O'Neil v. Demers

• Decision Date: 06 November 1922
• Docket Number: Nos. 513-519.,s. 513-519.
• Citation: 118 A. 677
• Parties: O'NEIL v. DEMERS.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

118 A. 677

O'NEIL

v. DEMERS.

Nos. 513-519.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Nov. 6, 1922.

Criminal complaints by William P. O'Neil against Arthur Demers, August Dunn, Joseph B. Black, and John E. Ward, respectively. Constitutional questions were certified by the district court to the Supreme Court, where motions to dismiss the complaints were also filed. Questions answered and motions denied.

Elmer S. Chace, City Sol., and Henry C. Cram and Sigmund W. Fischer, Jr., Asst. City Sols., all of Providence, for complainant.

Rosenfeld & Hagan, of Providence, for defendants.

Baker & Spicer and Walter I. Sundlun, all of Providence, amici curi?

SWEETLAND, C. J. Each of the above-entitled causes is a criminal complaint preferred in the district court of the Sixth judicial district by the complainant as deputy chief of police of the city of Providence, charging the respondent with a violation of chapter 2231, Public Laws 1922, the same being "An act to enforce the prohibition of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes," sometimes called the "Sherwood Act."

In said district court in each complaint the respondent by his plea in abatement brought in question upon the record the constitutionality of said chapter 2231; and Howard B. Gorham, Esq., associate justice of said court, in conformity with statutory direction, has certified the constitutional questions raised to this court for its decision. The question certified is the same in each complaint, and is as follows:

"That chapter 2231 of the Public Laws of the state of Rhode Island, passed at the January session of the General Assembly A. D. 1922, is void and unconstitutional because it is in violation of section 10 of article 1 of the Constitution of the state of Rhode Island and of section 1 of article 14 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States of America."

Article 1, section 10, of the Constitution of Rhode Island is as follows:

"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury; to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining them in his favor, to have the assistance of counsel in his defense, and shall be at liberty to speak for himself; nor shall he be deprived of life, liberty, or property, unless by the judgment of his peers, or the law of the land."

Section 1 of article 14 of the Amendments to the Constitution of the United States is as follows:

"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."

After hearing the parties and receiving their briefs and supplemental briefs, Albert A. Baker, Esq., William H. Spicer, Esq., and Walter I. Sundlun, Esq., members of the bar, stated to the court that they represented a number of respondents, in pending criminal proceedings, whose interests would be affected by our determination in the matter now under consideration, and requested permission to file a brief in support of the contention of the respondents here. Such petition was granted, and they have filed a brief, as amici curias, which has been considered by the court in connection with the other briefs filed.

The questions certified treat said chapter 2231 as duly enacted by the General Assembly and approved by the Governor in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law, and only bring in question the constitutionality of its provisions. The provisions of said chapter are clearly not repugnant to nor in violation of said section 10, article 1. of the Constitution of Rhode Island, or section 1, article 14, of Amendments to the federal Constitution, as to any matter involved in either of said complaints. No claim of that nature has been made to us by either of these respondents, nor does such repugnance or violation appear to us upon an examination and consideration of said chapter. None of its provisions, which is pertinent to this complaint, attempts to authorize an invasion of the rights secured to an accused in a criminal prosecution by the provisions of the said section of the Rhode Island Constitution; nor does any of its provisions tend to abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within this state the equal protection of the laws, contrary to the prohibition contained in said section of the United States Constitution. Our decision is that, in as far as the provisions of said chapter 2231 affect the respondents under these complaints, such provisions are not in violation of the section of the Constitution of this state nor of the section of the federal Constitution relied upon in the question certified.

While said constitutional questions were pending in this court the respondent in each of said complaints moved' to dismiss the complaint on the ground that said district court was without jurisdiction in the premises for the following reasons: (1) That said chapter 2231 is in conflict with the provisions of the National Prohibition Act, commonly called the Volstead Act; and (2) that said chapter 2231 is inoperative and void because it was not enacted by the General Assemblj in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution of the state. Question arises as to the propriety of entertaining the motion to dismiss a complaint, pending in a district court, when the only matter before us connected with such complaint is a constitutional question certified. We find authority for such action, however, in Lace v. Smith, 34 R. I. 1, 82 Atl. 268, Ann. Cas. 1913E, 945, in which case a constitutional question, brought on the record in a bill in equity pending in the superior court, was certified to this court for determination. During the pendency of the constitutional question here this court considered and passed upon a motion to dismiss said bill in equity in the superior court, which motion was based upon the ground that the superior court was without jurisdiction. The court based its action upon the broad ground that a question of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in a cause before judgment, and said:

"If the motion should be granted, the whole case including the constitutional questions raised therein, would terminate and cease to exist, therefore it becomes necessary to first inquire into the validity of the motion."

We are the more inclined to be governed in this matter of procedure by the authority of Lace v. Smith because of the desirability of determining the question involved at this time and setting at rest the doubt that has been raised in the minds of the public as to the validity of this very important statute, for the violation of the provisions of which a large number of criminal prosecutions are now pending in the various courts of the state, in nearly if not all of which prosecutions the questions involved in this motion have been raised in one form or another.

As to the first ground of the motion to dismiss—i. e., that the provisions of chapter 2231 of the Public Laws conflict with those of the Volstead Act (41 Stat. 305)—it is claimed by these respondents that in some respects the state law provides for a more stringent system of prohibition than the federal statute, and in that regard conflicts with such statute. It has been held by courts before which' the question has been presented that the Eighteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution does not take away the authority of a state, in the exercise of its police power, to absolutely prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors within such state; and, further, that in the exercise by a state of the concurrent power to enforce the amendment by appropriate legislation, given by said amendment to Congress and to the several states, it is not essential that the state legislation be identical with that of Congress, but merely that it shall be appropriate to the purpose of enforcing the prohibition established by the article, with the proviso that a state enforcement statute cannot effectively authorize the doing of an act forbidden...