Nelson v. Brames
| Decision Date | 31 January 1957 |
| Docket Number | No. 5417.,5417. |
| Citation | 241 F.2d 256 |
| Parties | Elmer S. NELSON and Mabel R. Nelson, Appellants, v. Thomas BRAMES and Marilyn C. Brames, Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Albert E. Nelson, Rock Springs, Wyo., and A. G. McClintock, Cheyenne, Wyo., for appellants.
A. Joseph Williams, Cheyenne, Wyo., for appellees.
Before BRATTON, Chief Judge, and HUXMAN and PICKETT, Circuit Judges.
Elmer S. Nelson and Mabel R. Nelson, husband and wife, instituted this action against Thomas Brames and Marilyn C. Brames, husband and wife, to recover damages arising out of an automobile collision which occurred on a highway in Wyoming. The grounds of negligence pleaded in the complaint were driving the automobile of defendants at an excessive rate of speed; driving the automobile upon the icy, slippery, and hazardous highway without chains; failing to keep the automobile under control; and driving the automobile in such manner that it went out of control and crossed the center of the highway into the lane of approaching traffic. By answer, the defendants denied negligence and pleaded that the collision was an unavoidable accident. The jury returned a verdict for defendants; judgment was entered upon the verdict; and plaintiffs appealed.
The judgment is challenged upon the ground that the court erred in admitting in evidence the testimony of an expert witness that in the circumstances shown in the evidence the use of chains at the time and place of the accident was not advisable. The witness was a consulting engineer and professor of mechanical engineering at the University of Nebraska. He was present and heard the evidence as it was adduced. He heard evidence concerning weather and road conditions; evidence tending to show that there was snow on the highway at the place of the accident; evidence tending to show that the highway was icy, slick, and hazardous; evidence tending to show that a sheet of ice covered the entire highway; evidence tending to show that the ice was smooth and slick; evidence tending to show that there were ruts in the ice; evidence tending to show that there were no ruts; evidence tending to show that there was some slush; evidence tending to show that the automobile of defendant suddenly skidded across the center of the highway into the lane of approaching traffic; and evidence tending to show that the collision occurred while the automobile was on the wrong side of the highway. After hearing such evidence, the expert witness testified respecting the effect of chains while driving an automobile on snow and while driving it on ice. He was then permitted to testify over objection that in his opinion the use of chains in the circumstances shown in the case was not advisable. It is the general rule that expert testimony is appropriate when the subject of inquiry is one which jurors of normal experience and qualifications as laymen would not be able to decide on a solid basis without the technical assistance of one having unusual knowledge of the subject by reason of skill, experience, or education in the particular field; that the admission or rejection of expert testimony rests largely in the sound judicial discretion of the trial court; and that when exercised within...
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Combined Ins. Co. of America v. Sinclair
...that indicates that being upon the wrong side of the road is to be considered as negligence per se. This statement from Nelson v. Brames, 241 F.2d 256, 257 (10 Cir. 1957) I think succinctly summarizes the Wyoming " * * * (T)here is no actionable negligence where without fault on the part of......
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Associated Dry Goods Corporation v. Drake
...of one having unusual knowledge of the subject by reason of skill, experience, or education in the particular field. Nelson v. Brames, 241 F.2d 256 (10 Cir., 1957). The ordinary layman would not be expected to be knowledgeable in the construction of the stairway and its characteristics as e......
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Smith v. State
...of one having unusual knowledge of the subject by reason of skill, experience or education in the particular field. Nelson v. Brames, 10 Cir. 1957, 241 F.2d 256. See also People v. Lawson, Colo.App.1976, 551 P.2d 206, McCormick on Evidence, 2d Ed. 1972, § 13, pp. 29-31. The doctor had origi......
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Dubus v. Dresser Industries
...traffic law or regulation will impose liability only when it is the proximate cause of the resulting injuries.' ",citing Nelson v. Brames, 241 F.2d 256 (10 Cir. 1957); Checker Yellow Cab Co. v. Shiflett, Wyo., 351 P.2d 660 (1960); Christensen v. McCann, 41 Wyo. 101, 282 P. 1061 (1929). This......