Neil F. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin.
| Docket Number | 4:22-cv-10789 |
| Decision Date | 12 May 2023 |
| Parties | NEIL F., Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan |
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO DENY PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO 10), GRANT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (ECF NO. 13) AND AFFIRM THE COMMISSIONER'S DECISION
I. RECOMMENDATION: For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DENY Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 10), GRANT Defendant's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13), and AFFIRM the Commissioner's decision.
II. REPORT
Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (Commissioner) denying his application for Disability Insurance (DI) benefits. This matter is before the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 10), the Commissioner's cross-motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 13), Plaintiff's reply (ECF No. 14), the Commissioner's sur-reply (ECF No. 16), and the administrative record (ECF No. 8).
In his July 18, 2019 application for disability insurance benefits (DIB), Plaintiff alleges his disability began on May 1, 2018, at the age of 50. (ECF No. 8, PageID.262-263.) In his disability report, he lists bilateral varicose veins, right hand surgery with a tumor present, major depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and chronic low back pain as limiting his ability to work. (ECF No. 8, PageID.279.) His application was initially denied on February 6, 2020. (ECF No. 8, PageID.125-126.)
Plaintiff requested a hearing by an ALJ. (ECF No. 8, PageID.183-184.) On September 18, 2020, ALJ John Dodson held a very brief hearing (ECF No. 8, PageID.106-110), but became unavailable to issue a decision (see ECF No. 8, PageID.59, 78). Accordingly, on March 16, 2021, ALJ Anthony Smereka held a second hearing at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE), Diane Regan, testified. (ECF No. 8, PageID.76-105.) On March 25, 2021, ALJ Smereka issued an opinion, which determined that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (ECF No. 8, PageID.56-75.)
Plaintiff submitted a request for review of the hearing decision/order. (ECF No. 8, PageID.252-254.) However, on February 15, 2022, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. (ECF No. 8, PageID.27-33.) Thus, ALJ Smereka's decision became the Commissioner's final decision.
Plaintiff timely commenced the instant action on April 12, 2022. (ECF No. 1.)
The administrative record contains approximately 398 pages of medical records, which were available to the ALJ at the time of his March 25, 2021 decision. (ECF No. 8, PageID.398-796 [Exhibits 1F-21F].) These materials will be discussed in detail, as necessary, below.
Pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4), at Step 1 of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 1, 2018, the alleged onset date. (ECF No. 8, PageID.61.) At Step 2, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: depressive disorder, anxiety disorder, and status post-right hand tumor excision. (ECF No. 8, PageID.61-62.) At Step 3, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed impairments. (ECF No. 8, PageID.63-64.) Between Steps 3 and 4 of the sequential process, the ALJ evaluated Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC) and determined that Plaintiff had the RFC:
to perform light work . . . with additional limitations. He cannot work at unprotected heights or around dangerous moving machinery. He cannot climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds, and cannot drive or use foot controls in the course of employment. He can frequently handle and finger with the right dominant upper extremity. He has the ability for simple, routine, repetitive tasks with a specific vocational preparation (SVP) of one or two, for routine work is that which does not require changes in work settings or duties more than once per month. He should avoid work with the general public, but can have occasional contact with co-workers and supervisors. He must avoid work at a fast-production pace, where the pace is set by others, such as conveyor belt or assembly line work.
(ECF No. 8, PageID.64-68.) At Step 4, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was unable to perform any past relevant work. (ECF No. 8, PageID.68.) At Step 5, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform, such as packer, sorter, and assembler. (ECF No. 8, PageID.69.) The ALJ therefore concluded that Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, since May 1, 2018. (ECF No. 8, PageID.69.)
The District Court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final administrative decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.'” Rabbers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Rogers v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (). Under this standard, “[s]ubstantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). In deciding whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, the Court does “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or decide questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007); Rogers, 486 F.3d at 247 (“It is of course for the ALJ, and not the reviewing court, to evaluate the credibility of witnesses, including that of the claimant.”).
Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must “‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight'” of the Commissioner's decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.'” Blakley v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). Finally, even if the ALJ's decision meets the substantial evidence standard, “‘a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.'” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision is unsupported by substantial evidence because: (1) the RFC assessment does not include the entirety of his documented limitations; (2) the ALJ erred at Step 2 by failing to find his varicose veins and venous insufficiency to be severe impairments; (3) the ALJ erred in evaluating his subjective symptoms; and (4) the ALJ improperly analyzed medical opinions. (ECF No. 10, PageID.801-808-824.) The Commissioner opposes Plaintiff's motion, arguing that the Court should find no error on the bases asserted and that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision. (ECF No. 13, PageID.834-860.) In his reply brief, Plaintiff reiterates his arguments, but adds an assertion that the ALJ failed to fully develop the record (ECF No. 14, PageID.863), and the Commissioner responds to this argument in its own sur-reply (ECF No. 16). I will address each argument, though in a different order than presented by Plaintiff, below.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred at Step 2 by failing to include varicose veins and venous insufficiency as severe impairments. (ECF No. 10, PageID.815-818.) Specifically, he asserts that the ALJ provided inadequate explanations for his findings, and that both impairments fit the requirements to be considered severe. (ECF No. 10, PageID.815-818.)
Step 2 requires an ALJ to determine if a claimant suffers from any severe impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii), (c). Plaintiff bears the burden at Step 2 of establishing that he suffers from a severe impairment. See Walters, 127 F.3d at 529. An impairment is considered severe if it “significantly limits your physical or mental ability to do basic work activities[.]” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). “An impairment or combination of impairments is found ‘not severe' and a finding of ‘not disabled' is made at this step when medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality or a combination of slight abnormalities which would have no more than a minimal effect on an individual's ability to work even if the individual's age,...
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