Neill v. Maag
| Docket Number | 23-3126-JAR |
| Decision Date | 30 June 2023 |
| Parties | CHASE NEILL, Plaintiff, v. JARED MAAG, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Kansas |
Plaintiff Chase Neill brings this civil rights action. Plaintiff proceeds pro se and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. He is a federal prisoner confined at the U.S. Penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas (“USP-Leavenworth”). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed. Also before the Court are five (5) motions filed by Plaintiff.
Plaintiff's Complaint (Doc. 1)[1] is based on his prosecution for violation of 18 U.S.C. 155(a)(1)(B), Threatening a Federal Official. See United States v. Neill, Case No. 22-CR-40037 (D Kan.). Plaintiff was found guilty after a 3-day jury trial and sentenced on May 23, 2023, to 46 months imprisonment followed by 3 years of supervised release. Id. at Doc. 169 (Judgment in a Criminal Case). On May 26, 2023 Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal. Id. at Doc. 177. On May 30, 2023, his appeal was docketed in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and remains pending. See United States v. Neill, Case No. 23-3096 (10th Cir.).
Plaintiff asserts the primary basis of jurisdiction as 42 U.S.C. § 2000a - 2000a-6(a). He also references 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Federal Agents, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), and 28 U.S.C. § 2671. The Complaint alleges generally that the defendants engaged in wrongful conduct, including prosecuting him, “on account of religious and racial discrimination.” See Doc. 1, at 9, 11, 13, for example. Plaintiff states that he is “Mashiach,” the “One who comes in the name of the Lord” and “the only one whom has and bears and has authenticated and officially-proven his record of religious identity corroborating this fact without any room of doubt.” Id. at 13.
Plaintiff includes twenty-seven (27) claims in the Complaint: (1) discriminatory enforcement of law 18 U.S.C. § 115; (2) negligence, or more specifically the negligent refusal to “comply with Attorney General-implemented ‘requirement of nondiscrimination' which prohibited the Prosecution and arrest of the Plaintiff”; (3) abuse of process by “misusing” the proceedings in Case No. 22-CR-400037 for “malicious, illegal, unconstitutional, and discriminative intents/purposes”; (4) malicious prosecution; (5) discriminatory enforcement of law 18 U.S.C. § 4241; (6) discriminatory enforcement of law 18 U.S.C. § 3241; (7) discriminatory defamation on account of religion/race/national origin in the course of the prosecution of Plaintiff; (8) discrimination-based false light invasion of privacy on account of religion/race/national origin in the course of the criminal proceedings; (9) discrimination-based fraud on account of religion, ancestry, and national origin in the course of the prosecution; (10) discrimination-based false arrest/wrongful detention; (11) discrimination-based unlawful conversion of property (described by Plaintiff as “the souls of the people”) with a value “over $156-centillion” in the course of the criminal proceedings; (12) discrimination-based interference with contracts (the contract being the Ten Commandments or “The Covenant”) by arresting and prosecuting Plaintiff; (13) discrimination-based fraud by silence or fraudulent concealment for concealing “known and authenticated, proven-official, facts of the Plaintiff's identity” in the criminal proceedings; (14) discrimination-based deprivation of the right to free speech as a result of his arrest and prosecution; (15) discrimination-based deprivation of the right of free exercise as a result of his arrest and prosecution; (16) discrimination-based deprivation of the right of protection of the Establishment Clause as a result of his arrest and prosecution; (17) discrimination-based deprivation of the rights and protections of the Due Process Clause by engaging in “conduct that is extremely shocking to conscience” in the course of his arrest and prosecution; (18) discrimination-based deprivation of the rights and protections of the Equal Protection Clause by depriving Plaintiff of an impartial jury; (19) discrimination-based deprivation of the rights and protections of the Faithful Execution Clause by “illegally” prosecuting Plaintiff; (20) deprivation of the protections of the Prohibited Powers Clause (Article 1, Section 9, Clause 1) of the U.S. Constitution by “illegally prosecuting the Plaintiff”; (21) discriminatory deprivation of Plaintiff's Second Amendment right to bear arms, resulting in Plaintiff suffering “injury to his left arm” as “God's punishment for not speaking” because of his arrest and prosecution; (22) deprivation of Plaintiff's rights and protections of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) through his arrest and prosecution; (23) discriminatory enforcement of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines; (24) deprivation of Plaintiff's protection of the Disqualifications Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the defendants participated in a war against the Constitution, God, and religion by prosecuting Plaintiff; (25) discriminatory deprivation of Plaintiff's Sixth Amendment right and protection of “competent, indiscriminant, and impartial counsel”; (26) conspiracy to interfere with the exercise of religious speech through Plaintiff's prosecution; and (27) the common law tort of outrage through various statements and acts associated with Plaintiff's prosecution.
Plaintiff names as defendants three federal prosecutors, two federal judges, two congressional aides, a U.S. Capitol police officer, five Kansas legislators, two officers with the Lawrence Police Department, the governor of Kansas, the Lawrence Police Department, the State of Kansas, an FBI agent, a psychologist, two federal public defenders, and a U.S. Congressman.
Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of compensatory damages of not less than $250 million and punitive damages of the same amount. He further seeks, among other things, an order granting him “immunity of religious conduct and speech”; an order “entitling Plaintiff to diplomatic-type immunity pursuant to Common Law Divine Right of Kings”; prosecution of the defendants for various crimes, up to and including treason; an order for Plaintiff's immediate release; an order staying the criminal proceedings in Case No. 2022-CR-40037; and an order requiring the U.S. Secret Service to restore to Plaintiff his “aural energy, which is described as the glowing luminescent light often painted or depicted around angels, typically denoting a ‘halo.'” Id. at 3339.
The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).
A court liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006).
On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
A pro se litigant's “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitlement to relief' requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint's “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court's decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.'” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a...
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