O'Neill. v. Cent. Leather Co.

Citation94 A. 789,87 N.J.L. 552
Decision Date14 June 1915
Docket NumberNo. 51.,51.
PartiesO'NEILL et al. v. CENTRAL LEATHER CO. et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (New Jersey)

(Syllabus by the Court.)

For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, Neutrality.]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Hudson County.

Action by James L. O'Neill and another against the Central Leather Company and another. Judgment for the defendants, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

John M. Enright, of Jersey City, and Oscar R. Houston, of New York City, for appellants. Morgan J. O'Brien, of New York City, and William D. Edwards, of Jersey City, for appellees.

SWAYZE, J. The question to be decided is the title to certain hides claimed by the plaintiff under Martinex, the former owner, and by the defendant Central Leather Company under a title based on a seizure in Mexico by military forces under the authority of Gen. Villa.

1. In cases of this kind the courts are bound to follow the action of the political branches of the federal government where there has been such action. Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202, 11 Sup. Ct. 80, 34 L. Ed. 691. Our first question is, therefore, What action has been taken by the federal government? We are informed of this by various documents submitted in evidence. The letter from Mr. Lansing, counselor to the Department of State, written for the Secretary of State under date of August 20, 1914, makes it clear that our government has never recognized any government in Mexico headed by Carranza or Villa, and has never recognized as belligerents, within the intent and meaning of the law of nations, any forces operating in Mexico under their command. This explicit declaration of Mr. Lansing, acting officially, settles that question as far as this court is concerned, and leaves nothing to inference.

When we examine further to determine what is the exact position taken by our government with reference to the forces under the command of Oarranza as chief, and the immediate command of Villa, we find no such explicit declaration; but the official communications by the President to Congress leave no doubt or room for a contrary inference that at the time the hides in question were seized in November, 1913, and sold in January, 1914, the Carranza and Villa forces were recognized by our government as engaged in actual war. In a message to Congress on August 27, 1913, the President stated his efforts to secure the abdication of the Huerta government, and said that the territory "in some sort controlled by the provisional authorities at Mexico City (the Huerta government) has grown smaller, not larger"; that "difficulties more and more entangle those who claim to constitute the legitimate government"—a "claim they have not made good in fact." He states that he has suggested a settlement conditioned on immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico, a definite armistice solemnly entered into and scrupulously observed, security for an early and free election in which all will agree to take part, the agreement of all parties to abide the result of the election and to co-operate in organizing and supporting the new administration. These references to a cessation of fighting and definite armistice obviously recognize that fighting is going on and that it is of such a character that it may be stopped by an armistice, a word appropriate only to a condition of warfare. "An armistice suspends military operations by mutual agreement of the belligerent parties." Article 36 of the Hague Convention of 1907 as to Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare. It is a word that cannot properly be applied to agreements between a government on the one side and rioters, brigands, or banditti on the other. The message of the President, moreover, contemplated an agreement between parties who had the power to secure the scrupulous observance of agreements solemnly entered into and of an agreement to abide the result of an election. If there could be any doubt that the President thereby recognized that the armed forces in Mexico were divided into parties who could command the obedience of their members and that their armed struggle was war, that doubt would be removed by his further declaration that it is our duty to show what true neutrality will do to enable the people of Mexico to set their affairs in order again. Neutrality is a word not properly applicable, except as between armed forces engaged in war which our government desires to treat on a plane of absolute equality. The necessary inference to be drawn from the use of the word "neutrality" is confirmed by subsequent language in the message. The President speaks of increased danger to noncombatants in Mexico, as well as to those actually in the field of battle, and says that he deems it his duty "to see to it that neither side to the struggle now going on in Mexico receive any assistance from this side of the border." He refers to the "best practice of nations in the matter of neutrality." The evidence proves that this recognition by the President of a state of war between the Huerta government and the Carranza government was merely a recognition of existing facts. Prof. Beale defines war as follows (9 Harvard Law Review, 407):

"War, in law, is not a mere contest of physical force, on however large a scale. It must be an armed struggle, carried on between two political bodies, each of which exercises de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory, and commands an army which is prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war."

That the struggle in Mexico in 1913-14 was an armed struggle is well known; that it was carried on between two political bodies, one the Huerta government, claiming to be the legitimate successor of the formerly existing Mexican government, and the other the 'Carranza government, organized under the so-called Plan of Guadelupe, is proved; that each exercised de facto authority over persons within a determinate territory and commanded an army is proved; that the Carranza forces, at least, were prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war, is shown by their adoption of our own regulations.

Our government has, however, gone further than merely to recognize that the two contending parties were at war. On December 2, 1913, the President in his annual message spoke of Huerta's authority as usurped and said there could be no lasting peace until he-surrendered it. If Huerta's authority was usurped, if peace was impossible until he surrendered, armed resistance to that authority was justified. The President added the most important declaration: "Mexico has no government." In that situation the only control resembling governmental...

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7 cases
  • Sokoloff v. Nat'l City Bank of New York
    • United States
    • New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
    • 19 Diciembre 1924
    ...recognition, a like effect would have been ascribed to a levy of contributions by a commander in the field. O'Neill & Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 87 N. J. Law, 552, 94 A. 789, L. R. A. 1917A, 276;Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 594, 605, 606, 24 L. Ed. 1018. We think the case at hand is not so ......
  • Stanbery v. Aetna Life Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court
    • 29 Junio 1953
    ...'war.' Our courts have given the word a realistic interpretation when used in private contracts or documents. See O'Neill v. Central Leather Co., 87 N.J.L. 552, 94 A. 789, L.R.A.1917A, 276 (E. & A.1915), affirmed Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 38 S.Ct. 309, 62 L.Ed. 726 (1918)......
  • D'Angelo v Petroleos Mexicanos
    • United States
    • U.S. Supreme Court
    • 26 Diciembre 1974
    ...court considered the effect of the action of the foreign government upon the rights of the parties. See O'Neill v. Central Leather Co., 87 N.J.L. 552, 94 A. 789 (1915). Ricaud v. American Metal Co., supra, resulted in judgment for the plaintiff which was reversed after appellate adjudicatio......
  • D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • 26 Diciembre 1974
    ...trial court considered the effect of the action of the foreign government upon the rights of the parties. See O'Neill v. Central Leather Co., 87 N.J.L. 552, 94 A. 789 (1915). Ricaud v. American Metal Co., supra, resulted in judgment for the plaintiff which was reversed after appellate adjud......
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