O'NEILL v. ARA Services, Inc.
Decision Date | 08 August 1978 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 78-1441. |
Citation | 457 F. Supp. 182 |
Parties | Peter L. O'NEILL v. ARA SERVICES, INC., William S. Fishman, Lee F. Driscoll, Jr., Marvin D. Heaps and William M. Siegel. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
James E. Beasley, Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.
Theodore W. Flowers, Philadelphia, Pa., for defendants.
This is a diversity action brought by Peter L. O'Neill, a former employee of ARA Services, Inc., for breach of a contract to employ plaintiff in a management position in ARA, for wrongful discharge from his employment, and for conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of his rightful occupation. Defendants are ARA Services, Inc.; William S. Fishman, President of ARA; and several corporate officers of ARA. Defendants have moved to dismiss all three complaints for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The motion to dismiss is denied as to the first claim. As to the second and third claims, the motion is granted.
In reliance on these assurances, plaintiff accepted ARA's offer and went to work for ARA as corporate security director on July 1, 1974.
Shortly after starting work, plaintiff was asked to investigate rumors of organized crime infiltration of an ARA subsidiary. He expressed concern that an extensive investigation would interfere with his broader security duties and might impede his advancement to an executive position in operations. Defendants Fishman and Driscoll told plaintiff that this investigation should take precedence over his other duties and they assured him that the investigation would not prevent ARA from honoring its commitment to place plaintiff in management of operations. According to the complaint, defendants repeated these assurances throughout the next two years.
Plaintiff spent the bulk of this time investigating illegal acts by ARA personnel. His investigations disclosed evidence that ARA subsidiaries were infiltrated by organized crime, that ARA funds were being used to finance loan-shark operations and to bribe public officials, and that certain executives were defrauding ARA of money. As a result, several key executives were terminated or asked to resign, including a member of the board of directors.
In the fall of 1976, plaintiff asked to begin formal training in operations. He was told that he would have to withdraw from his investigative work before beginning formal training. O'Neill was assured by all defendants that he would be guaranteed a position as regional vice-president at a salary commensurate with what he was then earning (about $64,000). He helped locate a replacement, left the investigation, and in February, 1977, began training in operations. During the next two months plaintiff was by-passed for three regional executive openings without being given an opportunity to interview for the positions. Plaintiff complained. On May 2, 1977, he was fired without explanation.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant ARA breached its contract to employ plaintiff in management of operations after two years. As a result, plaintiff seeks damages for loss of earnings, loss of earning capacity, and damages to his professional reputation. The motion to dismiss will be denied as to the first count because the plaintiff should have the opportunity to prove at trial any facts and circumstances from which a jury could infer that defendants entered into a definite agreement to employ plaintiff in a management position for a reasonable period of time.
Defendants contend that plaintiff has not stated a claim for breach of contract because the employment agreement does not specify employment for a definite time period and is therefore terminable at will by either party for any reason. A contract of employment which does not specify a definite duration is presumed to be terminable at will by either party. The plaintiff may overcome this presumption by showing the intent of the parties that the contract last for some definite period of time or for a reasonable time. See Cummings v. Kelling Nut Company, 368 Pa. 448, 84 A.2d 323 (1951).
Slonaker v. P. G. Publishing Company, 338 Pa. 292, 13 A.2d 48 (1940).
The intent of the parties to a contract with regard to the duration of the employment relationship in the absence of a specific provision has been treated by Pennsylvania courts as a factual matter to be decided by the jury. See, e. g., Lubrecht v. Laurel Stripping Company, 387 Pa. 393, 127 A.2d 687 (1956).1
In the present case, plaintiff O'Neill alleges that he left his former employment and worked for ARA for two years in reliance on the promise that he would be transferred to a management position after two years. He further alleges that he left his position as security director for ARA to train for management on the assurance that he would be promoted to regional vice president. If these allegations were established at trial, it would not be unreasonable for a trier of fact to conclude that the parties intended plaintiff's employment in management to extend for a reasonable period of time.
The defendants also contend that the first count should be dismissed because the alleged agreement is too vague to be enforced under Pennsylvania law. For the purposes of pleading, plaintiff's allegations contain a sufficiently definite oral agreement to allow him the opportunity of proving a definite agreement to a jury. Pennsylvania cases have held that whether the parties formed a complete contract is a question for the jury. Under Pennsylvania law, the determination of the terms of a disputed oral contract is the exclusive function of the jury as a question of fact; the legal effect of the agreement is the province of the courts as a matter of law. McCormack v. Jermyn, 351 Pa. 161, 40 A.2d 477 (1945). Plaintiff here has alleged an oral agreement, various assurances and commitments, a letter of confirmation, various modifications, a rate of pay, and an official title. Plaintiff's complaint will not be dismissed without giving him an opportunity to prove the existence of facts and circumstances which together may show a definite employment contract.
In the second count, plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages for his allegedly wrongful discharge by defendants, "their primary motivation being concealment of the wrongful acts of ARA Services, Inc., and its employees and executives and their desire to prevent the plaintiff from continuing in the career which had been promised him as the condition of his employment." Defendants have moved to dismiss this claim as being insufficient under Pennsylvania law. Dismissal is appropriate when a complaint states a wrong for which there is clearly no remedy. Melo-Sonics Corp. v. Cropp, 342 F.2d 856 (3rd Cir. 1965). The motion to dismiss is granted because the courts of the Commonwealth do not provide a remedy for the tort of wrongful discharge where the plaintiff does not show defendant's specific intent to harm him or to act contrary to public policy.
Plaintiff relies on Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), for the proposition that Pennsylvania recognizes a cause of action for wrongful discharge. However, Geary does not support plaintiff's claim. In general, Pennsylvania courts do not recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge; absent a statutory or...
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