Nelson v. Araiza, No. 49144

• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois
• Writing for the Court: DOOLEY
• Citation: 372 N.E.2d 637,69 Ill.2d 534,14 Ill.Dec. 441
• Parties: , 14 Ill.Dec. 441 Deborah NELSON, Appellee, v. Theodore ARAIZA et al., Appellants.
• Docket Number: No. 49144
• Decision Date: 27 January 1978

Page 637

372 N.E.2d 637 69 Ill.2d 534, 14 Ill.Dec. 441 Deborah NELSON, Appellee,
v.
Theodore ARAIZA et al., Appellants. No. 49144. Supreme Court of Illinois. Jan. 27, 1978.

[69 Ill.2d 536] Heineke & Schrader, Chicago, for Juan Guel et al. etc.; Robert M. Burke, Chicago, of counsel.

John Fako, Jr., Chicago, for Luke Savich etc. et al.; Edwin A. Strugala, Chicago, of counsel.

Alan C. Mendelson, Chicago, for appellee.

DOOLEY, Justice.

Plaintiff, Deborah Nelson, brought this action to recover damages for personal injuries under section 14 of article VI of the Dramshop Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 43, par. 135). At the close of plaintiff's case the defendant tavern owners moved for a directed verdict based on the affirmative defense of complicity. The circuit court of Cook County directed a verdict for defendants. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, deciding that complicity was an issue of fact. (43 Ill.App.3d 685, 2 Ill.Dec. 230, 357 N.E.2d 207.) We granted plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal under Rule 315 (58 Ill.2d R. 315).

Here the issue is whether evidence of complicity so overwhelmingly favored the dramshop defendants that no verdict in plaintiff's favor could stand. In a broader vein, we assess the essentials of complicity as a defense to a dramshop action.

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[14 Ill.Dec. 442] Between 7 and 8 p.m. on March 2, 1970, plaintiff, 21 years old, and her girl friend, Marlene, went to Juan & Tina's Lounge. Neither had any money. Among the [69 Ill.2d 537] patrons were two of plaintiff's girl friends and defendant Theodore Araiza.

Plaintiff had known Araiza for a couple of years. Marlene had dated him previously. Araiza was seated at the bar with several beer bottles and a glass in front of him. He appeared to plaintiff to be "pretty drunk."

Araiza called plaintiff and Marlene to the bar and offered to buy them a drink. Plaintiff accepted a beer from Araiza and then joined her girl friends at their table. Plaintiff did not spend any time with Araiza after he bought her the beer. However, she noticed him at the bar drinking beer and behaving in a boisterous manner.

At 10 p.m. plaintiff and Marlene were going out the tavern door to walk five blocks to the home of friends. Araiza, upon learning their destination, insisted on giving them a ride. Plaintiff initially declined the offer. Araiza, six feet tall and about 250 pounds, persisted. To avoid a "hassle," the girls let Araiza drive them the short distance.

En route to their destination, Araiza made a detour. He stopped in front of Luke's Lounge, left plaintiff and Marlene in the car, and bought four six-packs of beer. He then drove them to the friends' home.

There the three remained for the next few hours. Plaintiff had one or two cans of beer. Araiza, already intoxicated, drank about eight cans of beer.

At 2 a.m., plaintiff and Marlene were leaving. Plaintiff's home was about two blocks away. Araiza protested vigorously and insisted that Marlene go out with him. Marlene agreed if plaintiff would also go. Plaintiff finally yielded to the pleas of both Marlene and Araiza, on condition that she be allowed to drive.

Plaintiff drove them about 20 blocks to a King Kastle restaurant. Plaintiff went into the restaurant to purchase the food. When she returned, Araiza had moved into the driver's seat. Plaintiff sat in the back seat. Araiza refused to let her drive.

[69 Ill.2d 538] It was now close to 3 a.m. and raining. Plaintiff was tired and had no money. Buses ran only once an hour to her neighborhood.

Plaintiff and Marlene told Araiza they wanted to go home. Araiza became very upset and drove away suddenly. The accident causing plaintiff serious injury occurred a few blocks away.

Plaintiff's action was under the Dramshop Act. She alleged she was injured by an intoxicated person and that she had a right of action against Juan & Tina's Lounge and Luke's Lounge because they supplied Araiza with liquor, causing his intoxication.

The remedy afforded by the Dramshop Act is a creature of legislation. The statute imposes no-fault liability. (See Graham v. General U.S. Grant Post No. 2665 (1968), 97 Ill.App.2d 139, 143, 239 N.E.2d 856; Osinger v. Christian (1963), 43 Ill.App.2d 480, 485, 193 N.E.2d 872.) It is to be liberally construed to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the people from the dangers of traffic in liquor. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 43, par. 94.) It grants every person injured a right of action. It provides no statutory defenses. (Matney, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: Recent Developments, 1967 U.Ill.L.F. 116, 128.) Its passage in 1872 was a product of the temperance movement, apparently designed at curtailing a never popular business. See Osinger v. Christian (1963), 43 Ill.App.2d 480, 485, 193 N.E.2d 872.

Complicity interdicting recovery under the Act has its genesis not in the statute but in judicial decisions. This unique defense is an outgrowth of the "innocent suitor" concept. (See Holcomb v. Hornback (1964), 51 Ill.App.2d 84, 200 N.E.2d 745; Ness v. Bilbob Inn, Inc. (1957), 15 Ill.App.2d 340, 146 N.E.2d 234; James v. Wicker (1941), 309 Ill.App. 397, 33 N.E.2d 169; Hays v. Waite (1890), 36 Ill.App. 397.) The teaching is based on the premise that one who is guilty of complicity in the inebriate's intoxication should not be allowed to succeed.

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[14 Ill.Dec. 443] Recovery by him would undermine the purpose of the Act [69 Ill.2d 539] in controlling abuses of the liquor trade. Osinger v. Christian (1963), 43 Ill.App.2d 480, 485, 193 N.E.2d 872; Matney, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: Recent Developments, 1967 U.Ill.L.F. 116, 129.

Emphasis is on the role of the plaintiff in causing the intoxication.

"A party complaining of the wrongful act of a saloonkeeper in causing the intoxication of another, from which damage or injury results to him, must not be an active and willing agent with the saloonkeeper, assisting in causing such intoxication." (Emphasis added.) Hays v. Waite (1890), 36 Ill.App. 397, 399.

The Dramshop Act is not predicated on negligence. Hence, contributory negligence is not an issue. (Osinger v. Christian (1963), 43 Ill.App.2d 480, 482, 193 N.E.2d 872; Douglas v. Athens Market Corp. (1943), 320 Ill.App. 40, 50, 49 N.E.2d 834.) Yet a court, while recognizing this, observed that complicity and contributory negligence are both children of the doctrine that one cannot profit from his own wrong. (Osinger v. Christian (1963), 43 Ill.App.2d 480, 485, 193 N.E.2d 872.) The pertinent inquiries, however, are different. Contributory negligence relates to the plaintiff's role in causing his own injury, while complicity concerns the plaintiff's role in causing the inebriate's intoxication. Matney, The Illinois Dram Shop Act: Recent Developments, 1967 U.Ill.L.F. 116, 129.

The genesis of complicity antedates multiple amendments to the Act marking its evolution. Until 1949 compensatory as well as punitive damages were recoverable. In a myriad of situations punitive damages were approved. See, e.g., Earp v. Lilly (1905), 217 Ill. 582, 75 N.E. 552; Buck v. Maddock (1897), 167 Ill. 219, 47 N.E. 208; Wolfe v. Johnson (1894), 152 Ill. 280, 38 N.E. 886.

Originally the potential compensatory recovery was unlimited, even in death cases, notwithstanding at the same time the amount recoverable under the Wrongful [69 Ill.2d 540] Death Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 70, par. 1 et seq.) was limited, originally to $5,000 (1853-1935), then to $10,000 (1935-1947), $15,000 (1947-1951), $20,000 (1951-1955), $25,000 (1955-1957), and $30,000...