Negron v. Suffolk Cnty. Police Dep't
| Decision Date | 29 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | 18-CV-5426(JS)(ARL) |
| Parties | RAYMOND NEGRON, Plaintiff, v. THE SUFFOLK COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT; GERALDINE HART, the Suffolk County Police Commissioner; TIMOTHY D. SINI, The Former Police Commissioner; THE SUFFOLK COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE; ERROL D. TOULON, JR., Suffolk County Sheriff; and VINCENT F. DEMARCO, Former Suffolk County Sheriff, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York |
APPEARANCES
For Plaintiff:
Raymond Negron, Esq., prose1
234 North Country Road
Mount Sinai, New York 11766
For Defendants:
Brian C. Mitchell, Esq.
Suffolk County Attorney's Office
100 Veterans Memorial Highway
P.O. Box 6100
Hauppauge, New York 11788
Plaintiff Raymond Negron ("Plaintiff") commenced this action against the Suffolk County Police Department ("SCPD"); the Suffolk County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff's Office");Geraldine Hart ("Hart"), the Suffolk County Police Commissioner; Timothy D. Sini ("Sini") the former Police Commissioner; Errol D. Toulon, Jr. ("Toulon"), the Suffolk County Sheriff; and Vincent F. DeMarco ("DeMarco"), the former Suffolk County Sheriff (collectively, "Defendants"); asserting constitutional violations arising out of the suspension of his Suffolk County pistol license. (See Compl., D.E. 1.) Currently pending before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment. (Defs. Mot., D.E. 21-1; Pl. Cross Mot., D.E. 23.) For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is GRANTED and Plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff's cross-motion must be denied because he never sought permission to file a cross-motion, as required by the Court's Individual Rules. (Defs. Letter, D.E. 22; Defs. Sur-Opp., D.E. 26-1, at 1.) The Court's Individual Rules set forth the procedure parties must follow before filing motions for summary judgment. (Individual Rules, § IV.F.) There is no doubt that Plaintiff violated the Court's Individual Rules, however, the Court "'has broad discretion to determine whether to overlook a party's failure to comply with' its individual rules." CIT Bank, N.A. v. Donnatin, No. 17-CV-2167, 2020 WL 248996, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2020) (quoting Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2001)). Here, because Plaintiff served hiscross-motion with his opposition and "the legal issues raised by both motions are identical, the Court finds no surprise or prejudice warranting the extremely punitive remedy of striking" Plaintiff's cross-motion. Id. Accordingly, the Court considers Plaintiff's cross-motion.
Defendants ask the Court to disregard Plaintiff's Rule 56.1 Statement submitted in support of his cross-motion because it was not previously disclosed. (See Defs. Sur-Opp., D.E. 26-1, at 1-2; Pl. 56.1 Stmt., D.E. 23-1.) Despite Plaintiff's failure to adhere to Local Rule 56.1 and this Court's Individual Rules, the Court does not entirely disregard Plaintiff's Rule 56.1 Statement. After a thorough review of the record and the statements, the Court can decipher the facts in dispute. See Santiago v. Cuomo, No. 12-CV-2137, 2019 WL 8587292, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2019).
Further, in his Rule 56.1 Counterstatement, Plaintiff repeatedly responds that he "has no knowledge of any conflicting fact(s)" or that "[t]here is no admissible evidence to support or disclaim this conclusory statement." (See, e.g., Pl. 56.1 Counterstmt., D.E. 20-1, ¶¶ 4-8, 45.) "A non-moving party cannot raise a material issue of fact by denying statements which the moving party contends are undisputed for lack of knowledge and information, in part because discovery allows the party opposing summary judgment to obtain the facts necessary to determine whetherit must admit or deny them." Yagudaev v. Credit Agricole Am. Servs., Inc., No. 18-CV-0513, 2020 WL 583929, at *3 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2020) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). Thus, the Court deems the paragraphs in Defendants' Rule 56.1 Statement (Defs. 56.1 Stmt., D.E. 21-2) admitted where Plaintiff responds, for example, that he "has no knowledge of any conflicting fact(s) (Pl. 56.1 Counterstmt., ¶¶ 4-8)." Leon v. Dep't of Educ., No. 10-CV-2725, 2017 WL 6729676, at *1, n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2017) (collecting cases).
Finally, the Court disregards the legal arguments and conclusions improperly asserted in the parties' respective Rule 56.1 Statements. (See, e.g., Pl. 56.1 Counterstmt. ¶¶ 9, 47; Defs. 56.1 Stmt., ¶ 59); LG Capital Funding, LLC v. PositiveID Corp., No. 17-CV-1297, 2019 WL 3437973, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July 29, 2019), R&R adopted, 2019 WL 4564882 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2019).
Plaintiff served in the United States Army and Army Reserve as a commissioned Judge Advocate and an enlisted Military Police from 1986 to approximately 2000 and 2003, respectively. (Compl. § III, ¶ L.) From 1992 through 1996, Plaintiff worked asa United States Immigration Officer and from 1996 through his retirement in 1999, as a New York City Fire Department ("FDNY") firefighter. (Compl. § III, ¶¶ N-O.) In 1987, the Suffolk County Police Department Pistol License Bureau (the "Pistol License Bureau") issued Plaintiff a pistol license. (Compl. § III, ¶ H; Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 5.)
In November 2016, Plaintiff, as an attorney, spoke with the Suffolk County District Court Supervising Judge and reported that Judge Linda Kevins, a Suffolk County Supreme Court Justice, threatened him during a Court appearance.3 (Pl. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 12.) On November 4, 2016, non-party Donna Giordano ("Giordano"), a Suffolk County Detective Sergeant in the Criminal Intelligence Bureau, informed non-party SCPD Lieutenant Joseph Cahill ("Cahill"), the Commanding Officer of the Pistol Licensing Bureau, of the "incident" between Plaintiff and Judge Kevins and that Plaintiff "may have some PTSD issues." (Cahill Dep., Mitchell Decl., Ex. A, D.E. 21-5, at 6:20-7:7; Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 2-4.) On November 7, 2016, Cahill initiated a non-suspension re-evaluation4 into Plaintiff's pistol license. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 6, 8.)
Cahill also received a report prepared by Leonard Badia ("Badia"), the Deputy Chief Clerk of the Suffolk County District Court, that provided an "assessment and summary" from Badia's interview with Plaintiff (the "Report"). (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 9; Report, Mitchell Decl., Ex. C, D.E. 21-7.) The Report states that on November 2, 2016, the Supervising Judge informed Badia that Plaintiff said he suffered from PTSD, that Judge Kevins "trigger[ed]" his PTSD, and that "if and when [Plaintiff] was to be in Judge Kevin's courtroom, 'there needed to be an extra court officer present.'" (Report at 1.) Badia met with Plaintiff who explained that Judge Kevins' comments in open court triggered Plaintiff to "say inappropriate or even actionable comments to the judge."5 (Report at 1.) Plaintiff further explained that he requested extra court officers because he "found that the presence of a uniformed officer reminded him to not act in a way that wouldbe counter to his core values and beliefs." (Report at 1-2.) Badia "scrutinized" Plaintiff's comments but did not believe that they "were an attempt to threaten or intimidate Judge Kevins." (Report at 2.) Badia recommended that Plaintiff "seek guidance and professional assistance" to "appropriately articulate his feelings regarding judicial conduct and decisions." (Report at 2.)
Cahill suspended Plaintiff's pistol license in consideration of the Report and information received from Giordano. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 10, 13.) On November 7, 2016, the Pistol Licensing Bureau advised Plaintiff that his pistol license was suspended and that he had to surrender his handguns and license.6 (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 15-19.) Plaintiff spoke with DeMarco, then-Suffolk County Sheriff, who suggested that Plaintiff surrender his handguns to the Sheriff's Office Quartermaster. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 21-22.) Allegedly, DeMarco stated that if the handguns were not surrendered for legal reasons, they would be marked for "safe keeping" and Plaintiff could reclaim them "no matter what." (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 21-23.) On November 9, 2016,Plaintiff voluntarily surrendered his handguns to the Sheriff's Office Quartermaster for safe keeping.7 (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 20.)
Plaintiff did not notify the Pistol Licensing Bureau that he surrendered his handguns as required by the Suffolk County Pistol License Information Handbook (the "Pistol License Handbook"). (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 24-27, 32; see generally Pistol License Handbook, Mitchell Decl., Ex. G, D.E. 21-11, at 28.) On November 23, 2016, SCPD members visited Plaintiff at home to ask about the status of his handguns. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 31.) Plaintiff provided the SCPD officers with a Sheriff's Office receipt that acknowledged the surrender of his handguns. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 37-39.)
Between November 9, 2016 and February 2017, Plaintiff never requested that the Sheriff's Office return his handguns. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 41.) In February 2017, DeMarco arranged for Plaintiff to access one of his handguns to qualify for the Federal Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act ("LEOSA")8 at the SuffolkCounty Sheriff's Department Pistol Range. (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 39-40.) On February 2, 2017, the Sheriff's Office issued Plaintiff a "Firearms Qualification Record." (Firearms Qual. Record, Negron Decl., Ex. F, D.E. 23-8, at ECF p. 2.) The Firearms Qualification Record reads that Plaintiff was a retired FDNY member and that he received "Firearm Safety" and "Use Of Force" training. After shooting at the range, Plaintiff returned his handgun to the Sheriff's Office and did not ask for its permanent return. (Negron Dep. at 104:9-105:12.)
On or around April 19, 2017, Plaintiff asked DeMarco for his handguns and was instructed to "call the Quartermaster." (Defs. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 42-43.) On April 21, 2017, the Quartermaster refused to return Plaintiff's handguns...
To continue reading
Request your trial