Nelson v. Blinn

• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Writing for the Court: KNOWLTON, C.J.
• Citation: Nelson v. Blinn, 197 Mass. 279, 83 N.E. 889 (Mass. 1908)
• Decision Date: 25 February 1908
• Parties: NELSON v. BLINN.

197 Mass. 279

83 N.E. 889

NELSON v. BLINN.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

February 25, 1908

COUNSEL

George R. Blinn, in pro. per.

Amos L Taylor, for appellee.

OPINION

KNOWLTON C.J.

The appellant was appointed the receiver of the estate of an absentee from the commonwealth, under Rev. Laws, c. 144, as amended by St. 1904, p. 178, c. 206. After due proceedings in the management and settlement of the estate of the absentee more than 14 years having elapsed since the time of her disappearance as found and recorded by the court, a petition for distribution of the estate was filed in the probate court, and after proper notice and regular proceedings a decree was made ordering distribution in accordance with the prayer of the petition. The case is befoer us on an appeal and the only question raised is whether the statute referred to is constitutional.

The appellant relies upon part 1, art. 10, of the Constitution of Massachusetts, which guarantees to every individual protection in the enjoyment of his life, liberty and property, and upon the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which declares that no state shall deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. As applied to a case like the present, the prohibition in the amendment just referred to is as broad as the general provision in the Constitution of Massachusetts.

The unanimous opinion of the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States upon a similar statute, in the case of Cummins v. Reading School District, 198 U.S. 458, 25 S.Ct. 721, 49 L.Ed. 1125, may be treated as a sufficient authority, except so far as the different provisions of the statutes modify the questions involved. This case arose upon a statute of Pennsylvania, whose constitutionality was sustained by a unanimous decision of the Supreme Court of that state, reported in 206 Pa. 469, 56 A. 16, 98 Am. St. Rep. 790. In each decision a distinction was pointed out between those statutes which authorize a settlement of the estate of a deceased person, under which the proceedings are void and the whole jurisdiction gone if the person is in fact alive, and statutes like the present, in which a state undertakes to deal with property within its jurisdiction when its owner has abandoned it, or for some other reason cannot be found. Said Mr. Justice Mitchell, speaking for the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in the case just cited: 'It is a wise and just statute of sequestration and conservation of property which is without a known owner, whether the late owner has abandoned it (as in the present case), or the title has devolved upon others by his death not being presently ascertainable. The statute steps in to provide a caretaker, and to vest present benefit in those who appear to be the owners, with as complete provision as is practicable for the re-establishment of the rights and possession of the absentee on his reappearance. That the state must have some such power is manifest. The property is within its jurisdiction and should have its protection. It is not in the interest of order or good government that property should lie ownerless or open to conflicting claims. If the absentee be really dead, it is conceded that the proceeding is unimpeachable; but if he is dead so far as can be learned, though the death be not absolutely proved, yet the effect to the state is the same. There is property in its charge, without a recognized owner. It must have power to meet such a case, or one of its chief functions as a government must be inoperative.' The subject is very fully and ably considered by Mr. Justice White in giving the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the same case, and the legality and propriety of the exercise of this governmental right is established historically as well as by sound reasoning. In view of these decisions the cases of Carr v. Brown, 20 R.I. 217, 38 A. 9, 38 L. R. A. 294, 78 Am. St. Rep. 855, and Clapp v. Houg, 12 N.D. 600, 98 N.W. 710, 65 L. R. A. 757, 102 Am. St. Rep. 589, so far as they present a different view, should not be followed.

In the fundamental principles upon which the law rests there is no difference between the statute in Massachusetts and that in Pennsylvania. Each alike makes a reasonable provision for notice. As the proceeding is in its nature in rem, a personal notice to the absentee, which in most cases would be impossible, is not necessary to its validity. The constitutionality of our statute was assumed by the parties and the court in George v. Clark, 186 Mass. 426, 71 N.E. 809, and in Purdon v. Blinn, Receiver, 192 Mass. 387, 78 N.E. 462.

...