Nei v. Contracting & Material Co.
| Decision Date | 21 March 1968 |
| Docket Number | Gen. No. 52143 |
| Citation | 93 Ill.App.2d 226,236 N.E.2d 264 |
| Parties | Elsie NEL, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CONTRACTING & MATERIAL COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
William L. Arnold, Edward E. Reda, Chicago, for appellant.
Tom L. Yates, Carl E. Abrahamson, T.A.E. Poehlmann, Chicago, for appellee.
The trial of this personal injury action resulted in a jury verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $5,000.00.
On appeal the defendant contends that the judgment should be reversed because the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, because the evidence was insufficient to support either the verdict or the award of damages and because the trial court erred in refusing to give a tendered defense instruction.
The plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident on what is now known as the Kennedy Expressway. Her auto ran into the car in front of her when this car stopped suddenly to avoid colliding with a ten-ton, six-wheel dump truck owned by the defendant which was transporting asphalt to locations in need of repair on the blacktop shoulders of the expressway. The day was clear, traffic was of medium density and the plaintiff was traveling in a southeasterly direction towards downtown Chicago. She testified that: she was going between fifty-five and sixty miles per hour--a speed under the maximum limit--in the middle lane and was keeping four to five car lengths behind the auto in front of her; she first noticed the truck on the right shoulder of the road when she was two blocks from it; when she was about a block away it moved into the right-hand lane of traffic; it did not stay in this lane but, when she was roughly sixty feet away, unexpectedly made a direct crossover to the left side of the expressway; as it went through the center lane, the brake lights of the car ahead of her flashed and the car stopped; she applied her brakes as soon as she realized what was happening but was unable to stop completely and ran into the rear of the car.
The driver of this car testified that: he was driving in the center lane and was two to three hundred feet from the truck when it pulled off the right shoulder of the road and, with no warning by directional lights or otherwise, crossed the three lanes of traffic at a sharp angle; when it first entered the center lane it was less than fifty feet in front of him; he had to apply his brakes very hard to avoid hitting the truck in the side as it moved crosswise, and it was directly in front of him when he came to a stop.
The truck driver denied that his truck was involved in the accident. He testified that: he had stopped his truck and deposited some asphalt on the right-hand shoulder approximately one mile northwest of where the accident occurred; he traveled in the right lane for two or three blocks at a speed of ten miles per hour; then, with his directional signals on and after looking into his rear-view mirror and observing that the nearest vehicles were two or three blocks behind him, he proceeded into the center lane; he traveled a few hundred feet in the center lane at twenty-five to thirty miles per hour; he then crossed over the third lane and onto the left-hand shoulder where he stopped to drop off more asphalt and was there for half a minute before he heard the screeching brakes of the two autos.
It is the defendant's contention that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law because she was following the car ahead of her so closely that she was unable to stop without coming in contact with it. Several cases are cited in support of the proposition that a party who collides with a stopped vehicle is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. However, as this court observed in Murad v. Witek, 48 Ill.App.2d 137, 199 N.E.2d 809 (1964), such cases must be decided on their own particular facts.
Traffic conditions on modern expressways differ sharply from those on side streets, arterial streets or even highways. Traffic proceeds at a high rate of speed--the minimum speed permitted on the expressway where the accident took place is forty miles an hour--and vehicles are constantly changing lanes. The faster vehicles usually use the lane or lanes closest to the median strip. Vehicles entering an expressway cross through traffic to reach these lanes and vehicles leaving the expressway execute a like maneuver from the faster lanes to the exit ramps. The maximum speed for trucks is less than the maximum speed for automobiles. Autos move around trucks and trucks move around slow-moving autos. Drivers are alert for openings and take advantage of those which enable them to change their positions. A careful driver, no matter what his speed, finds it almost impossible to maintain a...
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Larson v. Thomashow
...668, 1938.) While we agree that such duties existed, this court is also cognizant of the decision in Nei v. Contracting and Material Co., 93 Ill.App.2d 226, 236 N.E.2d 264, 1968. The court pointed out that there are numerous cases within this jurisdiction that have held that a person who co......
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...752 (1964)). A party can drive under the speed limit and still drive too fast for existing conditions. (Nei v. Contracting & Material Co., 93 Ill.App.2d 226, 230, 236 N.E.2d 264 (1968)). There therefore was no error in the giving of the instruction on We have considered whether the error wh......
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...to instruct the jury on the issue of speed. We hold that the refusal constituted reversible error. In Nei v. Contracting & Material Co. (1968), 93 Ill.App.2d 226, 236 N.E.2d 264, the court 'A person can be driving under the speed limit and still be driving too fast for existing conditions. ......
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