Neff v. Hmurovich

• Decision Date: 13 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. IP01-0582-C B/F.,IP01-0582-C B/F.
• Citation: 261 F.Supp.2d 1026
• Parties: Stephen NEFF, Plaintiff, v. James HMUROVICH, individually and in his official capacity; STEVEN VAUGHN, individually and in his official capacity; The Family and Social Services Administration and State of Indiana, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

261 F.Supp.2d 1026

Stephen NEFF, Plaintiff, v. James HMUROVICH, individually and in his official capacity; STEVEN VAUGHN, individually and in his official capacity; The Family and Social Services Administration and State of Indiana, Defendant.

No. IP01-0582-C B/F.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

May 13, 2003.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Terry R. Boesch, Boesch & Istrabadi, PC, Valparaiso, IN, for Plaintiff.

Patricia 0. Grow, Deputy Indiana Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendant.

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BARKER, District Judge.

I. Introduction.

Stephen Neff alleges three federal and three state causes of action against his former employer, the Indiana Department of Family and Social Services Administration (hereafter "the FSSA" or "the State"), and the two named individuals in their individual and official capacities. All of his claims grow out of his employment as Director of the Marshall County Division of Family and Children Services (hereafter "DFC"), which is a subdivision of FSSA. Mr. Neff alleges that he was suspended and demoted from his position as Director in retaliation for refusing to follow orders to take or support political positions for which he had no sympathy and for refusing to sign a politically-motivated affidavit which unfairly placed blame on the County Prosecutor's office. Then, when statewide Director of the DFC, James Hmurovich, spoke to the press about Mr. Neff's job performance, he prevented Mr. Neff from responding to his comments.

Mr. Neff's federal claims include that: (1) Mr. Hmurovich suspended Mr. Neff and demoted him from his position as Director of the Marshall County DFC as a result of a partisan political agenda unrelated to Mr. Neff's work (Count II); (2) Mr. Hmurovich suspended him and demoted him in retaliation for exercising his First Amendment rights (Count III); and (3) Mr. Hmurovich and Mr. Vaughn conspired to deprive him of his constitutional right to free expression and political affiliation (Count IV). His state law claims include that the defendants: (1) defamed him by, among other things, publicly discrediting his work performance and publicly lying about his role in the release of a convicted felon (Count I); (2) intentionally inflicted emotional distress on him by harassing him and publicly humiliating him (Count V); and (3) violated Indiana public policy by violating his right as a merit employee to pursue his career free of political and partisan biases (Count VI).

The case is before us on defendants' dispositive motion, which they style as a motion for "judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment." The portion of the motion that asks for judgment on the pleadings has become moot. The defendants have properly noted that the FSSA, the State of Indiana, and Messrs. Hmurovich and Vaughn in their official capacities are not proper defendants in this federal court action because of the Eleventh Amendment's doctrine of sovereign immunity. Since Mr. Neff concedes this point, we have no occasion to address it further. Additionally, Mr. Neff acknowledges that Count VI does not state a viable cause of action and agrees to the dismissal of that claim. Accordingly, with the exception of one wrinkle that we address in sub-part D below, the parties have whittled the claims down to three federal causes of action against Messrs. Hmurovich and Vaughn in their individual capacities, along with pendent state claims which Mr. Neff alleges against the state agencies as well as the named defendants.

These surviving claims are before us on defendants' motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, we GRANT defendants' motion as to Mr. Neff's federal claims and we decline to exercise jurisdiction over his state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Accordingly, we DISMISS Mr. Neff's pendent state claims WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

II. Statement of Facts.

This case consists of two very different factual recitations. On a motion for summary judgment, we, of course, construe all disputed facts in a light reasonably most favorable to Mr. Neff as the party opposing the motion. By "reasonably" most favorable, we mean most favorable in light of the facts that are supported by admissible evidence. The reason for expressing this qualification, though it should be obvious, will become clearer as we proceed. For now, suffice to say that the parties offer factual narratives that are not only divergent, but pass one another like ships in the night.

A. The State's Factual Statement.

The FSSA is an agency of the State of Indiana. The Division of Family and Children is a subdivision of the FSSA. At all pertinent times, James Hmurovich was state-wide director of the DFC. In 1995, he appointed Mr. Neff as Director of the DFC for Marshall County. Mr. Neff served in that position until January 7, 2001. Steve Vaughn was the Northwest Regional Manager of the DFC. Def. S.J. Brief, p. 2, ¶¶ 1, 3, 6.

Mr. Hmurovich's responsibilities as County Director included: the establishment of policy for his agency; communication of the policy through written directives and through monthly regional meetings and two annual statewide workshops; establishment of child welfare consultants; establishment of a quality assurance process; use of management reports from the Indiana Child Welfare Information System (ICWIS) to monitor activities; establishment of comprehensive training; and use of peer mentors. As Director of the Marshall County Office, Mr. Neff reported to Mr. Hmurovich and oversaw eighteen staff members; he had final responsibility for everyone in the office and had authority to hire and fire.

Mr. Neff acknowledges that he had "responsibility to investigate cases of abuse and neglect" and "to insure the safety of children once they were in [his] agency." Mr. Neff also prepared budgets and submitted them annually; he administered child welfare services and public assistance programs; he appointed and oversaw child protection teams and prepared child protection plans; he attended court with case workers or family case managers; he was involved in quality control issues; and he developed procedures to implement policy. Def. S.J. Brief, pp. 2-3, ¶¶ 5, 8, 9.

Effective July 1, 1999, Mr. Hmurovich's Policy Directive # 1-Z-012 on Child Welfare Quality Assurance Reviews ("QAR") revised the policy and procedures governing reviews of county child welfare activities and functions for quality assurance. Mr. Hmurovich directed that reviews be conducted of all county offices and that the reviews were to be completed within a two-year time period. The review teams were appointed by the Regional Managers.

The FSSA's unchallenged description of the QA review process is that it is "an assessment of the integrity of child welfare services" provided by all county offices, including Marshall County's. It is undisputed that: "The review serves as an objective measurement of compliance with child welfare statutes, rules, policies, and practice and assists local and divisional management staff in determining opportunities for program enhancement." Def. S.J. Brief, p. 4, ¶¶ 15, 16.

Directive Z-012 provides for an elaborate investigation into each county's case management. Since the FSSA's description is unchallenged, suffice to say that the process includes a random selection of open and closed investigations and informal adjustments. The QAR team reviewed hard copy case files as well as the pertinent database for each selected case. "Worksheets, containing necessary statutory program and rule compliance, policy and practice elements specific to the type of case reviewed, were completed for each case reviewed. Interview questionnaires containing questions designed to obtain the interviewee's knowledge and actual experience in dealings with Marshall County local office child welfare services and staff were completed for the Circuit Court Judge, a Family Therapist, a foster parent, a child welfare staff member, and the County Director." Def. S.J. Brief, pp. 4-5, ¶ 16.

Terry Ciboch, Director of the LaPorte County Office, prepared a report of the September 21-22, 2000 QAR for the Marshall County Office. The report—detailed in Terry Ciboch's declaration and exhibited in eight single-spaced, densely packed pages [Def. Ex. D]—revealed that Marshall County's case management was woefully deficient in all areas reviewed. The FSSA asserts, without contradiction, that an acceptable level of performance is 90%. De. S.J. Brief, p. 5, ¶ 18. Marshall County's ratings fell far below acceptable. According to the State's unrebutted statistics:

Intake and Investigation: 51%, At Risk score/Intake and Investigations: 62%. CHINS/Wardship Case Management: 53%, At Risk score/CHINS Management: 69%. Informal Adjustments: 26%, At Risk score/Informal Adjustments: 30%; Service Referral Agreement: 48%, At Risk score/Service Referral Agreement: 60%; Adoption: 75%, At Risk/Adoption: 81%. (Ciboch Decl. ¶ 18.)

The QAR found Child Protective Services Reports, including sexual molestation and neglect, had not been investigated for six to eight months. In addition, a Family Case Manager had 130 uninvestigated reports.

Def. S.J. Brief, pp. 5-6, ¶¶ 19, 20.

Mr. Neff does not challenge that he was aware of the DFC's policies, methods, and procedures. Def. S.J. Brief, p. 6, ¶ 21. Terry Ciboch asked Mr. Neff to explain how so many investigations could be placed in the closed case category. According to Terry Ciboch, Mr. Neff indicated that it could have been the result of linking current investigations with previously closed cases as a result of "a systems problem." Terry Ciboch posed the question of whether a systems failure inadvertently could have produced this result to Sandy Lock, the State ICWIS director. Terry Ciboch was satisfied with Sandy Lock's explanation that such a result was not possible, because...