O'Neill v. City Manager of Cambridge

• Decision Date: 16 October 1998
• Citation: 428 Mass. 257,700 N.E.2d 530,1998 WL 720134
• Parties: Robert O'NEILL, Jr. v. CITY MANAGER OF CAMBRIDGE.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 530

700 N.E.2d 530

428 Mass. 257

Robert O'NEILL, Jr. v. CITY MANAGER OF CAMBRIDGE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,

Middlesex.

Argued Sept. 10, 1998.

Decided Oct. 16, 1998.

Devra G. Bailin, Boston (Thomas J. Urbelis and Nancy E. Glowa, with her), for defendant.

Douglas I. Louison, Boston (James W. Simpson, Jr., Quincy, with him), for plaintiff.

Before WILKINS, C.J., and ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY, FRIED and IRELAND, JJ.

IRELAND, Justice.

This appeal concerns the proper interpretation of G.L. c. 32, § 8, as amended by St.1996, c. 306, § 16 (Chapter 306), a law that establishes procedures for reinstatement of formerly disabled civil service employees. It presents issues similar to those in White v. Boston, 428 Mass. 250, 700 N.E.2d 526 (1998), also decided today.

The plaintiff, Robert O'Neill, Jr., was a police officer for the city of Cambridge from November 1, 1965, until June 24, 1972, at which time a retirement board granted him a disability retirement. The plaintiff was disabled primarily as a result of psychological injuries stemming from an automobile accident on July 30, 1971.

In December, 1989, a regional medical panel cleared the plaintiff to return to work. On January 26, 1990, after the Cambridge retirement board notified him of the medical panel's conclusion, the defendant, the city manager of Cambridge and appointing authority for the Cambridge police department (department), acting on the recommendation of the Cambridge police commissioner, refused to reinstate the plaintiff because there was no vacancy in the department.

The plaintiff first brought suit in 1993 in the Superior Court. After trial, on November 15, 1996, a judge ordered the defendant to consider the plaintiff for reinstatement. The defendant did so and, after reviewing the recommendation of the police commissioner, rejected the plaintiff in writing to the retirement board on January 17, 1997, citing numerous reasons beyond the plaintiff's physical condition. These included the fact that the plaintiff had been brought up on criminal charges, had a protective order entered against him, was alleged to have committed perjury in a 1994 deposition, and had provided false information on his 1996 application for reinstatement to the department.

On January 31, 1997, the plaintiff was reexamined by another regional medical panel, which found him fit to return to his job. The retirement board notified the defendant of the medical panel's conclusion, but he again declined to reinstate the plaintiff. The plaintiff again filed suit in the Superior Court, this time relying on the new statute, Chapter 306. A second Superior Court judge granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and ordered the defendant to reinstate the plaintiff. The judge stayed her decision pending the defendant's appeal. We transferred the case from the Appeals Court on our own motion and now affirm.

1. Discretionary authority. We held today, in White, supra, that G.L. c. 32, § 8, mandates reinstatement of formerly disabled employees once a medical panel determines they are fit to return to their former positions and a vacancy exists. Our conclusion here is the same as the one we reached in that case.

This case, however, differs from White in one key respect. The defendant raises disturbing allegations of improprieties committed by the plaintiff while he was on disability retirement. In such instances, the defendant argues, appointing authorities need discretion to deny reinstatement of such an employee. Nothing in the statute, however, allows the defendant to prevent reinstatement of the plaintiff based on allegations of this type. As we noted in an earlier discussion of G.L. c. 32, § 8, the appointing authority may work within the preexisting civil service system to remedy problems like those raised by these facts. See Yebba v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 406 Mass. 830, 839 n. 7, 551 N.E.2d 488 (1990) (noting that "discharge proceedings may be commenced against a civil service employee immediately following his reinstatement, or at any time thereafter").

2. Constitutionality of G.L. c. 32, § 8. We reject the defendant's constitutional challenge to G.L. c. 32, § 8, for the same reasons we rejected the defendants' position in White. See White, supra at 254-255, 700 N.E.2d 526.

3. Claim preclusion. The defendant argues that claim preclusion operates to bar the plaintiff's present action because his reinstatement claim was already raised and decided in the earlier action in the Superior Court in November, 1996.

"Claim preclusion makes a valid, final judgment conclusive on the parties and their privies, and prevents relitigation of all matters that were or could have been adjudicated in the action." Blanchette v. School Comm. of Westwood, 427 Mass. 176, 179 n. 3, 692 N.E.2d 21 (1998). It "is 'based on the idea that the party to be precluded has had the incentive and opportunity to litigate the matter fully in the first lawsuit.' " Heacock v. Heacock, 402 Mass. 21, 24, 520 N.E.2d 151 (1988), quoting Foster v. Evans, 384 Mass. 687, 696 n. 10, 429 N.E.2d 995 (1981).

Claim preclusion does not bar the plaintiff's claim. It does not...