Neelley v. Walker
| Decision Date | 10 November 2014 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:14–CV–269–WKW. |
| Citation | 67 F.Supp.3d 1319 |
| Parties | Judith A. NEELLEY, Plaintiff, v. Clifford WALKER, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
Barry Alan Ragsdale, Sirote & Permutt PC, Birmingham, AL, Julian Lenwood McPhillips, Jr., McPhillips Shinbaum L.L.P., Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiff.
This case presents allegations that the Alabama Legislature overstepped its bounds by amending a state statute to ensure that Plaintiff Judith A. Neelley, a former death-row inmate whose sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, would never become eligible for parole consideration. Plaintiff sues the current members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles—Clifford Walker, William W. Wynne, Jr., and Robert P. Longshore—the officials required to apply Alabama's allegedly unconstitutional law against her. Before the court is their motion to dismiss, (Doc. # 18), which has been fully briefed, (Docs. # 20, 21). Upon consideration of Plaintiff's amended complaint, the parties' arguments, and the relevant law, the court finds that the motion to dismiss is due to be granted in part and denied in part.
Except as noted infra at Part IV.A., the court has subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested.
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) challenges the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. McElmurray v. Consol. Gov't of Augusta—Richmond Cnty., 501 F.3d 1244, 1251 (11th Cir.2007). On a Rule 12(b)(1) facial attack, the court evaluates whether the plaintiff “has sufficiently alleged a basis of subject-matter jurisdiction” in the complaint and employs standards similar to those governing Rule 12(b)(6) review. Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1335 (11th Cir.2013).
When evaluating a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court must take the facts alleged in the complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Resnick v. AvMed, Inc., 693 F.3d 1317, 1321–22 (11th Cir.2012). To survive Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). “[F]acial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ).
“[A] Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred.” La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On March 22, 1983, Plaintiff was convicted of first-degree murder in the Circuit Court of DeKalb County, Alabama. Despite a jury's 10–2 recommendation that Plaintiff be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the trial judge sentenced Plaintiff to death. Plaintiff exhausted all of her state and federal remedies for challenging her death sentence. On January 15, 1999, four days after the U.S. Supreme Court denied Plaintiff's last petition for writ of certiorari, see Neelley v. Nagle, 525 U.S. 1075, 119 S.Ct. 811, 142 L.Ed.2d 671 (1999), Governor Fob James, as one of his final official acts before leaving the governorship, notified the Alabama Supreme Court that he commuted Plaintiff's death sentence to “life imprisonment.” (Doc. # 1–1 (“Pursuant to the authority granted to me by virtue of Amendment No. 38, Constitution of Alabama, I [Governor Fob James, Jr.] hereby commute the sentence of death of Judith Ann Neel[l]ey to life imprisonment.”).) Plaintiff represents that no Alabama governor had commuted a death sentence since 1962.
At the time of the commutation, Alabama law provided that “[a]ny person whose sentence to death has been commuted by the Governor to life imprisonment shall not be eligible for a parole from the Board of Pardons and Paroles until he shall have served at least [fifteen] years of such life sentence, and any parole granted contrary to the provisions of the section shall be void.” Ala.Code § 15–22–27(b) (1975). However, Alabama law also provided that a person convicted of a capital offense must be sentenced to either “life imprisonment without parole or to death.”Ala.Code § 13A–5–39 (1975).
Perplexed, Defendants' predecessor members of the Alabama Board of Pardons and Paroles (“the Board”) inquired of the Alabama Attorney General whether, in view of § 13A–5–39, Governor James had the authority to commute Plaintiff's sentence to life imprisonment as opposed to life imprisonment without parole. Attorney General Bill Pryor responded that the Governor in fact had that authority. (See Doc. # 1–2, at 9.) Assuming that parole was a possibility for Plaintiff, the Board Members also asked whether Plaintiff had to serve fifteen years from the date her sentence was commuted, or whether her time served under the death sentence was adequate. The Attorney General advised that Plaintiff would not be eligible for parole until she had served at least fifteen years of the commuted life sentence. (Doc. # 1–2, at 11.)
On March 8, 1999, the Board notified Plaintiff that her case would be considered for parole in January 2014, fifteen years from the date that Governor James commuted her sentence. On October 1, 2001, counsel for Plaintiff requested that the Board provide Plaintiff with an initial parole consideration hearing. The Board responded by reiterating its stance that Plaintiff would not become eligible for parole consideration until January 2014.
On October 23, 2001, Plaintiff filed a suit for declaratory relief in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Alabama, asking the court to adjudge her immediately eligible for parole consideration because she had already served nineteen years in prison, including sixteen-plus years as a death row inmate. The Circuit Court of Montgomery County denied her request for relief and held that, pursuant to § 15–22–27(b), Plaintiff would remain ineligible for parole consideration until she had served fifteen years of her commuted sentence.1
On June 18, 2003, the Alabama Legislature passed Act 2003–300 (“the Act”), which amended § 15–22–27(b) to provide that “[a]ny person whose sentence to death has been commuted by the Governor shall not be eligible for a parole. ” (emphasis added). The Act also amended the statute to require that “[a]ny person whose sentence to death has been commuted by the Governor” remains ineligible for a grant of parole “unless sufficient evidence is presented to the Board of Pardons and Paroles to satisfy it that the person was innocent of the crime for which he or she was convicted, the board votes unanimously to grant the person” parole, and “the Governor concurs in and approves the granting” of parole. Ala.Code § 15–22–27(d) (incorporating by reference § 15–22–27(a) ). The Legislature specifically made the Act “retroactive to September 1, 1998.” Ala. Acts 2003–300, § 3 (S.B. 49). Plaintiff alleges that the “sponsor and supporters of the legislation that became [the Act] expressly indicated that the amendment was intended to ‘fix’ Governor James's commutation of [Plaintiff's] death sentence and even referred to it as ‘Neelley's law.’ ” (Am. Compl. at ¶ 15.) Plaintiff's brief cites media reports from 2002 and 2003 to the same effect. (See Doc. # 20, at 21–22.) There is no allegation in the amended complaint that Plaintiff herself was aware of the passage of the Act or its retroactive effect on her case.
In January 2014, when Plaintiff reached the fifteenth anniversary of Governor James's commutation of her sentence, her counsel requested that Defendants, the current members of the Board, provide Plaintiff with a parole consideration hearing. Defendants, like their predecessors, looked to the Attorney General's Office for guidance. On March 31, 2014, the current Attorney General issued an advisory opinion that Plaintiff is ineligible for parole consideration because of the retroactive application of the Act amending § 15–22–27. Defendants informed Plaintiff that she was barred from parole consideration, and Plaintiff represents that they have continued to deny her an initial parole hearing.
Plaintiff filed this suit on April 10, 2014. The original complaint named the Board, as opposed to its individual members, as the defendant. The Board moved to dismiss the complaint, and Plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming the current Board Members as Defendants. On May 12, 2014, the court denied the motion to dismiss the original complaint as moot. (Doc. # 16.)
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that the retroactive effect of the Act, as applied to her, is in violation of (1) the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Alabama Constitutions; (2) the United States Constitution's Bills of Attainder Clause; and (3) Sections 42 and 43 of the Alabama Constitution, which provide for the separation of powers among three branches of state government.2 Plaintiff brings her claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. Defendants argue that the amended complaint is due to be dismissed in its entirety.
Defendants assert Plaintiff's suit for declaratory and injunctive relief, as it pertains to the constitutionality of the Act under the Alabama Constitution, is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment requires that “[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not be...
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