Nelson v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 06 June 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. COA05-1052.,COA05-1052. |
| Citation | 630 S.E.2d 221 |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Donald NELSON and Dinah Nelson, Plaintiffs, v. HARTFORD UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Sharpe Home Concepts, Inc. and ARS Merger Inc., Defendants. |
Everett, Gaskins, Hancock & Stevens, LLP, by E.D. Gaskins, Jr., Ashley Matlock, and Michael J. Tadych, Raleigh, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Douglas W. Hanna, Raleigh, for defendant-appellee.
Plaintiffs, Donald and Dinah Nelson, brought this action against their homeowner's insurance carrier, Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company (Hartford), alleging claims for breach of an insurance contract and a violation of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices statute. Hartford answered, denying the allegations of the complaint, and moved to dismiss. The motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. Hartford subsequently moved for summary judgment as to Hartford's remaining claims.
Evidence before the trial court showed that plaintiffs purchased a new home in September 1996. By October 1996, plaintiffs noticed an unusual odor in the house, and by March 1997, they could smell a musty odor in the master bedroom and bathroom which they now know to be mold.
Plaintiffs and Hartford agree the mold in the house had three causes. First, an oversized heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) system was installed in the home during its construction, which failed to remove all of the humidity from the air. Second, in June 1997, plaintiffs noticed the water supply line to their Jacuzzi had a leak. The leak was caused by the homebuilder's plumbing subcontractor, who, while in the process of fixing a mistake in the hot-and cold-water lines, created a leak allowing water to seep from the water connection and wetting the floor and wall between the Jacuzzi and the master and guest bedrooms. The plumbing contractor did not replace the water damaged materials, and did not apply any chemical treatment to the wet area. Third, in late 1998 or early 1999, plaintiffs found wet carpet in their guest bedroom, which was located adjacent to the master bathroom. The plumbing subcontractor found a nail penetrating the shower boot in the master bathroom, allowing water to leak out of the shower stall. The shower boot and a small area of carpet pad were replaced, but the wet carpet, subflooring, and wall between the rooms were not replaced.
Plaintiffs terminated their insurance policy with their previous insurer in early 1999, and Hartford issued its first insurance policy to plaintiffs on 14 May 1999. The policy ran from 14 May 1999 to 14 May 2000, and for another 12-month period upon each renewal. The policy covered losses that occurred during the "policy period" and not otherwise excluded:
SECTIONS I AND II — CONDITIONS
1. Policy Period. This policy applies only to loss in Section I . . ., which occurs during the policy period.
The policy contained an exclusion for mold:
SECTION I — PERILS INSURED AGAINST
. . . We do not, however, insure for loss:
. . .
2. Caused by:
. . .
e. Any of the following:
. . .
(3) Smog, rust or other corrosion, mold, wet or dry rot[.]
The policy also contained an exclusion for faulty workmanship:
SECTION I — EXCLUSIONS
. . .
2. We do not insure for loss to property described in Coverages A and B caused by any of the following.
. . .
c. Faulty, inadequate or defective:
. . .
(2) Design, specifications, workmanship, repair, construction, renovation, remodeling, grading, compaction[.]
Plaintiffs called Hartford and made a mold claim on either 13 June 2001 or 13 September 2001. Although the date of the claim is disputed by the parties, with Hartford providing electronic records in support of the later date, the date is not material. A Hartford adjuster interviewed the plaintiffs on 18 September 2001, and then Hartford had a local engineering firm, Marshall Miller & Associates ("MMA"), inspect the Nelsons' home. MMA spoke to Dinah Nelson, and inspected the home for mold. Plaintiffs did not mention to MMA the water leaks from the shower and Jacuzzi. MMA produced a report, finding evidence of mold on the carpeting, curtains, and floor materials in the vicinity of the HVAC vents. The report concluded the mold conditions were "associated with the operation of the ventilation system and were not associated with some other event." According to the report, the home had an oversized HVAC system which might "short-cycle," causing the house to cool down very quickly and preventing it from extracting sufficient moisture out of the air during the cooling system.
After receiving the MMA report, Hartford denied coverage of the mold claim. In a letter dated 12 October 2001, defendant cited the mold exception and the faulty workmanship exception as the reasons for denial. The letter also expressly reserved Hartford's right to assert other rights or defenses to the claim.
Plaintiffs had the HVAC unit replaced in March 2002, but the mold around the HVAC vents did not immediately diminish. Also in March 2002, plaintiffs made a second claim to Hartford regarding the mold. In making this claim, Dinah Nelson called Hartford and asked whether the water leaks, which she had not previously mentioned to Hartford, could possibly change Hartford's denial of their first claim.
On 16 May 2002, the insurance carrier for the home's general contractor produced a report confirming the presence of mold in the home. The report found several types of mold, and the insurance carrier called plaintiffs and suggested they move out of the house. In late May, plaintiffs moved out.
Hartford sent MMA to conduct a second inspection of plaintiffs' home on 15 May 2002. This inspection was more extensive than the fall 2001 inspection, and included removing carpet and examining the subflooring to look for water damage. MMA produced a report on 17 July 2002, finding mold in the house and concluding that the shower leak and its subsequent repair was the likely cause of the mold, which was then circulated in the house by the HVAC system. Hartford received the report and began its review to determine whether its insurance policy covered the mold claim.
On 5 August 2002, Hartford received a letter from the Nelsons' legal counsel directing Hartford to have no further contact with plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed suit on 6 September 2002 against several defendants, including the general contractor, several subcontractors, and Hartford. Hartford moved to dismiss, which the trial court granted, in part, on 11 October 2004, as to all claims for breach of contract "in which the event or occurrence that gave rise to the claim predates the issuance of the Policy on May 14, 1999." The trial court also granted the motion, in part, as to all claims for breach of contract excluded by the faulty workmanship exclusion in the contract.
Hartford's motion for summary judgment as to plaintiffs' remaining claims was granted. Plaintiffs settled their claims with the other defendants, and now appeal the grant of summary judgment to Hartford.
Hartford has moved to dismiss the appeal, asserting that plaintiffs' assignments of error violate North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(c)(1) because they fail to "state plainly . . . the legal basis upon which error is assigned." Plaintiffs' assignments of error in the record are:
1. The Durham County Superior Court's Order Granting in Part Defendant Hartford's Motion to Dismiss, dated October 11, 2004, and filed on October 14, 2004.
2. The Durham County Superior Court's Order Granting Defendant Hartford's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated March 7, 2005, and filed March 14, 2005.
Defendant contends these assignments of error fail to raise factual or legal issues for appeal, and therefore fail to give notice to defendant and prejudice the case on appeal.
We note that a recent opinion of this Court may appear to state a new rule regarding the sufficiency of an assignment of error to an order of summary judgment. In Hubert Jet Air, LLC v. Triad Aviation, Inc., ___ N.C.App. ___, 628 S.E.2d 806 (2006), the panel dismissed a plaintiff's appeal from an order granting partial summary judgment because it deemed the assignment of error to be insufficient. The assignment of error stated: "The trial court's partial granting of the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Counts 3 through 8." According to the panel, such an assignment of error does not comply with Rule 10 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
A contrary rule, however, is well-established by the precedents of this Court and our Supreme Court. More than twenty years ago, this Court held in Vernon, Vernon, Wooten, Brown & Andrews, P.A. v. Miller, 73 N.C.App. 295, 326 S.E.2d 316 (1985):
We observe first that defendant did not set out, in the record on appeal, any exceptions or specific assignments of error as required by Rule 10(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. We conclude, however, that none is required where, as here, the sole question presented in defendant's brief is whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The appeal from the judgment is itself an exception thereto.
Id. at 297, 326 S.E.2d at 319 (citing West v. Slick, 60 N.C.App. 345, 299 S.E.2d 657 (1983)). Recently, this Court stated:
An appeal from an order granting summary judgment raises only the issues of whether, on the face of the record, there is any genuine issue of material fact, and whether the prevailing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, the notice of appeal suffices as an assignment of error directed to the order of summary judgment.
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