Nelson v. Likins, 4-74 Civ. 236.

• Citation: 389 F. Supp. 1234
• Decision Date: 22 November 1974
• Docket Number: No. 4-74 Civ. 236.,4-74 Civ. 236.
• Parties: Alice Lorraine NELSON et al., Plaintiffs, Winifred Brown et al., Intervening Plaintiffs, v. Vera LIKINS et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

389 F. Supp. 1234

Alice Lorraine NELSON et al., Plaintiffs, Winifred Brown et al., Intervening Plaintiffs, v. Vera LIKINS et al., Defendants.

No. 4-74 Civ. 236.

United States District Court, D. Minnesota, Fourth Division.

November 19, 1974.

On Motion for Temporary Stay November 22, 1974.

Luther A. Granquist, Legal Aid Society, Minneapolis, for plaintiffs & intervening plaintiffs.

Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., State of Minn. by Thomas Fabel, Deputy Atty. Gen., St. Paul, Minn., for Commissioner Likins.

James Bares, Asst. County Atty., Minneapolis, Minn., for defendant members of Hennepin County Welfare Bd.

ORDER AND MEMORANDUM

MILES W. LORD, District Judge.

This matter came before the Court on a motion for a preliminary injunction and a motion for class action status on May 23, 1974. On September 5, 1974, this Court allowed certain individuals to intervene as plaintiffs. The addition of these intervenors did not alter the issues in the original action. The named plaintiffs are a mother and son who receive public assistance benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program. 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. and M.S.A. §§ 256.72-256.87. Living with this family is another son who is too old to receive AFDC benefits but, due to a physical impairment, is receiving benefit under the Supplementary Security Income (SSI) program. 42 U.S. C. § 1381 et seq. (1973 Supp.), Minn. Laws 1974, Chap. 487.

The defendants are state officials who have the statutory responsibility of administering the AFDC program in Minnesota. Vera Likins is the head of the Minnesota Department of Public Welfare (MDPW) while the rest are members of the Hennepin County Welfare Board.

Plaintiffs' specific allegation in these two motions is that the defendants are administering a welfare system, a part of which calls for the classification of AFDC families as "shared households" if they reside with an individual who is not an AFDC recipient but an SSI recipient. This classification lowers the AFDC benefit received. Plaintiffs contend that this is in violation of not only their basic constitutionally protected rights but also a specific federal statute. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24).

The genesis of this complaint lies in the implementation by the State of Minnesota of the "flat grant" welfare system. Basically this changed the method of computing a welfare recipient's benefits from the sum of basic allowances for food, clothing, shelter, personal items, etc. that the recipient had to justify; to an amount based on a table of the "historic average" need for AFDC families of certain sizes and types. This table was the result of a state-wide, statistical survey of the historic average needs of AFDC families.

Part of the "flat grant" system is the "shared" household vs. the "unshared" household differentiation. "Shared" means a group that has AFDC and non-AFDC members; "unshared" means a group made up entirely of AFDC recipients.¹ In general, it can be said that "shared" groups receive lower AFDC benefits than "unshared" groups of like size. The defendants' justification for this, and the explanation for this lower historic average need for the shared household, is economies of scale. For example, if a family of two, both AFDC recipients, lived in a dwelling that rented for $100.00 per month, their individual historic average need for shelter would be $50.00 per month. If these two AFDC recipients lived in a household with a non-AFDC recipient, i. e. "shared," their average need for shelter would be $33.33 ($100.00 ÷ 3).

Plaintiffs claim subject matter jurisdiction in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). While defendants vigorously contest the plaintiffs' constitutional claims, they do not argue that they are either frivolous or devoid of merit. This Court finds them to be arguable at the very least and therefore finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974); Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 93 S.Ct. 854, 35 L.Ed.2d 36 (1973). With this initial jurisdictional prerequisite fulfilled, the theory of pendant jurisdiction outlined in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), allows this Court to reach the statutory question previously mentioned since both claims arise from a common nucleus of operative fact, both would normally be tried at the same time, and to do so would result in substantial judicial economy. Hagans v. Wyman, 415 U.S. 528, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974).

The Court will now turn to the pending motions noting that it is only considering them as they relate to the question of whether or not Minnesota's AFDC program is in accord with 42 U. S.C. § 602(a)(24).

Motion for Preliminary Injunction

It is hornbook law that the following factors must be considered by this Court as it deliberates over the appropriateness of injunctive relief: plaintiffs' probability of success on the merits; immediacy and irreparability of the harm if the injunction is not granted; the harm that will be suffered by the defendants if the preliminary relief is granted; and the effect of the injunction on the public good.

This Court finds that in this particular situation the loss of money to these AFDC families is immediate and irreparable harm. While the loss of money is normally not considered irreparable, this Court must point out that in this case those affected are not the average citizens but rather those who are in the grip of poverty. The loss to them of a certain sum of money each month is much more of an injury than it is to the average individual. And it is this average individual who is the basis for the rule that the loss of money is not considered irreparable harm. When one adds to this the case of Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L. Ed.2d 662 (1974), that holds that the Eleventh Amendment bars the federal courts from ordering "retroactive benefits" in welfare cases and Commissioner's Policy Bulletin #56 which precludes administrative appeals challenging any aspect of the flat grant system (which may preclude state court action in the area, Jenswold v. St. Louis County Welfare Board, 247 Minn. 60, 65-66, 76 N. W.2d 639 (1956)); the irreparability of the harm becomes even more evident.

There will, of course, be harm to the defendants if this Court should grant the relief requested. The immediate harm would be an increase in administrative work to correct the system. This inconvenience cannot and does not outweigh the rights and the needs of AFDC recipients. It alone cannot be considered as dispositive.

Defendants argue that the granting of plaintiffs' requested relief is impossible,² will cause the loss of federal financial participation, will call for increased state funding, or will call for the reintroduction of the old system of grant administration which was prone to error and which would now be subject to H.E.W. fiscal sanctions.

This Court is not persuaded by any of these arguments. The changes that are called for can be implemented within the flat grant system. It seems only to call for the defendants to count the members of a household differently before going to the flat grant table of allowances in calculating the called-for amount of relief. As to the problem of establishing the equivalent of a "non-shared household" grant for a single AFDC recipient, the Court can only say that it is a problem that it expects the experts in the field to solve. The Court cannot solve all problems but it can rely on the expertise and goodwill of those in the State Welfare Department to work out such problems.

There can be no argument that the public good will be served by requiring state agencies to fulfill the statutory mandates of the Congress absent a positive showing to the contrary. Therefore, in this case, this factor and in reality the appropriateness of injunctive relief depends on the factor of probability of success on the merits.

The statute in question, 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(24), requires a state AFDC program to provide that:

If an individual is receiving benefits under Title XVI (the SSI program), then, for the period for which such benefits are received, such individual shall not be regarded as a member of a family for purposes of determining the amount of the benefits of the family under this title and his income and resources shall not be counted as income and resources of a family under this title.

Both sides in this controversy have submitted numerous briefs that look at all possible facets of this problem. But this Court notes that the basic issue of whether or not the statute is being complied with is relatively clear. The named plaintiffs may serve as an example: two AFDC recipients and one SSI recipient in a family or household. If the SSI recipient is to be disregarded as § 602(a)(24) contemplates, then the AFDC amount received by Mrs. Nelson should be the historic average amount needed by two AFDC individuals. But it is not. Mrs. Nelson receives a grant of $170.00 per month. If she and her one son were living alone the grant would be $262.00 per month.

This seems to be a clear violation of the statute. It is explained by the Welfare Department by saying that the reason that two AFDC recipients receive less when they are living with an SSI recipient than when they are living alone is that there are economies of scale involved. The rent example mentioned previously is such an economy. But inherent in that explanation is the fact that the non-AFDC recipient must be being considered in some way. If there were no consideration given, the two AFDC recipients would still need $50.00 per month for rent; not $33.33. The need is the same unless you give some consideration (i. e., that he can contribute) to the SSI recipient, and that is prohibited.

The Court is quick to point out that a slavish following of this principle could cause inequities and harm. Two AFDC recipients living...