O'Neill v. Johnson

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SAYRE, J.
• Citation: O'Neill v. Johnson, 73 So. 21, 197 Ala. 502 (Ala. 1916)
• Decision Date: 16 November 1916
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 643
• Parties: O'NEILL et al. v. JOHNSON et al.

73 So. 21

197 Ala. 502

O'NEILL et al. v. JOHNSON et al.

4 Div. 643

Supreme Court of Alabama

November 16, 1916

Appeal from Probate Court, Bullock County; J.T. Norman, Judge.

Petition by Oscar Johnson and others to probate the will of Mary A.D Reynolds, deceased, with contest by W.T. O'Neill and others. From a decree admitting the will to probate contestants appeal. Affirmed.

Ernest L. Blue, of Union Springs, for appellants.

Norman & Rainer, of Union Springs, for appellees.

SAYRE J.

No sufficient reason is suggested in the brief, nor has any occurred to us, why the will of testatrix's deceased husband should have been admitted in evidence on the contest of testatrix's will; the contest being based on grounds of alleged testamentary incapacity and undue influence. The husband had died about 15 months before testatrix leaving all his property to her. The contest involved no inquiry of law or fact upon which the husband's will shed any light. It was therefore properly excluded.

Nor do we find reversible error in the other assignment which has been argued in the brief for appellants. The will in contest gave a legacy of $10,000, to L.D. Morris.

Contestants (appellants) charged that the will had been induced by undue influence exercised by Morris. Whether there existed between testatrix and Morris a confidential relation within the meaning of the doctrine as to that subject maintained by the courts (Curry v. Leonard, 186 Ala. 666, 65 So. 362) was a question of fact to be decided by the jury on the evidence; but contestants have, of course, no reason to complain that the trial court, charging the jury as matter of law that such relation did exist, as to that improperly charged upon the effect of the evidence; for they alleged and undertook to prove such to be the case. But, further, that part of the court's oral charge made the subject of the thirty-fifth assignment of error, assuming the existence of a confidential relation between testatrix and Morris, proceeded to the broad statement, correct upon the assumption indicated, that Morris' activity about the preparation of the will imposed upon proponents the burden of proving that it was the product of testatrix's competent, free, and uninfluenced volition. But there was a dispute between the parties and in the evidence whether what Morris had done was the result of his intermeddling to procure the will or was the mere friendly performance of...