Neil v. Allstate Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 02 November 1988
• Parties: Lester NEIL and Arlene Neil, his Wife, Appellants, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1304

549 A.2d 1304

379 Pa.Super. 299

Lester NEIL and Arlene Neil, his Wife, Appellants, v. ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 1, 1988.

Filed Nov. 2, 1988.

John C. Carlin, Jr., Pittsburgh, for appellants.

David J. Obermeier, Pittsburgh, for appellee.

Before CIRILLO, President Judge, and TAMILIA and CERCONE, JJ.

PER CURIAM:

The issue in this appeal is whether the "family exclusion" clause in appellants' homeowners' insurance policy is valid with the result that appellants will be without insurance coverage for the jury-determined liability of appellant/mother for injuries sustained by her minor son.

Appellants' son, Adam Neil, was permanently injured when he was struck near his home by an automobile driven by Conrad Guenzel. Appellants brought a civil action against Guenzel for Adam's injuries, and Guenzel subsequently joined appellants as additional defendants on the grounds of negligent supervision of Adam. After they were joined in the action against Guenzel, the Neils requested that appellee, Allstate, represent them, by counsel, in the civil action and provide coverage for any liability which they might incur as a result of their joinder in the negligence action as additional defendants.¹ Allstate informed the Neils that the terms of their homeowners' policy excluded Adam from coverage, and therefore, they would provide no defense in the civil action. Specifically, Allstate cited the following provision which is the subject of this appeal:

We [Allstate] do not cover bodily injury to an insured person....

The definition of "insured person" under the policy was:

"Insured Person"--means you [policyholder] and, if a resident of your household any relative and any dependent person in your care.

After Allstate refused to defend them, appellants brought the instant action for declaratory judgment. In their complaint, appellants sought to have the "family exclusion" clause of their policy, upon which Allstate had relied in refusing coverage and a defense, declared invalid and void as against public policy. Appellee sought, by motion, an order of summary judgment, citing the terms of the policy. On December 18, 1987, appellee's motion for summary judgment was granted, and appellants then filed the instant timely appeal.

Meanwhile, the lawsuit against Guenzel for Adam's injuries proceeded. The jury in that case returned a verdict of $250,000 in Adam's favor, which was apportioned as follows: twenty-five percent attributable to Conrad Guenzel, forty percent attributable to Arlene Neil, thirty-five percent attributable to Thomas and Susan Lordi, and zero percent attributable to the Borough of Monroeville. As a result of this apportionment of negligence, appellant Arlene Neil is liable for her son's injuries in the amount of $100,000.

Since this case comes to us on the granting of a motion for summary judgment, we will first look to the standards under which such relief is granted. Summary judgment should not be entered unless the case is free from doubt. Weiss v. Keystone Mack Sales, Inc., 310 Pa.Super. 425, 456 A.2d 1009 (1983). The relief should be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.C.P., Rule 1035, 42 Pa.C.S.A.; Hower v. Whitmak Associates, 371 Pa.Super. 443, 538 A.2d 524 (1988). On review, the record must be examined in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, and in doing so all well-pleaded facts in the non-moving party's pleadings are accepted as true and that party is given the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Spain v. Vicente, 315 Pa.Super. 135, 461 A.2d 833 (1983).

It has also recently been established that summary judgment is available in a declaratory judgment action. Darlark v. Henry S. Lehr, Inc., 360 Pa.Super. 509, 520 A.2d 1206 (1987). In addition, we have held that an inquiry into whether a particular loss is within the coverage of an insurance policy is a question of law, which may be decided on a motion for summary judgment. Creed v. Allstate Insurance Co., 365 Pa.Super. 136, 529 A.2d 10 (1987), allocatur denied 517 Pa. 616, 538 A.2d 499 (1988).

With these principles in mind, we turn to an examination of appellants' contentions on appeal. Appellants argue that the family exclusion clause contained in their policy of homeowners' insurance is against the public policy of this Commonwealth and should be declared void. They submit that judicial abolition of the doctrines of parental immunity and interspousal immunity from tort liability requires such a declaration. See Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971) (abolition of parental immunity); Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 433 A.2d 859 (1981) (abolition of interspousal immunity). Appellants contend that the judicial and social policy of this Commonwealth is one of compensation to injured family members, and that when insurance companies insert family exclusion clauses into their policies, they are interfering with this policy, and the clauses should be declared void. We cannot agree.

In Mamlin v. Genoe, 340 Pa. 320, 17 A.2d 407 (1941), our Supreme Court set forth the standard under which public policy arguments in favor of voiding an insurance clause will be examined:

"It is only when a given policy is so obviously for or against the public health, safety, morals or welfare that there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in regard to it, that a court may constitute itself the voice of the community in [declaring that policy to be against public policy]."

Id. at 325, 17 A.2d at 409, cited in Guardian Life Insurance Co. v. Zerance, 505 A.2d 345, 354, 479 A.2d 949, 954 (1984).

Generally, the courts will look to two sources to ascertain public policy in a given area: legislative mandate and judicial precedent. Guardian Life Insurance Company v. Zerance, 505 Pa. 345, 479 A.2d 949 (1984) ("Public policy is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interest"). In addition, when scrutinizing an insurance policy's provisions, the general and well-established rule is that where the language of an insurance policy is unambiguous, a court cannot adopt a construction which conflicts with the clear meaning of that language. Guardian Life Insurance Co. v. Zerance, supra; Ditch v. Yorktowne Mutual Insurance Co., 343 Pa.Super. 22, 493 A.2d 782 (1985); U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty v. Griggs, 341 Pa.Super. 286, 491 A.2d 267 (1985).

In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Williams, 481 Pa. 130, 392 A.2d 281 (1978), cited by appellants, our Supreme Court voided an exclusionary provision in an insurance policy because the clause conflicted with the policy of this Commonwealth as set forth by the legislature in the Uninsured Motorists Act, 40 P.S. § 2000. The plaintiff in Williams was involved in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist. At the time, he was driving his wife's automobile which was insured by State Farm under a policy containing the legislatively mandated uninsured motorist provisions. Plaintiff also had insurance coverage from State Farm on his own automobile. This policy contained the mandated uninsured motorist provisions.

State Farm paid the plaintiff the $10,000 coverage limits under his wife's policy, but although plaintiff's injuries apparently exceeded $10,000, the company refused to make any payments under plaintiff's own policy. Plaintiff then requested arbitration, and the arbitrator denied coverage on the basis of a policy provision which prohibited all recovery by plaintiff under his policy if the injury was sustained while he occupied another motor vehicle owned by a resident of the same household, and which was not an insured vehicle under his own policy. The Superior Court affirmed.

On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, on the basis that the exclusionary provision of the insurance policy conflicted with the provisions of 40 P.S. § 2000, which requires insurance protection to be provided for bodily injury or death to insured persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from the owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles. The court reasoned that the exclusionary provision of the State Farm policy was unenforceable because it permitted a diminution of the protection afforded by the statute below the statutory limits. Williams, supra, 481 Pa. at 139-40, 392 A.2d at 285-87.

The instant case is not analogous. Unlike the area of automobile insurance, which is legislatively regulated, there is no legislative enactment in Pennsylvania governing or requiring that insurance companies provide a specified level of insurance coverage to homeowners. Thus, although we do not deny our power to hold unenforceable an insurance policy provision as did the court in Williams, appellants have not cited and we know of no legislative enactment in the field of homeowners' insurance which would require voiding the family exclusion provision herein on the grounds that it violates public policy.

Nor have we found in judicial precedent a firm public policy to void family exclusion provisions. In fact, our appellate decisions have upheld such clauses. See Puller v. Puller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955) (family exclusion provision upheld in suit by tort-feasor against joint tort-feasor, insured under the policy; insurance company not required to pay for injuries incurred by insured's wife and daughter); Great American Insurance Co. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 412 Pa. 538, 194 A.2d 903 (1963) (policy provision excluding residents of the named insured's household upheld, precluding recovery by the named insured's son for injuries sustained while a passenger in the insured automobile). Even in cases decided subsequent...