Neighbors v. Penske Leasing, Inc.

Decision Date18 March 1999
Docket NumberNo. 97-CV-75449-DT.,97-CV-75449-DT.
PartiesDavid Lee NEIGHBORS and, Leslie Ann Neighbors, Plaintiffs, v. PENSKE LEASING, INC., a Pennsylvania Company; National Steel Corporation, a Delaware Corporation; Transportation and Material Handling, a Division of National Steel Corporation; CRA Trailers, Inc., a Georgia Corporation f/k/a Great Dane Trailers, Inc.; General Electric Capital Corporation, a Delaware Corporation; Sturdy-Lite, Inc., a Tennessee Corporation; DNN Galvanizing Corporation, an Ontario Corporation; and DNN Galvanizing Limited Partnership, an Ontario Limited Partnership; Jointly and Severally, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

Fred A. Custer, Materna, Custer and Associates, Madison Heights, MI, for Plaintiffs.

Bret A. Schnitzer, Melican & Schnitzer, P.C., Detroit, MI, Co-Counsel for Plaintiffs.

Gerald V. Padilla, Siemion, Huckabay, Baiter, Padilla, Morganti & Bowerman, P.C., Southfield, MI, for DNN.

Dennis G. Bonucchi, Gerald E. Szpotek, Jr., Clark Hill, P.L.C., Birmingham, MI, for Defendants National Steel Corporation, Transportation and Material Handling, a Division of National Steel Corporation, Penske Truck Leasing Co., L.P. and General Electric Capital Corporation.

Elaine S. Wright, Darice E. Weber, Bowman and Brooke L.L.P., Detroit, MI, for Defendants Great Dane.

Jerome A. Galante, Plunkett & Cooney, PC, Detroit, MI, for Sturdy-Lite, Inc.

OPINION

DUGGAN, District Judge.

This matter is currently before the Court on defendants DNN Galvanizing Corporation's and DNN Galvanizing Limited Partnership's (collectively "defendants") motion to dismiss and/or partial motion for summary judgment. Defendants contend that this Court is without personal jurisdiction over them, venue is improper in this district, and the Canadian statute of limitations has run on plaintiffs' cause of action. In addition, defendants seek an order from this Court quashing service of process for an alleged failure to comply with Article 3 of the Hague Convention. Plaintiffs have filed a response in opposition to defendants' motions. The Court entertained oral argument on the defendants' motions on December 17, 1998. Because the Court is without personal jurisdiction over the DNN defendants, the Court grants the DNN defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Background

Plaintiffs' complaint is premised upon a July 31, 1995 accident in which plaintiff David Neighbors sustained an injury while climbing onto the bumper of a flat bed trailer. Plaintiff is a truck driver who transported a load of steel on the flat bed trailer and delivered it to the DNN defendants' premises in Windsor, Ontario, Canada. Plaintiff was employed by Vanguard Services and the trailer plaintiff was operating at the time of his injury was owned by defendants Penske Leasing, Inc. ("Penske") and General Electric Capital Corporation ("General Electric"). (Pls.' Br. in Opp. to Dfs.' Part.Mot.Summ.J. at 9). Penske and General Electric leased the trailer to defendants Transportation and Material Handling ("TMH") and National Steel, Inc. ("National"). Id.

At the time of the injury, the flat bed trailer was located on the DNN defendants' premises in Windsor. The DNN defendants are engaged in the business of galvanizing steel. According to defendants, "[s]teel companies bring rolls of steel to DNN on flat bed trailers. The steel is dropped off for processing and picked up after it has been galvanized." (Dfs.' Br. in Supp.Part.Mot.Summ.J. at 9). On the date of the injury, plaintiff was delivering a load of steel to defendants and attempted to climb onto the flat bed trailer to remove a tarp covering the steel. Plaintiff allegedly slipped and fell during this process sustaining severe injury.

Discussion
Personal Jurisdiction

The DNN defendants seek dismissal of this action contending that this Court is without personal jurisdiction. According to defendants, the facts in the record will not support this Court's exercise of either general or limited1 personal jurisdiction. With respect to the exercise of general jurisdiction, defendants maintain that they are not incorporated in the state of Michigan, they have not consented to suit in Michigan, nor do they carry on "continuous or systematic" business in the state of Michigan. (Dfs.' Br. in Supp.Part.Mot. Summ.J. at 13). In addition, defendants maintain that the facts do not warrant the exercise of limited jurisdiction. Defendants maintain that they do not advertise in Michigan, own any delivery trucks in Michigan, nor do they have a sales representative present in Michigan. Further, defendants allege that the tort forming the subject matter of the lawsuit occurred in Windsor, Ontario, Canada, and defendants do not contract to insure any person in the state of Michigan, nor do they enter into contracts for performance of services in the state of Michigan. Id.

The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the Court's jurisdiction over the defendants, and when faced with a properly supported Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the plaintiff must set forth facts establishing personal jurisdiction. Id. at 1458. Where, as in this case, the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter, "the court must consider the pleadings and affidavits in a light most favorable to the plaintiff.... To defeat such a motion, [the plaintiff] need only make a prima facie showing of jurisdiction." Dean v. Motel 6 Operating L.P., 134 F.3d 1269, 1272 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1262 (6th Cir. 1996)). A prima facie showing requires the plaintiff to "`demonstrate facts which support a finding of jurisdiction....'" Welsh v. Gibbs, 631 F.2d 436, 438 (6th Cir.1980) (quoting Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981, 101 S.Ct. 1517, 67 L.Ed.2d 816 (1981)).2 Furthermore, a court does not weigh the controverting assertions of the party seeking dismissal. Dean, 134 F.3d at 1272 (quoting CompuServe, Inc., 89 F.3d at 1262).

Therefore, in order to decide this motion, the Court must ascertain only whether plaintiffs have established a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction. The Court will review the pleadings, including the deposition testimony offered by plaintiffs, in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, to determine whether plaintiffs have adduced sufficient facts on which the Court can conclude it is appropriate to exercise personal jurisdiction over the DNN defendants.

Plaintiffs argue for the presence of both general and limited jurisdiction. The Due Process clause permits a Court to exercise both general and limited jurisdiction. However, "[i]n analyzing the due process limits of personal jurisdiction, a distinction is made between `general' jurisdiction and `specific' jurisdiction." Conti v. Pneumatic Prod. Corp., 977 F.2d 978, 981 (6th Cir.1992) (citing Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville v. WEDGE Group, Inc., 882 F.2d 1087, 1089 (6th Cir.1989)). "General jurisdiction exists when a defendant has `continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state sufficient to justify the state's exercise of judicial power with respect to any and all claims.'" Aristech Chem. Int'l, Ltd. v. Acrylic Fabricators, 138 F.3d 624, 627 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting Kerry, 106 F.3d at 149). By contrast, "[s]pecific jurisdiction ... subjects the defendant to suit in the forum state only on claims that `arise out of or relate to' a defendant's contacts with the forum" Id. (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 & n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404 (1984)).

In Michigan, general personal jurisdiction over a corporate defendant is governed by MICH.COMP.LAWS § 600.711 which provides:

The existence of any of the following relationships between a corporation and the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the courts of record of this state to exercise general personal jurisdiction over the corporation and to enable such courts to render personal judgments against the corporation.

(1) Incorporation under the laws of this state.

(2) Consent, to the extent authorized by the consent and subject to the limitation provided in section 745.

(3) The carrying on of a continuous and systematic part of its general business within the state.

MICH.COMP.LAWS § 600.711. With respect to § 600.711(1), it is clear from the record that the DNN defendants are not incorporated in the state of Michigan. The DNN defendants have not consented to suit in the state of Michigan so as to fall within the purview of § 600.711(2). Further, the DNN defendants do not carry on a "continuous and systematic" portion of their business in Michigan. As discussed infra, the record reveals that the DNN defendants galvanize steel which has been transported to their facility in Windsor, Ontario. The DNN defendants do not engage in any solicitation of business in the state of Michigan; nor do they contract for the delivery of the steel to Michigan. Therefore, in view of the record currently before the Court, this Court is unable to exercise general personal jurisdiction over the defendants.

In addition, plaintiffs argue that the facts of the present case warrant this Court's exercise of limited jurisdiction over the DNN defendants. The exercise of limited jurisdiction over a corporate defendant is governed by MICH.COMP.LAWS § 600.715 which provides:

The existence of any of the following relationships between a corporation or its agent and the state shall constitute a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the courts of record of this state to exercise limited personal jurisdiction over such corporation and to enable such courts to render personal judgments against such corporation arising out of the act or acts which create any of the following relationships:

(1) The transaction of any business within the state.

(2) The doing or causing any act to be...

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