O'Neill v. City Manager of Cambridge
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts |
| Citation | 428 Mass. 257,700 N.E.2d 530,1998 WL 720134 |
| Parties | Robert O'NEILL, Jr. v. CITY MANAGER OF CAMBRIDGE. |
| Decision Date | 16 October 1998 |
Page 530
v.
CITY MANAGER OF CAMBRIDGE.
Middlesex.
Decided Oct. 16, 1998.
Page 531
Devra G. Bailin, Boston (Thomas J. Urbelis and Nancy E. Glowa, with her), for defendant.
Douglas I. Louison, Boston (James W. Simpson, Jr., Quincy, with him), for plaintiff.
Before WILKINS, C.J., and ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY, FRIED and IRELAND, JJ.
IRELAND, Justice.
This appeal concerns the proper interpretation of G.L. c. 32, § 8, as amended by St.1996, c. 306, § 16 (Chapter 306), a law that establishes procedures for reinstatement of [428 Mass. 258] formerly disabled civil service employees. It presents issues similar to those in White v. Boston, 428 Mass. 250, 700 N.E.2d 526 (1998), also decided today.
Page 532
The plaintiff, Robert O'Neill, Jr., was a police officer for the city of Cambridge from November 1, 1965, until June 24, 1972, at which time a retirement board granted him a disability retirement. The plaintiff was disabled primarily as a result of psychological injuries stemming from an automobile accident on July 30, 1971.
In December, 1989, a regional medical panel cleared the plaintiff to return to work. On January 26, 1990, after the Cambridge retirement board notified him of the medical panel's conclusion, the defendant, the city manager of Cambridge and appointing authority for the Cambridge police department (department), acting on the recommendation of the Cambridge police commissioner, refused to reinstate the plaintiff because there was no vacancy in the department.
The plaintiff first brought suit in 1993 in the Superior Court. After trial, on November 15, 1996, a judge ordered the defendant to consider the plaintiff for reinstatement. The defendant did so and, after reviewing the recommendation of the police commissioner, rejected the plaintiff in writing to the retirement board on January 17, 1997, citing numerous reasons beyond the plaintiff's physical condition. These included the fact that the plaintiff had been brought up on criminal charges, had a protective order entered against him, was alleged to have committed perjury in a 1994 deposition, and had provided false information on his 1996 application for reinstatement to the department.
On January 31, 1997, the plaintiff was reexamined by another regional medical panel, which found him fit to return to his job. The retirement board notified the defendant of the medical panel's conclusion, but he again declined to reinstate the plaintiff. The plaintiff again filed suit in the Superior Court, this time relying on the new statute, Chapter 306. A second Superior Court judge granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and ordered the defendant to reinstate the plaintiff. The judge stayed her decision pending the defendant's appeal. We transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion and now affirm.
1. Discretionary authority. We held...
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