Nelson Bros., Inc. v. Busby
Decision Date | 21 August 1987 |
Citation | 513 So.2d 1015 |
Parties | NELSON BROTHERS, INC. v. Christine BUSBY, et al. 85-1355. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Edward R. Jackson and Richard E. Fikes of Tweedy, Jackson & Beech, Jasper, for appellant.
Robert T. Wilson and Kerri J. Wilson of Wilson & King, Jasper, for appellees.
The plaintiffs, who were property owners in Walker County, Alabama, brought suit against Gayosa Coal Company, Inc., Nelson Brothers, Inc., and the University of Alabama, for damage to plaintiffs' homes allegedly caused by blasting. The University of Alabama was dismissed. The plaintiffs reached a pro tanto settlement with Gayosa whereby Gayosa paid $9,375.00 damages as to each home. 1 Plaintiffs then proceeded to trial against Nelson Brothers only on counts of trespass, negligence, wantonness, and engaging in abnormally dangerous activity. The jury returned verdicts for the plaintiffs for $9,375.00 in compensatory damages for each house. Nelson Brothers did not file a post-trial motion for J.N.O.V. but did file a motion for a new trial, which was denied. Nelson Brothers appeals. We affirm.
During the course of the trial, the parties introduced conflicting testimony and other evidence regarding the existence and amount of damage to the plaintiffs' homes; regarding the number and dates of the "shots" put off by Nelson Brothers; regarding the nature, degree, and amount of technical assistance that Nelson Brothers provided to Gayosa on Gayosa's "shots"; and regarding the accuracy of the blasting log.
The first issue presented for review is whether it was reversible error for the trial court to give the following instruction on concurrent negligence:
The oral charge contains other instructions on concurrent negligence; however, Nelson Brothers contends that it objected to the portion of the oral charge set out above.
Plaintiffs contend that Nelson Brothers did not object to the trial court's charge on concurrent negligence and that Nelson Brothers waived any error by failing to object and to state its ground for objection.
In Louisville & N.R.R. v. Garrett, 378 So.2d 668, 673-74 (Ala.1979), we wrote:
Failure to object before the jury retires precludes raising the alleged error on appeal. Hancock v. City of Montgomery, 428 So.2d 29 (Ala.1983).
Nelson Brothers contends that the following objection made by it was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal:
"We want to object to the charge on joint and several liability as not being applicable at all in the case under the facts and circumstances and it attempts to emphasize something that the ..., defendant, Nelson Brothers, may not be responsible for in anywise."
This is not a proper objection to the charge on concurrent negligence. Nor is the ground that "it attempts to emphasize something that ... Nelson Brothers may not be responsible for in anywise" a proper ground for such objection.
Further, we are persuaded that the evidence introduced presented a jury question as to the combining and concurring negligence of Nelson Brothers and Gayosa.
A tort-feasor whose negligent act or acts proximately contribute in causing an injury may be held liable for the entire resulting loss. Beloit Corp. v. Harrell, 339 So.2d 992, 995 (Ala.1976); Butler v. Olshan, 280 Ala. 181, 191 So.2d 7 (1966); see also Prosser, Law of Torts, at 291-323 (4th ed. 1971), and Restatement Second of Torts § 879 (1979) ().
After studying Nelson Brothers' briefs, we believe that its problem with the oral charge was not with what the trial court gave, but with what it failed to give.
" 'Where there is evidence as to damage from various causes, as to a portion of which defendant cannot be held responsible, and no evidence as to the portion of the damages resulting from the separate causes, the proof is too uncertain to permit the jury arbitrarily to apportion a part or all of the proved damages to the act for which defendant is responsible.' "
Kershaw Mining Co. v. Lankford, 213 Ala. 630, 105 So. 896, 897 (1925), quoting 17 Corpus Juris 758.
Nelson Brothers' stated ground of objection (i.e., "it attempts to emphasize something that the ..., defendant, Nelson Brothers, may not be responsible for in anywise") was not sufficiently clear to call the trial court's attention to this omitted rule of law.
Nelson Brothers next contends that the jury award of damages to the plaintiffs is based on conjecture and speculation. There was evidence that the cause of the plaintiffs' damage was blasting by Gayosa and Nelson Brothers. All plaintiffs presented evidence of the fair market value of their property before and after the blasting. The proper measure of damages for property injury in a tort action is the difference between the fair market value of the property before the injury and the fair market value after the injury. Dooley v. Ard Oil Co., 444 So.2d 847 (Ala.1983). There was evidence that each home sustained at least $20,000.00 in damages.
Nelson Brothers argues the sufficiency of the evidence; however, since it did not file a motion for J.N.O.V., it has not preserved the right to attack the sufficiency of the evidence in its jury trial in this appeal. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Sealy, 374 So.2d 877 (Ala.1979). Evidentiary challenges, except on grounds of admissibility, are divided into two separate and distinct categories: sufficiency of the evidence raised by motions for J.N.O.V. and measured by the "scintilla" evidence rule; and weight and preponderance of the evidence raised by a motion for a new trial and measured by the "palpably wrong and manifestly unjust" standard. Burroughs Corp. v. Hall Affiliates, Inc., 423 So.2d 1348 (Ala.1982).
Our standard of review is whether the jury verdict, which we assume to be correct, is so against the great weight of the evidence that it is palpably wrong and manifestly unjust.
The jury's verdict was $9,375.00 for each home. This was less than the evidence of the damage to each home after discounting the amount received from Gayosa. The trial court gave the following instruction, to which there was no objection:
There was evidence to support the amount of the jury's verdict, and the trial court charged that the verdict could not be based on mere speculation or conjecture and that the jury must deduct the amount the plaintiffs had received from Gayosa from the total amount...
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