Nelms v. Wellington Way Apartments, LLC
| Decision Date | 04 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 11-3404,11-3404 |
| Parties | TREMAINE NELMS; KAYLEN ALLI, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WELLINGTON WAY APARTMENTS, LLC, c/o Statutory Agent Thomas H. Lagos; THOMAS H. LAGOS; TINA LAGOS; SHIRLEY MORELAND; THE CITY OF COLUMBUS, c/o Mayor Michael B. Coleman; MICHAEL FLEMING, Columbus, Ohio Division of Police; LOWELL WHITT, Columbus, Ohio Division of Police, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 13a0124n.06
Plaintiffs Tremaine Nelms and Kaylen Alli appeal the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants. We affirm in part and reverse in part. Specifically, we summarily affirm with respect to plaintiffs' claims under the federal Fair Housing Act and adopt the reasoning of the district court on those claims. We reverse with respect to Nelms's federal constitutional claims against defendants Michael Fleming, Lowell Whitt, and Tina Lagos, as well as his Ohiostatutory claim for unlawful entry against defendant Wellington Way Apartments, LLC, Thomas Lagos, and Tina Lagos (the "Wellington defendants").
At all relevant times, Tremaine Nelms was a resident of the Wellington Way Apartments in Columbus, Ohio. In April 2007, Kaylen Alli, who is Nelms's brother, and a few friends were visiting Nelms's apartment in the late afternoon. As the teens were leaving the apartment, one of them tripped on another's foot, causing both to fall, one directly to the ground and the other into a wooden privacy fence, damaging the fence.1 An apartment employee apparently saw what happened and called the police.
Dispatched to the apartment on a report of property damage in progress, police officers Michael Fleming and Lowell Whitt arrived to a calm scene outside of Nelms's apartment; none of the teens or adults standing outside were shouting or otherwise causing a ruckus. Fleming spoke first with Tina Lagos, an owner and representative of the apartment complex. Lagos said an employee told her that she saw a fight that resulted in damage to the fence. Lagos said the employee thought it "possible that one person that was involved in this fight . . . was in the apartment." The officers, however, saw nothing to suggest there had been a fight. The youths generally denied that there had been a fight. Alli testified that he answered any questions the officers asked; he was not evasive or uncooperative.
After conducting his investigation, Fleming told Lagos that he could not "determine what transpired in . . . relationship to the destroyed fence and what the [employee] witnessed." At this point, Lagos mentioned that there may be damage to the inside of Nelms's apartment, and that Nelms could be continuing the damage because he was angry that the police had been called. As the conversation progressed, Fleming speculated that there might be someone inside the apartment who had been injured in a fight. Fleming did not speak with the apartment employee about the details of her observations or the basis for her belief that a person involved in the incident might be inside the apartment.
Fleming then began to question Lagos about the lease and whether the landlord had a right to enter a tenant's apartment without consent. Lagos informed Fleming that the lease permitted the landlord to enter and inspect the property for damage. Thereafter, Fleming knocked on Nelms's front door and window, but there was no response. He then asked Lagos to retrieve a key to the apartment, which she did. With his gun drawn, Fleming entered Nelms's apartment with Whitt.
According to Alli, one of the officers—presumably Whitt—began to "flip[ ] through couches, through the cushions, looking for whatever" while the other officer—likely Fleming—went "around the corner" inside the apartment. Fleming found Nelms, fully clothed, standing in a bathtub. Upon finding Nelms, Fleming holstered his gun and drew his Taser. He then directed Nelms to his couch, sat him down, asked if there was "anything illegal" in the apartment, threatened to take him to jail if anything were found, and then searched his kitchen cabinets and living and utility rooms. Flemingwalked Nelms outside and placed him in the back of a police cruiser. He then reentered the apartment.
Nelms's mother complained to the Columbus Police Department, claiming Fleming entered her son's apartment illegally. Following an investigation by the Department's internal affairs bureau, police sergeant Dennis Weyandt concluded that Fleming's conduct complied with department policy "as it relates to a reasonable belief that the action is necessary to preserve life and limb or to provide immediate aid to involved person(s)." Two superior officers agreed. But Police Commander Jeffrey Blackwell disagreed, concluding that "the belief that emergency or exigent circumstances dictated the entrance by Officer Fleming is flimsy and not plausible." From his review of the file, Blackwell saw "no substantive evidence of any medical emergency" that would have allowed officers to enter Nelms's residence without a warrant. He recommended that Fleming be formally disciplined for his conduct. Deputy Police Chief John Rockwell disagreed with Commander Blackwell. He found that, while the department does not "necessarily encourage officers to enter under such circumstances, entering under the landlord's authority has generally been upheld by the courts."2 This was the police department's final decision on the matter.
This lawsuit followed. As relevant here, Nelms alleged that Fleming and Whitt violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment when they entered and searched his apartment without a warrant.He further asserted that Tina Lagos conspired with the officers in this regard and was therefore liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Finally, he claimed that the Wellington defendants violated Ohio law when their agents entered his apartment without giving reasonable notice. After discovery, all defendants filed motions for summary judgment, which the district court granted.
Nelms timely appealed.
We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment. King v. Taylor, 694 F.3d 650, 661 (6th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. King, 694 F.3d at 661.
Nelms first challenges the officers' warrantless entry and search of his apartment. The district court ruled as a matter of law that exigent circumstances existed to enter the apartment without a warrant because the officers had reason to believe "that a person inside the apartment was seriously injured and unable to respond" to the officers' knock on the door. It further ruled that no jury could believe testimony from Nelms and Alli that officers searched the apartment after locating and ensuring that Nelms did not require medical attention. Because genuine disputes of material fact exist, summary judgment on these two claims and the officers' qualified-immunity defense was not warranted.
The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their . . . houses . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated[.]" U.S. Const. amend. IV. And the Supreme Court has instructed that "physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585 (1980) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, warrantless entries into the home are "presumptively unreasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 586.
However, this presumption of unreasonableness can be "overcome," Michigan v. Fisher, 130 S. Ct. 546, 548 (2009) (per curiam), when a warrantless entry falls within one of the "well-delineated" exceptions to the warrant requirement. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). At issue in the present case is the exception that a warrant is not required to enter a person's home when "the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that the warrantless [entry] is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1978) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"One exigency obviating the requirement of a warrant is the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury." Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006). Under this "emergency aid" exception, "officers may enter a home without a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury." Id. Officers do not need "ironclad proof of a likely serious, life-threatening injury to invoke theemergency aid exception[.]" Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 549 (internal quotation marks omitted). But by the same token, their decision to enter must be based on more than a hunch or "the mere possibility" that someone inside needs immediate aid. See United States v. Radka, 904 F.2d 357, 362 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Delgado, 814 F. Supp. 2d 874, 885 (E.D. Wis. 2011) (). Consistent with the Fourth Amendment's "ultimate touchstone" of reasonableness, officers must have an "objectively reasonable basis for believing" that "a person within the house is in need of immediate aid." Fisher, 130 S. Ct. at 548 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) (emphasis added).
"Brigham City illustrates the application of this standard." Fisher, 130...
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