Nelson v. City of Davis, No. 07-16905.
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (9th Circuit) |
Writing for the Court | Thomas |
Citation | 571 F.3d 924 |
Parties | Timothy C. NELSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF DAVIS; James Hyde, Chief of Police, City of Davis; John Wilson, Sergeant; The Regents of the University of California; Joyce Souza; Michael Mason, Sergeant; Bruce Davidson, Sergeant; Fnu Bates, Sergeant; Javier Barragan, Officer; Brandon Jones, Officer; Calvin Chang, Officer; M. Garcia, Officer; Calvin Handy, Chief of Police, Defendants-Appellees. |
Docket Number | No. 07-16905. |
Decision Date | 07 July 2009 |
v.
CITY OF DAVIS; James Hyde, Chief of Police, City of Davis; John Wilson, Sergeant; The Regents of the University of California; Joyce Souza; Michael Mason, Sergeant; Bruce Davidson, Sergeant; Fnu Bates, Sergeant;
[571 F.3d 925]
John L. Burris and Adanté D. Pointer; Law Offices of John L. Burris; Oakland, CA, for the appellant.
J. Scott Smith, Douglas R. Thorn, and John A. Whitesides; Angelo, Kilday & Kilduff; Sacramento, CA, for appellees City of Davis, James Hyde, and John Wilson.
Michael T. Lucey, Don Willenburg, and Mar S. Posard; Gordon & Rees, LLP; San Francisco, CA, for appellees Javier Barragan, Mary Garcia, and Calivin Handy.
Kelli M. Kennaday and Kim Johnston; Wilke, Feury, Hoffelt, Gould & Birney; Sacramento, CA, for appellee Calvin Chang.
[571 F.3d 926]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Morrison C. England, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. CV-05-01193-MCE.
Before: J. CLIFFORD WALLACE, SIDNEY R. THOMAS and JAY S. BYBEE, Circuit Judges.
THOMAS, Circuit Judge:
This appeal presents the question of whether the "sham affidavit" rule precludes the introduction of testimony from other witnesses that is arguably inconsistent with a plaintiff's deposition testimony. Under the circumstances presented by this case, we conclude the doctrine does not extend that far, and we vacate the judgment of the district court and remand for reconsideration.
On the evening of April 16, 2004, 21-year-old University of California, Davis student Timothy Nelson attended a large party at the Sterling Apartment Complex in Davis, California. Police estimated that up to 1000 people were at the party. The party escalated out of control and approximately 30-40 city and school police officers were dispatched to the scene.
The officers formed a skirmish line and attempted to sweep the crowd toward the front of the apartment complex. The officers gave numerous dispersal orders while they moved through the crowd, and multiple officers stated that they were under a constant barrage of thrown bottles while moving through the property, and that many members of the crowd were chanting, yelling, and cursing at them.
Some officers shot pepperballs1 at bottle-throwing students and also at groups of people that did not move when told to disperse. The purpose of shooting the pepperballs was two-fold: (1) to specifically target those partygoers who were throwing bottles at the police; and (2) to create "area denial" or "area saturation" so that the OC would make it uncomfortable for any person to stay in the area.
Nelson and his group of friends eventually left the hallway in which they were standing and entered an outside breeze-way. The officers allegedly warned people in the breezeway that they needed to disperse, and Sgt. John Wilson of the Davis Police Department ordered the pepperball unit to fire when he felt that the students were not dispersing properly. After receiving the order, "[a]ll of the officers lined up. The four officers lined up in a row and pointed their Pepperball units down range[, and t]hey shot into the area of the crowd." Two officers testified that no one in the breezeway was throwing bottles.
During his deposition Nelson testified regarding the period when the police started shooting:
A. What I can recall? We were coming out the doors and I heard shots being fired.
Q. What do you mean you heard shots being fired?
A. I heard the mace bullet of hitting of the windows and I—....
Q. At the moment something impacted your eye what was the position of
your body? Were you standing straight up? Were you making— were you in the process of making some kind of motion?
A. I was just walking out. That's all I remember is walking out and when I saw that, then I got hit.
Q. So you didn't make a motion to dive into the bushes before that?
A. No, it was instantaneous of the sound. The sounds and the feeling was instantaneous. It wasn't like five minutes had passed. It was, boom, right then.
Nelson also presented the deposition testimony of Bridget Collins and Alicia Vittitoe. Collins testified that she was standing outside in front of the breezeway door with a group of friends, "[i]ncluding Tim," when the police opened fire. Alicia Vittitoe testified that Nelson was standing "[w]ith the group" in front of the door in the breezeway when the police started shooting. Thus, while Nelson seemed to indicate that he was not in the breezeway before the police fired, two supporting witnesses testified that he was included in the group upon which the police fired the pepperballs, making him an intended target of the shooting.
Nelson filed his lawsuit in the Eastern District of California and made eleven separate claims for relief. He brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and he brought eight claims for relief based on California state law grounds. Nelson claims that he lost his football scholarship after the injury, suffered temporary blindness and permanent disfigurement, and has undergone a number of corrective surgeries. After the conclusion of discovery, all defendants moved for summary judgment or partial summary judgment.
The district court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed Nelson's claims without hearing oral argument. The district court decided that Nelson was not an intended target of the pepperball unit because "[a]ny inference in that regard that may be drawn from the equivocal testimony of others, however, is nullified by Plaintiff's own clear version of what transpired during the period immediately...
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George v. Edholm, No. 11–57075.
...and the drawing of legitimate inferences from facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Id. (quoting Nelson v. City of Davis, 571 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir.2009)). We also review de novo the district court's ruling on qualified immunity. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir......
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Foster v. City of Indio, No. 17-55167
...only to declarations by the parties, not to declarations by non-party witnesses like Perez and Vallesillo. See Nelson v. City of Davis , 571 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The rationale underlying the sham affidavit rule is that a party ought not be allowed to manufacture a bogus dispute w......
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Cabasug v. Crane Co., Civil No. 12–00313 JMS/BMK.
...case, the Standard Form 171s and statements of other coworkers—is the province of the jury, not the judge. See Nelson v. City of Davis, 571 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir.2009) (“[W]e decline to extend our sham affidavit jurisprudence to preclude the consideration of testimony from third parties th......
-
Soto v. McHugh, CIVIL NO. 13-1507 (GAG)
...further explain Plaintiff's statements from her administrative hearings. Malave , 919 F.Supp.2d at 203 (citing Nelson v. City of Davis , 571 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir.2009) ) (“[t]his doctrine excludes conflicting testimony given by an interested party, but does not bar a party from ‘elaborati......
-
George v. Edholm, 11–57075.
...and the drawing of legitimate inferences from facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.” Id. (quoting Nelson v. City of Davis, 571 F.3d 924, 927 (9th Cir.2009)). We also review de novo the district court's ruling on qualified immunity. Furnace v. Sullivan, 705 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir......
-
Foster v. City of Indio, 17-55167
...only to declarations by the parties, not to declarations by non-party witnesses like Perez and Vallesillo. See Nelson v. City of Davis , 571 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009) ("The rationale underlying the sham affidavit rule is that a party ought not be allowed to manufacture a bogus dispute w......
-
Cabasug v. Crane Co., Civil No. 12–00313 JMS/BMK.
...case, the Standard Form 171s and statements of other coworkers—is the province of the jury, not the judge. See Nelson v. City of Davis, 571 F.3d 924, 929 (9th Cir.2009) (“[W]e decline to extend our sham affidavit jurisprudence to preclude the consideration of testimony from third parties th......
-
Soto v. McHugh, CIVIL NO. 13-1507 (GAG)
...further explain Plaintiff's statements from her administrative hearings. Malave , 919 F.Supp.2d at 203 (citing Nelson v. City of Davis , 571 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir.2009) ) (“[t]his doctrine excludes conflicting testimony given by an interested party, but does not bar a party from ‘elaborati......