O'Neil v. City of Richmond

• Decision Date: 15 January 1925
• Citation: 141 Va. 168
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: KATE O'NEIL, EXECUTRIX OF OWEN O'NEIL, DECEASED v. CITY OF RICHMOND.

Page 168

141 Va. 168

KATE O'NEIL, EXECUTRIX OF OWEN O'NEIL, DECEASED v. CITY OF RICHMOND.

Supreme Court of Virginia, Richmond.

January 15, 1925.

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Actions for Injuries Against — Notice of Claim. — The charter of the city of Richmond, ¶ 19-g, as amended by Acts of 1918, page 182, provides that no action shall be maintained against the city for damages for an injury to person or property through negligence of the city or its officials, unless a verified statement of the nature of the claims is filed with the city attorney within six months after the cause of the action arose.

Held: That the provision is constitutional, and this although the wrong complained of was done in the city's private and not in its governmental capacity.

2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Actions for Injuries Against — Notice of Claim. — It is undoubtedly within the power of the legislature to impose upon a person claiming damages for negligence against a municipality the duty of giving notice to the municipality of his claim before bringing an action, and it is not a violation of the constitutional rights of the injured party or an unwarranted discrimination between municipal and private corporations to require the giving of notice, within a limited period, or the presentation of a claim to the municipal authorities as a condition precedent to an action at law, or to an action at law of a certain class, against a municipal corporation, provided such requirement be not unreasonable.

3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Actions for Injuries Against — Notice of Claim. — Provisions for notice of claim for damages against a municipality are construed as mandatory, a condition precedent to the right to sue, are universally upheld.

4. STATUTES — Constitutional Law — Supremacy of Legislature. — The supremacy of the General Assembly in all respects, save as limited by the Constitution, is certainly well settled.

5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Creations of Statute. — Municipal corporations are created by law, all of their powers are derived from the statutes creating them, and all of their liabilities are thereby imposed.

6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Notice of Claim — Reason for Statute. — The reasons for statutes requiring notice of claim to be given municipalities before action have been frequently indicated. They afford the city authorities the opportunity to investigate the circumstances, examine the locality in which the injury is alleged to have occurred, and to discover the witnesses promptly so as to ascertain the facts while their recollections are fresh. Such statutes tend to discourage and avoid the expense of litigation, because if the investigation discloses legal liability a prompt settlement is both proper and probable. They also tend to prevent perjury and fraud as well as to avoid injustice growing out of the failure of the witnesses to recollect clearly occurrences long past before they are called upon to testify and thus better to safeguard against unfounded claims.

7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Notice of Claim — City Water Works. — The mere fact that the negligence complained of is alleged to have arisen out of the operation of the city water works does not take the case out of the operation of a statute requiring notice of claim to be given a city before an action may be maintained against it for negligence. Such statutes can be made applicable to such actions as this, as well as to actions growing out of the strictly governmental functions of the city.

8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS — Notice of Claim — Provision not Confined to Negligence as to Streets. — The provision in charter of the city of Richmond, ¶ 19-g, as amended by Acts of 1918, page 182, in regard to notice of claim to be given the city attorney in negligence cases is not limited to negligence in the construction or maintenance of streets.

9. STATUTES — Construction — Plain Language. — Generally, when the meaning of language is plain, and to accord its obvious meaning to it leads to no absurd results, and to nothing which is inconsistent with other statutes, the rules which govern the construction of language which is obscure do not apply. Such rules are only aids to be used when needed to clarify obscurities.

10. STATUTES — Title — One Subject to be Expressed in Title — Charter Provision Requiring Notice of Claim. — It was objected to the provision of the charter of the city of Richmond, prohibiting actions based on negligence except after notice of the claim, that it contravened ¶ 52 of the Constitution of 1902, which provides that no law shall embrace more than one object, which shall be expressed in its title. The title was stated to be to amend and re-enact certain specified sections of the charter of Richmond, followed by a digest of every material change made in the charter as it had theretofore existed, while the specific object so far as it relates to the requirement of notice in all negligence cases is expressed in the title in language which cannot be misunderstood.

Held: That there was no merit in the objection.

11. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — ¶ 4 of Bill of Rights — Exclusive — Privileges — Notice of Claim for Negligence. — The provision of the charter of the city of Richmond requiring notice of claim in negligence cases does not contravene ¶ 4 of the Bill of Rights against special privileges.

12. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — ¶ 4 of Bill of Rights. — This clause was intended to shield against heredity in office and has no reference to the private relations of the citizens or to the action of the legislature in passing laws regulating the domestic policy and business affairs of the people, or any portion of them.

Error to a judgment of the Law and Equity Court of the city of Richmond, in a proceeding by warrant against the city of Richmond. Judgment for the city. Plaintiff assigns error.

The opinion states the case.

Sands, Williams & Lightfoot and H. S. Burnett, for the plaintiff in error.

James E. Cannon, for the defendant in error.

PRENTIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error sued out a warrant against the city of Richmond, alleging negligence and resulting damages to certain real estate inundated by defective water pipes owned and operated by the city of Richmond.

The defendant moved the dismission of the warrant because no verified written statement of the claim had been furnished the city attorney within six months of the injury complained of, relying upon the requirement of section 19g of the charter of the city, as amended, Acts 1918, page 182. This motion was sustained, first by the trial justice, and then by the trial court, on appeal, and the plaintiff is here assigning error.

The provision to be construed reads thus: "No action shall be maintained against the said city for damages for an injury to any person or property alleged to have been sustained by reason of the negligence of the city, or of any officer, agent, or employee thereof, unless a written statement, verified by the oath of the claimant, his agent or attorney, of the nature of the claim and of the time and place at which the injury is alleged to have occurred, or been received, shall have been filed with the city attorney of said city within six months after such cause of action shall have accrued." It is admitted that the notice required by this statute was not given.

1, 2 1. The validity of this provision is attacked as inapplicable to the plaintiff's claim upon the ground that the wrong complained of was done by the city in its private and not its governmental capacity, and therefore that the city is liable just as an individual or a private corporation would be.

There are many cases involving such statutes, and there is little conflict in the decisions. Such differences as exist arise only out of the construction of different statutes.

The general rule is thus clearly and succinctly stated in 19 R.C.L., section 329, page 1040: "* * * it is undoubtedly within the power of the legislature to impose such a requirement, and it is not a violation of the constitutional rights of the injured party or an unwarranted discrimination between municipal and private corporations to require the giving of notice within a limited period, or the presentation of a claim to the municipal authorities as a condition precedent to an action at law, or to an action at law of a certain class, against a municipal corporation, provided such requirement be not unreasonable." The cases there cited fully sustain this comprehensive statement.

3 In 6 McQuillin on Mun. Corp., section 2714, it is said that such provisions are construed as mandatory, a condition precedent to the right to sue and are universally upheld. 28 Cyc. page 1447.

The support, so far as we are advised, for the distinction claimed, is suggested by the cases of D'Amico Boston, 176 Mass. 599, 58 N.E. 158, where the language of the statute is not given, and Henry City of Lincoln, 93 Neb. 331, 140 N.W. 664, 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 174. These cases appear to stand alone, and in the latter case there was a strong dissenting opinion. Generally, the courts have made no reference to such a distinction, but have confined themselves to construing the particular statute involved.

4, 5 The supremacy of the General Assembly in all respects, save as limited by the Constitution, is certainly well settled. Town of Danville Pace, 25 Gratt. (66 Va.) 9, 18 Am.Rep. 663; Whitlock Hawkins, 105 Va. 248, 53 S.E. 401; Button State Corporation Commission, 105 Va. 634, 54 S.E. 769. Certainly this power must be exercised as to municipal corporations. They are created by law, all of their powers are derived from the statutes creating them, and all of their liabilities are thereby imposed. White Nashville, 134 Tenn. 688, 185 S.E. 721, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 961.

6 The reasons for these statutes have been frequently indicated. They afford the city authorities the opportunity to investigate the circumstances, examine the locality in...