O'Neel v. City of Folsom

Decision Date15 July 2022
Docket Number2:21-cv-02403 WBS DB
PartiesFAUN O'NEEL, individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for her children B.T., A.O., D.O., and A.T., Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF FOLSOM, a public entity; SPENSER HEICHLINGER, an individual; MELANIE CATANIO, an individual; LOU WRIGHT, an individual; [FNU AUSTIN, an individual; [FNU HUSAR, an individual, DOE CITY OF FOLSOM DEFENDANTS, individuals; COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO, a public entity; DOE DCFAS DEFENDANTS, individuals; and DOES 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
ORDER RE: DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Faun O'Neel, individually and on behalf of her children B.T., A.O., D.O., and A.T (collectively,plaintiffs), brought this § 1983 action against the City of Folsom (the City); various Folsom police officers; the County of Sacramento; and various Sacramento Department of Child, Family and Adult Services officials challenging defendants' alleged unlawful entry of O'Neel's home and their alleged unlawful seizure and removal of B.T., A.O., D.O., and A.T. (See First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (Docket No. 18).) Specifically, plaintiffs assert claims for (1) warrantless seizure of children under the Fourth Amendment and denial of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment; (3) municipal liability (4) false imprisonment; and (5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Id. at ¶¶ 56 110.) Defendants City of Folsom, Spenser Heichlinger, Melanie Catanio, Lou Wright, [FNU] Austin, and [FNU] Husar now move for judgment on the pleadings. (Mot. (Docket No. 23-1).)[1]

I. Factual and Procedural Background[2]

Plaintiff O'Neel is a resident of the County of Sacramento and is married, with four minor children: B.T., A.T., A.O., and D.O. (FAC at ¶¶ 1, 24, 26.) On December 20, 2020,before the family left home to go to dinner, O'Neel asked D.O. to put away some cookies so that the dog would not get to them while the family was out. (Id. at ¶ 31.) When the family returned,O'Neel saw that the cookies had not been put away and that the dog had eaten most of them and made a mess in the kitchen. (Id. at ¶ 32.) O'Neel called D.O. over to clean up the mess, and after he had done so she sent him to his room as a form of discipline. (Id. at ¶ 33.)

At around 9:00 p.m., there was loud banging at the front door, which O'Neel's husband opened to find defendant officers Heichlinger, Austin, and Husar standing at the entryway. (Id. at ¶ 34.) They informed him that they were there to carry out a welfare check on the children because B.T. had called 911 to ask whether grabbing a child by the neck was child abuse. (Id. at ¶ 35.) Evidently, after being made to clean the kitchen, D.O. had gone to B.T.'s room and falsely stated that O'Neel had picked D.O. up by the neck and carried him to the kitchen. (Id.)

The officers then entered the home without O'Neel's or her husband's consent and without a warrant. (Id. At ¶ 37.) They ordered O'Neel and her husband to wake the children up so they could be interviewed and proceeded to interview each child outside the presence of O'Neel and her husband. (Id.) The officers then photographed D.O., who had no marks or bruises on him. (Id.) The officers then left without interviewing anyone else who was at the home or providing any paperwork, contact information, or any indication of what might happen next. (Id. at ¶¶ 38-39.)

Plaintiffs allege that the following day, one or more City officials contacted Sacramento Department of Child, Family and Adult Services to file a report of suspected child abuse. (Id. at ¶ 40.) Plaintiffs further allege that multiple City and County defendants agreed to seize the four children from O'Neel's care and custody without seeking court authorization, despite the lack of any imminent risk of serious bodily injury to any of the children. (Id. at ¶ 41.)

Between the December 20, 2022 welfare check and December 22, 2022, there were no further incidents involving the children. (Id. at ¶ 42.) Plaintiffs also allege that no further investigation occurred during this time. (Id.) Nevertheless, on December 22, defendant officers Catanio, Wright, and Does 1 through 4 came to plaintiffs' home and informed O'Neel that they were there to seize all of the children and remove them from her custody. (Id.) None of the defendants presented a warrant or court order authorizing seizure of the children. (Id. At ¶ 43.) These officers entered the home without O'Neel's or her husband's consent and ordered O'Neel and her husband to bring the children to the officers so the children could be interviewed again. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Catanio interviewed the children without parental consent and outside of O'Neel's presence. (Id. at ¶ 47.)

Plaintiffs allege that Catanio did not gain any new information from the December 22 interviews of the children. (Id. at ¶ 48.) Notwithstanding the lack of any indication any child was at imminent risk of serious harm, after the interviews the defendant officers removed all four children from O'Neel's home, drove the children to the Folsom Police Department, and continued to interrogate the children. (Id. At ¶¶ 48-49.) O'Neel's mother sought to have the children placed in her care, but defendants refused and instead decided to place the children in non-relative foster care. (Id. at ¶¶ 50-52.)

Plaintiffs served a government claim against the City on June 16, 2021, which the City rejected on June 24, 2021. (Id. at ¶ 54.) Plaintiffs brought this action in this court on December 24, 2021. (Docket No. 1.)

II. Legal Standard

“After the pleadings are closed -- but early enough not to delay trial -- a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A Rule 12(c) motion may ask for judgment on the basis of a plaintiff's [f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(2)(B). “A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings and a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss are virtually interchangeable.”[3] Sprint Telephony PCS, L.P. v. Cnty. of San Diego, 311 F.Supp.2d 898, 902 (S.D. Cal. 2004). “Because the two motions are analyzed under the same standard, a court considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings may give leave to amend and ‘may dismiss causes of action rather than grant judgment.' Id. at 903 (citing William W. Schwarzer, et al., Federal Civil Procedure Before Trial § 9:341 (2003); Moran v. Peralta Cmty. Coll. Dist., 825 F.Supp. 891, 893 (N.D. Cal. 1993)).

As with a motion to dismiss made under Rule 12(b)(6), the inquiry before the court is whether, accepting the allegations in the complaint as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, the complaint has alleged “sufficient facts . . . to support a cognizable legal theory,” Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001), and thereby stated “a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). In deciding the motion, the court must accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Turner v. Cook, 362 F.3d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 2004)). Courts are not, however, “required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).III. Discussion

Defendants move for judgment on several of plaintiffs' claims, on multiple grounds. The court will address each in turn. Because the court has discretion to consider a motion for judgment on the pleadings as it would a motion to dismiss, and because no evidence is currently before the court, the court declines to grant judgment at this stage and will instead consider whether the challenged claims merit dismissal. See Sprint, 311 F.Supp.2d at 903.

Certain claims brought by plaintiffs primarily concern defendants' alleged entry into plaintiffs' home on December 20, 2020, whereas others primarily concern defendants' alleged conduct on December 22, 2020, including removing B.T., A.T., A.O., and D.O. from their home. The court will first address defendants' arguments for dismissal of the former category of claims, followed by those for dismissal of the latter category.[4]

A. Claims Based on December 20 Entry

1. Qualified Immunity

In the First Amended Complaint, plaintiffs claim defendants are liable for unlawful searches of their home, based on defendants' alleged warrantless entries on December 20 and 22, 2022. (See FAC at ¶¶ 70-76.) Defendants argue that defendants Heichlinger, Austin, and Husar are entitled to qualified immunity as to their alleged unlawful entry on December 20, 2022. (Mot.at 8.)[5]

In § 1983 actions, qualified immunity “protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, the court considers (1) whether there has been a violation of a constitutional right and (2) whether the defendants' conduct violated “clearly established” federal law. Sharp v. Cnty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 909 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted). The court has discretion to decide which prong to address first and, if analysis of one proves dispositive, the court need not analyze the other. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236. Here, the court will exercise its discretion to analyze the...

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