Nelson v. Carlson

• Decision Date: 29 June 1893
• Citation: 55 N.W. 821,54 Minn. 90
• Parties: NELSON v CARLSON.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

54 Minn. 90

55 N.W. 821

NELSONvCARLSON.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 29, 1893.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1.In an action for the rescission of a contract of exchange of real property on the ground that the defendant falsely and fraudently pointed out to plaintiff one lot as the land that was to be conveyed to him, while the lot in fact conveyed was an entirely different one, the right of plaintiff to a rescission depends, not upon whether the lot pointed out was worth more than the one actually conveyed, but upon the fact that he did not get the property which it was represented that he was getting.

2.Knappen v. Freeman, 50 N. W. Rep. 533,47 Minn. 491, followed to the effect that, where a party seeks the aid of a court to rescind a contract, it is not necessary that he should have previously attempted a rescission, or made any tender to the other party, except where such tender is necessary to put the other party in default.

3.Motion for a new trial on the grounds of “accident and surprise” and of “newly-discovered evidence” held to have been properly denied.

Appeal from district court, Chisago county; Crosby, Judge.

Action by Anders Nelson against Peter A. Carlson to rescind a contract.Plaintiff had judgment, and defendant appeals.Affirmed.

R. P. Hoskyn, for appellant.

J. P. Nelson, for respondent.

MITCHELL, J.

This was an action for the rescission of an executed contract of exchange of properties, the plaintiff having executed to defendant a conveyance of certain land in the village of Franconia in consideration of a conveyance by the latter to the former of a house and lot in the city of Minneapolis.The ground on which a rescission is asked is the alleged false and fraudulent representations of defendant, or rather of his agent through whom the trade was made, by which one house and lot was pointed out to plaintiff as the property which it was proposed to convey to him, and which he supposed he was getting, while the property actually conveyed to him was an entirely different house and lot.If such was the fact, (and the court has so found on what we deem sufficient evidence,) this was good ground for rescission, provided it was seasonably asserted by plaintiff after the discovery of the fraud.The assignments of error predicated upon the admission of evidence as to the relative values of the two houses and lots in Minneapolis, or upon the absence of evidence of the value of the Franconia land, are without merit.The right of the plaintiff to a rescission depended, not upon the fact that the property pointed out to him was worth more than the property which was conveyed to him, but upon the fact that he did not get the property which it was represented that he should get.Hence the question of relative values was wholly immaterial, unless it might possibly have some bearing upon the question of a motive on part of defendant or his agent to deceive the plaintiff.The value of the Franconia property was equally immaterial, and for the same reason.It may be true, as suggested by defendant, that to entitle plaintiff to a rescission it must appear that he parted with something of value; but this land will be presumed to be of some value, but how much that was, whether great or small, is not important.If false and fraudulent representations were made to plaintiff, and he relied upon them in making the trade, it does not lie in the mouth of defendant to say that he was negligent in relying on them, or that, before the contract was executed, facts were brought to his notice that ought to have put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry as to their...