O'Neil v. Quilter
| Decision Date | 02 November 1921 |
| Docket Number | (No. 3060.) |
| Citation | 234 S.W. 528 |
| Parties | O'NEIL v. QUILTER. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Townes & Vinson, J. H. Ross, and Fred R. Switzer, all of Houston, for appellant.
Hutcheson & Hutcheson, of Houston, for appellee.
This is a case presented to us by the honorable Court of Civil Appeals upon a certified question. The question, together with the accompanying statement, is so general in its nature as to be somewhat confusing as to just what is the legal query contained therein, and we have had some doubt as to whether or not it is within our jurisdiction. From the certificate as a whole, however, it is reasonably clear that the question presents an issue of law rather than of fact for our determination. We will briefly state the case and the question as follows:
John O'Neil brought suit against M. A. Quilter for the value of a certain small dwelling house erected by Quilter on land belonging to O'Neil, and which was thereafter torn down and removed from said land by Quilter. John O'Neil had been an oil operator for a good many years, and owned many wells and holdings. M. A. Quilter, who was in the employ of O'Neil, moved upon O'Neil's place at the request of O'Neil, in order to be closer to his work and for the purpose of furthering O'Neil's interests. While in O'Neil's employ Quilter was to pay no rent. There was a house on the place which had formerly been used as a dwelling, but at this time was not in condition for Quilter's family to live in. There was also a small shed for stock.
At O'Neil's request Quilter tore down the old house, and with the lumber built a suitable barn for the premises. With material purchased and paid for by himself, Quilter built the three-room box house on the premises of O'Neil, in which he and his family lived until he moved off of the premises, at which time he moved the house off.
In his suit for the value of the house, O'Neil alleged an agreement or understanding between them that Quilter was to leave the house on the place, and that it should belong to O'Neil. This appears to have been the only fact question on this phase of the case that was submitted by the court to the jury, and upon it the jury found in favor of Quilter that there was no agreement or understanding between them at the time Quilter built the house, or at any time, that it should belong to O'Neil and be left on the premises.
O'Neil's contention is that under the admitted and proven facts and circumstances, in the absence of an agreement between them that Quilter could remove the house from the premises, it became the property of the owner of the land upon which it was situated. Quilter's contention is that under the same facts and circumstances the presumed intention which the law imputes would make the house built by Quilter retain its character of personalty and subject to his right to remove it.
We interpret the court's question to be: In the absence of an agreement between O'Neil and Quilter that the house erected by Quilter should remain on the premises, does the law impute to Quilter the intention that the house should remain personalty and therefore subject to his removal?
The controlling question in the case is, Was it Quilter's intention, at the time he built the house on O'Neil's premises, that it should be a permanent accession to the freehold? This intention is to be ascertained from the facts and circumstances attendant upon the placing of the house there.
The principles governing the question are well expressed in Hutchins v. Masterson, 46 Tex. 554, 26 Am. Rep. 286, wherein the court says:
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