Negron-Gaztambide v. Hernandez-Torres
Decision Date | 06 June 1994 |
Docket Number | 94-1183,P,NEGRON-GAZTAMBID,Nos. 93-2376,HERNANDEZ-TORRES,s. 93-2376 |
Citation | 35 F.3d 25 |
Parties | Olga J.laintiff, Appellant, v. Zaida, etc., et al., Defendants, Appellees. . Heard |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Carlos A. Del Valle Cruz, with whom Ricardo L. Torres Munoz, Hato Rey, PR, was on brief, for appellant.
Teresa Medina Monteserin, with whom Manuel D. Herrero Garcia, Hato Rey, PR, and Miguel A. Pagan-Rivera, San Juan, PR, were on brief, for appellees.
Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, CAMPBELL, Senior Circuit Judge, and LAGUEUX, District Judge. *
Olga Negron Gaztambide ("Negron"), plaintiff-appellant, was employed by the Legislative Service Office of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as a librarian in the Legislative Library. 1 In late January or early February 1993, Negron was discharged from her position. She learned of this action by way of a letter, dated January 29, 1993, signed by Nelida Jimenez Velazquez ("Jimenez"), Director of the Legislative Service Office. 2 On June 22, 1993, Negron sued Jimenez in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. Also named as defendants were Zaida Hernandez Torres ("Hernandez"), President of the House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Roberto Rexach Benitez ("Rexach"), President of the Senate of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Negron claimed that she had been dismissed (1) because of her political affiliation with Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party in violation of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 (1988), (2) without a hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and (3) in disregard of her handicapped condition in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992).
On August 5, 1993, Hernandez and Jimenez moved to dismiss Negron's complaint for lack of jurisdiction. They argued that their decision to discharge Negron was a legislative act protected by the Legislative Immunity Doctrine. 3 See U.S. Const. art. I, Sec. 6 (Speech or Debate Clause); P.R. Const. art. III, Sec. 14. On October 14, 1993, Negron moved for an extension of time within which to oppose defendants' motion to dismiss. Her motion was denied. On October 18, 1993, the district court issued the following order:
Before the Court is the defendants' unopposed motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. After fully reading the same, the Court finds itself in accord with the legal arguments proffered by the defendants in support of their motion.
WHEREFORE, for the reasons stated in defendants' motion, this case is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). 4 (footnote supplied).
Judgment was entered on October 29, 1993. Thereafter, on November 2, 1993, Negron filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). This motion was supplemented by Negron on November 4, 1993, subsequently opposed by defendants, and ultimately denied by the district court on November 17, 1993. This appeal followed on November 29, 1993. 5 We do not disturb the district court's dismissal of Negron's claims under the Due Process Clause and the Americans with Disabilities Act, but we reverse the dismissal of her Sec. 1983 claim.
Although defendants ostensibly brought their motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (), the district court granted it pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (). For purposes of this appeal, however, we need not decide whether defendants' motion is more appropriately cast under one rule or the other. In either case, we review the district court's decision granting defendants' motion to dismiss de novo. Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700 (1st Cir.1994). "We take the allegations of the complaint to be true, and we will not affirm the district court's dismissal unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." Carney v. Resolution Trust Corp., 19 F.3d 950, 954 (5th Cir.1994); e.g., Vartanian, 14 F.3d at 700.
Negron's complaint contained the following relevant allegations. Negron began her employment with Puerto Rico's Legislative Library on July 14, 1967, as a Librarian Grade II. She worked continuously for the library until she learned of her dismissal by way of a letter, dated January 29, 1993, signed by Nelida Jimenez Velazquez, Director of the Legislative Service Office. During the period of her employment, Negron's job performance was exemplary. At the time of her discharge, she was a Librarian Grade V.
On November 4, 1992--prior to Negron's dismissal--Zaida Hernandez Torres and Roberto Rexach Benitez, members of Puerto Rico's New Progressive Party, were elected to Puerto Rico's House of Representatives and Senate, respectively. On or about January 11, 1993, Hernandez was elected President of the House of Representatives and Rexach was chosen to be President of the Senate. On that same date, Hernandez and Rexach appointed Jimenez, also a member of the New Progressive Party, Director of the Legislative Service Office. Less than three weeks later, Negron, who is affiliated with Puerto Rico's Popular Democratic Party, was discharged. She was replaced by a New Progressive Party activist.
Negron argues on appeal that, contrary to the district court's conclusion, defendants' decision to discharge her was not a legislative act entitled to absolute legislative immunity from damages under Sec. 1983. We agree.
It is established that "state legislators enjoy common-law immunity from liability for their legislative acts ... that is similar in origin and rationale to that accorded Congressmen under the Speech or Debate Clause." Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the United States, Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 732, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1974, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980). In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 71 S.Ct. 783, 95 L.Ed. 1019 (1951), the United States Supreme Court "concluded that Congress did not intend Sec. 1983 to abrogate the common-law immunity of state legislators." Supreme Court of Va., 446 U.S. at 732, 100 S.Ct. at 1974. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court "has been cautious in recognizing claims that government officials should be free of the obligation to answer for their acts in court." Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 223-24, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988). Legislators are absolutely immune only from claims that stem from their legitimate legislative activities. E.g., Supreme Court of Va., 446 U.S. at 732, 100 S.Ct. at 1974; Roberson v. Mullins, 29 F.3d 132, 134 (4th Cir.1994); see Forrester, 484 U.S. at 227, 108 S.Ct. at 544 ; Acevedo-Cordero v. Cordero-Santiago, 958 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir.1992) (). Acts undertaken by legislators that are administrative in nature do not "give rise to absolute immunity from liability in damages under Sec. 1983." Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229, 108 S.Ct. at 545; Acevedo-Cordero, 958 F.2d at 23; Gross v. Winter, 876 F.2d 165, 170-73 (D.C.Cir.1989).
The issue is thus whether defendants were acting in a legislative or administrative capacity when they discharged Negron. In Cutting v. Muzzey, 724 F.2d 259 (1st Cir.1984), we spoke of
two tests for distinguishing between legislative and administrative activity. The first test focuses on the nature of the facts used to reach the given decision. If the underlying facts on which the decision is based are "legislative facts," such as "generalizations concerning a policy or state of affairs," then the decision is legislative. If the facts used in the decisionmaking are more specific, such as those that relate to particular individuals or situations, then the decision is administrative. The second test focuses on the "particularity of the impact of the state action." If the action involves establishment of a general policy, it is legislative; if the action "single[s] out specifiable individuals and affect[s] them differently from others," it is administrative.
Id. at 261 (quoting Developments in the Law--Zoning, 91 Harv.L.Rev. 1427, 1510-11 (1978)); e.g., Roberson, 29 F.3d at 135 . Under either of these purported tests, defendants' decision to replace Negron--a member of the Popular Democratic Party--with a New Progressive Party activist was administrative. E.g., Forrester, 484 U.S. at 229, 108 S.Ct. at 545 ( ); Roberson, 29 F.3d at 135 (...
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