Negley v. Farrow

• Decision Date: 29 March 1883
• Parties: PETER NEGLEY and Charles Negley, trading as Negley & Co. v. JOSEPH H. FARROW.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

60 Md. 158

PETER NEGLEY and Charles Negley, trading as Negley & Co. v. JOSEPH H. FARROW.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

March 29, 1883

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Washington County.

The appellee sued the appellants as editors, proprietors and publishers of a newspaper called "The Herald and Torchlight," published in Hagerstown, in an action of libel. The declaration is substantially set forth in the opinion of the court. The defendants filed a general demurrer to the declaration, which was overruled. They then filed the plea of "did not commit the wrong alleged," and the two following special pleas:

2nd. That the defendants at the time of the publication of said alleged libellous articles in the several counts of the plaintiff's declaration, were the publishers, in Washington County, of a certain public newspaper called "The Herald and Torchlight," and at said time the plaintiff was the State Senator of Washington County, in the Legislature of Maryland, and acting as such, and in such public capacity his votes and actions were proper subjects for investigation and information, and that said alleged libellous articles related to the official conduct of the plaintiff acting in such public capacity, and was proper for public information, and that said publications were made in good faith, and in the belief in their truth, and not made maliciously nor negligently.

3rd. That the subject concerning which the article complained of was written, was a matter of great interest and importance to the people of Washington County and the State of Maryland who, being numerous, could only be reached through the press that the votes and acts of the plaintiff, as representing the people of Washington County, were a matter in which the said people were interested, and a proper subject of discussion in the newspapers; and that the defendants believing that such votes and acts did not correctly represent the people of Washington by whom the plaintiff was elected to the Senate of Maryland, and were an injury to them, discussed the same in good faith and without malice, and made only such statements and comments as they believed, on due inquiry and reasonable grounds, to be true and just and warranted by the plaintiff's acts.

The plaintiff joined issue on the first plea, and demurred to the second and third pleas, which demurrer was sustained.

First Exception.--The defendants, after offering evidence tending to prove that the plaintiff and Jas. Hawkins had a contract to furnish stone to lengthen a lock on the canal, offered to prove the following facts, to wit: That the stone furnished by plaintiff and Hawkins, cost them from twelve to seventeen cents per perch, and that it cost them fifteen cents to deliver them, and that this was all the cost and expense they were put to; and that they received from the Canal Company eighty cents per perch, and that it cost them fifteen cents to deliver without any competition or public notice, to which evidence the plaintiff objected, and the court (Alvey, C.J Motter and Pearre, JJ.,) sustained the said objection, and ruled the evidence to be inadmissible. The defendants excepted.

Second Exception.--The defendants then offered to prove that it was known at the time of the election of Treasurer, in January 1882, to the public, and to the plaintiff, that the Governor and Comptroller, two members of the Board of Public Works differed in reference to the management of the canal; that the Governor was opposed to the then management and that the Comptroller was in favor of it; and, further, that Mr. Compton was known to agree with Mr. Keating, and both in favor of the retention of the officers of the canal, who had given the alleged contract to the plaintiff, to which evidence the plaintiff objected, and the court sustained the objection and ruled the evidence to be inadmissible. The defendants excepted.

Third Exception.--The plaintiff, in rebuttal, gave evidence tending to show that the plaintiff had no contract to furnish stone on the canal, and explained the circumstances of his votes on February 1st, being the votes referred to in the alleged libellous article on the printing question, and then offered in evidence the Journal and Proceedings of the Senate of Maryland, which took place on the 10th of February, 1882, said Journal and Proceedings having been previously proved by the Secretary of the Senate to be correct, in reference to the publication of the laws, and offered to read to the jury the action and votes of the plaintiff in reference to the publication of the laws, which took place February 10th, 1882, tending to show that the plaintiff was in favor of the repeal of the subsidy law; to all of which evidence the defendants objected as inadmissible, but the court overruled the objection and allowed the evidence to be read to the jury. The defendants excepted.

Fourth Exception.--The counsel for the plaintiff further in rebuttal, asked of the plaintiff the following question: State to the jury your action and vote in reference to the election of Treasurer of Maryland last winter, and whether you voted for Mr. Pratt or Mr. Compton? To which the plaintiff answered, I voted for Mr. Pratt; I got my ballot out of the waste paper basket, and gave the circumstances of his vote and the finding of the ballot. To the asking of said question, and to the answer to the same, the defendants objected, but the court overruled the objection, and allowed the question to be asked, and the answer to be given, and admitted the same as testimony in the cause. The defendants excepted.

Fifth Exception.--The counsel for the plaintiff further in rebuttal, asked the plaintiff the following question: State whether you had any contract or understanding with Mr. Gorman, directly or indirectly, in reference to your votes at Annapolis on the election of Treasurer, and on the publication of the laws? To which the plaintiff answered, I had not. To the asking of said question, and to the answer to the same, the defendants objected, but the court overruled the objection, and allowed the question to be asked, and the answer to be given and admitted the same as testimony in the cause. The defendants excepted.

Sixth Exception.--The plaintiff also gave in evidence the testimony of Senator Moore, tending to sustain the testimony of the plaintiff, Farrow. And further, in rebuttal, called A. P. Gorman as a witness, who testified he knew plaintiff since 1872; never had any business transaction with him, and never knew him to vote against his party in political questions, and then asked him the following questions, to wit: Did you, or not, have any arrangement with Mr. Farrow, as to how he should vote for Treasurer of the State of Maryland, or upon the publication of the laws? To which the witness answered, I had not. To the asking of said question, and to the answer to the same, the defendants objected, but the court overruled the objection, and allowed the question to be asked, and the answer to be given, and admitted the same as testimony in the cause. The defendants excepted.

Seventh Exception.--The plaintiff, further, in rebuttal, called L. G. Stanhope, superintendent of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, and asked him the following question: State whether the rates given for this contract were higher than the rates given for other contracts, to furnish stone for lengthening locks on the canal, and whether they were higher than you were instructed to give by the Canal Board? To which witness answered, the rates were not higher than given to other persons, who had contracts to furnish stone; all received eighty cents per perch, and which was not higher than the price fixed by the Canal Board, but was given to Hawkins, as to others, at the price fixed by the board. To the asking of said question and to the answer to the same, the defendants objected, but the court overruled the objection and allowed the question to be asked, and the answer to be given, and admitted the same as testimony in the cause. The defendants excepted.

Eighth Exception.--The plaintiff then offered the three prayers as follows, to wit:

1. If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendants, as partners, as charged in the declaration of the plaintiff, were the editors, proprietors and publishers of the newspaper published in Hagerstown, Washington County, and State of Maryland, called "The Herald and Torchlight," that the plaintiff was, on the 8th day of February, 1882, the member from said county of the Senate in the General Assembly of said State and was then attending the session of the said General Assembly; and that the said defendants published in the said issue of the said paper of, and concerning, the plaintiff the words set forth in said declaration, then the plaintiff, under the law, is entitled to recover.

2. If the jury believe the facts as set forth in the plaintiff's first prayer, the law imputes malice to the defendants, by the publication of the words, and the jury in awarding damages may take into consideration the publicity of the libel and the injury to the feelings and reputation of the plaintiff, and the mortification such a publication and such charges would be likely to produce; and if the jury further find that the said publication proceeded from express malice, or ill will to the plaintiff, then they may award punitive or exemplary damages.

3. The jury are instructed that the article published in the defendant's paper of February 8th, 1882, (if they find such publication to have been made,) and read in evidence to the jury, is libellous and actionable in itself, and even if the jury believe that the defendants, or either of them before writing said article, had received information from Mr. Briscoe or Mr. King, or any...