O'Neill v. City of East Providence
Decision Date | 07 August 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83-141-A,83-141-A |
Citation | 480 A.2d 1375 |
Parties | Gerald F. O'NEILL v. CITY OF EAST PROVIDENCE et al. ppeal. |
Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
a. It authorizes the City of East Providence to acquire property within or without its corporate limits for any city purpose in fee simple, or in lesser interest or estate, by purchase, gift, devise, lease or condemnation, and to sell, lease, mortgage, hold, manage and control such property as its interests may require; or
b. Said provision does not provide the method of payment for any property so condemned; or
c. Whether it is a valid constitutional delegation of legislative power; or
d. Whether it is a constitutional delegation of legislative power, in that it delegates the right to condemn for 'city purposes.'
a. In that pursuant to R.I.Gen.Laws § 24-1-1, a city or town may 'determine that the public interest and convenience makes necessary or advantageous' the acquisition of real property for highway purposes.
b. In that R.I.Gen.Laws § 24-1-15 allows for payment for the acquisition of real property taken pursuant to this chapter in a manner other than by payment of money."
The District Court has provided a statement of facts relevant to the present controversy. The constitutionality of two separate condemnation proceedings is in issue. The facts indicate that plaintiff is the owner of several parcels of land and the real estate thereon located at the southerly corner of Bullocks Point Avenue and Morrone Avenue in East Providence. The defendant city of East Providence (city) sought to acquire a portion of this property in order to effectuate certain urban-renewal plans. The stated objective of these plans, the so-called Riverside Square Revitalization Project, was to increase the flow of business and revenue into the Riverside Square area of the city through the construction of a small retail building containing a convenience store.
On March 12, 1981, the council passed an ordinance pursuant to § 1-3 of the charter and article XXVIII of the Rhode Island Constitution. This ordinance authorized the city to acquire the portion of plaintiff's property needed for the Riverside Square Redevelopment Project. Following these condemnation proceedings, plaintiff's land was to be sold to a private developer for construction of the proposed convenience store.
A second, separate condemnation of plaintiff's land was subsequently undertaken by the city. On June 22, 1981, the council adopted resolution No. 26 entitled "Resolution Declaring the Necessity of Taking Land for Highway Purposes under the Provisions of chapter 1, title 24 of the General Laws of Rhode Island." This resolution authorized the city to acquire the eight-foot area of plaintiff's land that fronted on Bullocks Point Avenue. In enacting this resolution, the council acted pursuant to the provisions of G.L.1956 (1979 Reenactment) chapter 1 of title 24 rather than § 2-22 of the charter.
The plaintiff subsequently instituted an action in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, alleging that the council acted in violation of the State and Federal Constitutions in authorizing the two condemnation proceedings.
The first issue to be resolved is whether the city could properly authorize the expenditure of funds or incurrence of a debt relative to the highway condemnation of plaintiff's land by means of a resolution under chapter 1 of title 24. Section 2-22 of the charter states that "every act of the council providing for the expenditure of funds or for the contracting of indebtedness shall be by ordinance." This section further provides for specific procedures to be followed in the enacting of any ordinance. In this case, the council, in authorizing the taking of plaintiff's land for highway purposes, followed the procedure outlined in chapter 1 of title 24. The plaintiff contends that because the condemnation and purchase of plaintiff's property necessarily involves an expenditure of funds by the city, the council was required to proceed by enacting an ordinance according to the procedure mandated in the charter. The plaintiff concludes that the condemnation of his property is void and invalid because of the council's failure to comply with the provisions of § 2-22 of the charter.
The authority of a municipality to engage in self-government does not extend to enacting local laws that are inconsistent with those provisions of the general laws enacted in conformity with the Legislature's reserved powers. Marro v. General Treasurer of the City of Cranston, 108 R.I. 192, 195, 273 A.2d 660, 662 (1971). This court has stated that when the provisions of a city or town charter conflict with general laws of statewide application, the general laws take precedence. Lynch v. King, 120 R.I. 868, 876-77, 391 A.2d 117, 122 (1978); State v. Krzak, 97 R.I. 156, 162, 196 A.2d 417, 421 (1964). In this case, § 2-22 of the East Providence City Charter and chapter 1 of title 24 of the general laws, a statute of general application not affecting the form of local government, provide differing procedures to be followed in eminent-domain proceedings. According to the principle enunciated in Lynch and Krzak, both supra, the provisions of the general laws control. Consequently, the council acted properly in authorizing the condemnation of plaintiff's land for highway purposes pursuant to the procedure outlined in chapter 1 of title 24 of the general laws. The plaintiff's contention that the city council acted improperly in failing to proceed according to § 2-22 of the city charter is thus without merit.
The next issue, which relates to the condemnation for redevelopment purposes, concerns the constitutionality of § 1-3 of the city charter. Section 1-3 provides in relevant part:
The plaintiff argues that the aforesaid section contravenes the prohibition of article XXVIII of the Rhode Island Constitution against enacting local laws that conflict with the Constitution or the General Laws of the state of Rhode Island. 1 The plaintiff more specifically states that this section of the city charter is unconstitutional because it grants an overly broad condemnation authority to the city of East Providence, makes no provision for the method of payment, and is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power because it contains insufficient guidelines and delegates the authority to condemn for "city purposes."
Although the home-rule amendment provides a broad grant of lawmaking authority to cities and towns, that authority is not without limitation. A specific limitation on this right of self-government is found in art. XXVIII, sec. 4, of the Rhode Island Constitution which specifically reserves to the General Assembly the power to legislate "in relation to the property, affairs and government of any city or town by general laws which shall apply alike to all cities and towns, but which shall not affect the form of government of any city or town." (Emphasis added.)
This court has consistently held that when the provisions of a city or town charter conflict with legislation reserved to the General Assembly under article XXVIII of the Rhode Island Constitution, the provisions of the general laws supersede those of the charter. In City of East Providence v. Local 850, International Association of Firefighters, 117 R.I. 329, 339, 366 A.2d 1151, 1156 (1976), this court held that because the Firefighters Arbitration Act was a statute of general application that applied to the firefighters of any city or town in the state, it therefore superseded the provisions of the city charter. See also City of Cranston v. Hall, 116 R.I. 183, 186, 354 A.2d 415, 417 (1976). Similarly, in Pitassi v. Personnel Hearing Board of East Providence, 116 R.I. 116, 119, 352 A.2d 658, 660 (1976), this court struck down a right of appeal granted under a city charter because it intruded upon a power reserved to the General Assembly. See also Lynch v. King, 120 R.I. 868, 876, 391 A.2d 117, 122 (1978).
In this case, the matter regulated under § 1-3 of the charter is the eminent-domain power of the city. Several provisions of the general laws similarly prescribe the authority of a city or town to...
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