amount is fatally defective on its face for lack of complete diversity. Barker v. Lein, 366 F.2d 757 (1 Cir. 1966); Martin v. Wyzanski, 262 F.Supp. 925 (D.Mass.1967). I treat it as mere surplusage herein.

Defendant also moves to dismiss on the ground that this controversy is within "the exclusive jurisdiction of the School Committee . . . and the plaintiff has not exhausted her remedies thereunder." I rule that the assertion that this controversy involving the alleged deprivation of federal constitutional rights is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the School Committee is frivolous. Defendants do not specify what administrative remedies are open to plaintiff. In any event, the Court of Appeals for this circuit has held that there is no general requirement of administrative exhaustion in § 1983 cases; but rather, that there is a necessity for ripeness to the extent that there must be at least some definite administrative or institutional determination before a § 1983 action may arise. Raper v. Lucey, 488 F.2d 748, 751 n. 3 (1 Cir. 1973). The Court there noted that courts should not intervene in school personnel problems without requiring "such prior reference to local institutional authority as may be necessary to assure that the action complained of is final within the institution in the sense that it is ripe for adjudication." 488 F.2d at 751 n. 3, quoting Stevenson v. Board of Education, 426 F.2d 1154, 1157 (5 Cir.), cert. denied 400 U.S. 957, 91 S.Ct. 355, 27 L. Ed.2d 265 (1970). In the instant case, plaintiff was not offered a contract as Chairman of the Mathematics Department for the 1970-1971 school year and received no hearing prior to the School Committee's refusal to offer her a contract. Although she has requested reinstatement to that position from subsequent school committees, she...